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I am studying why European nations have created new sub-regional Multinational 
Defence Co-operations (MDCs) in the last couple of years, instead of using the 
existing NATO and EU institutional frameworks for military collaboration. By 
applying the multiple-case study research method elaborated by Robert K. Yin, I 
investigated three cases: the Central European Defence Co-operation, the British-
French ‘Lancaster House Treaties’ and the Nordic Defence Co-operation. In this 
framework I tested three rival explanations using the method of pattern matching, 
which means that I generated predicted patterns regarding the studied phenomena and 
compared them to empirically based patterns. The three rival explanations I compared 
regarding the creation of new sub-regional MDCs were 1) the lack of progress on 
pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation 2) the impacts of the financial crisis, 
3) different emerging shared threat perceptions of European states. This research 
framework provided the opportunity to close certain explanations out, and helped to 
develop the empirically based patterns concerning every case that could convincingly 
explain the three studied cases individually. These empirically based patterns helped 
to develop a generic framework that describes the circumstances, which encouraged 
the launch of the studied sub-regional MDCs. The thesis concludes that two main 
structural and two main situational factors played the most significant roles in the 
creation of the MDCs. The structural factors are ‘previous defence collaborations 
between the participating states’ and ‘similar perception about certain defence related 
EU/NATO processes and initiatives’. The situational factors are ‘strong leadership of 
a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good interpersonal chemistry among 
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CHAPTER 1.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the dynamically evolving processes regarding 
European security and defence have generated a great deal of research on the field of 
international security.
1
 This is understandable, if we take into consideration that after 
the fall of the Soviet Union Europeans found themselves in a fundamentally 
transformed strategic environment, where maybe for the first time in history, they did 
not have to fear traditional military threat in the near future. This has been epitomised 
by NATO’s generation of a succession of strategic concepts.2 Furthermore, Europeans 
also had to learn to live in a unipolar world, where the sole superpower – the United 
States – was and is their ally, while other security concerns that had not received 
much attention earlier gained more significance.
3
 The consequences of these 
processes have triggered overarching changes in the European military affairs as 
well.
4
 According to Anthony King, this ‘changing nature of warfare’ in Europe has 
been examined by scholars who have studied ‘national, EU and NATO security and 
defence policy and […] have explored the institutional transformation of the armed 
forces themselves at national, EU and NATO levels.’5 This focus on the national and 
                                                 
1
 Inter alia: Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies In 
The Post-Cold War Era (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Andrew M. Dorman and Adrian 
Treacher, European Security: An Introduction to Security Issues in Post-Cold War Europe (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1995); Martin A. Smith, NATO in the first decade after the Cold War (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2000).; Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, Defending Europe: the EU, 
NATO, and the quest for European autonomy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).; Sven Biscop 
and Jo Coelmont, Europe, strategy and armed forces: the making of a distinctive power (Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2013). 
2
 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Brussels, NATO, 1991.; The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 
Washington DC, 1999.; Active Engagement, Modern Defence – Strategic Concept for the Defence and 
Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Lisbon, 2010 
3
 Inter alia: Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International 
Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 44-79, doi:10.2307/2539097.; Birthe Hansen, Peter Toft, and Anders Wivel, 
Security strategies and American world order: Lost power (London: Routledge, 2009).; Cristopher 
Layne, “The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power: The Paradoxes of American Hegemony,” in 
Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael 
Fortmann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2004), 103-126. 
4
 David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, Mind the gap: promoting a 
transatlantic revolution in military affairs (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 
1999).; Andrew M. Dorman, M. L. R. Smith, and Matthew Uttley, The changing face of military 
power: joint warfare in an expeditionary era (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).; Gordon Adams and Guy 
Ben-Ari, Transforming European militaries: coalition operations and the technology gap (London: 
Routledge, 2006).; Anthony King, The transformation of Europe's armed forces: from the Rhine to 
Afghanistan (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
5
 King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, p. 5. 
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international institutional level is also true in regard to the much narrower research 
topic of this thesis - Multinational Defence Co-operation (MDC) in Europe. 
MDC has been defined by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence as ‘any 
arrangement where two or more nations work together to enhance military 
capabilities. This can include exchanges and liaison, training and exercising, common 
doctrine, collaborative equipment procurement, or multinational formations.’6 Such 
initiatives in the framework of NATO and EU have been studied widely for the last 
twenty five years. However, ‘traditional’ bilateral and sub-regional defence 
collaboration that was established outside the NATO and EU frameworks has 
received much less academic attention, despite the fact that many – like the Benelux, 
Baltic, Visegrad Four, Nordic, Anglo-French, Central European etc. – have emerged 
for the last two decades. The thesis attempts to fill this gap in the literature by 
analysing three cases: the Central European Defence Co-operation, the British-French 
‘Lancaster House Treaties’ and the Nordic Defence Co-operation. These sub-regional 
MDCs provide a good opportunity to study current processes concerning military co-
operation in Europe, as all of them have been established at the end of the 2000s and 
at the beginning of the 2010s, and their participating states have effectively begun to 
tighten their defence co-operation on an unprecedented and comprehensive scale, 
which was not typical for earlier non NATO/EU MDCs. 
Interestingly, these states co-operate with each other irrespective of whether 
they are members of the same defence related organisation(s) (NATO, EU). In other 
words, currently many European countries only partly use the NATO and EU 
frameworks to intensify their multinational defence co-operation and they engage 
with partners on a different basis. This is surprising, because these two organisations 
have been in the focal point of military co-operation in Europe since the end of the 
Cold War. Although NATO and EU provide many robust mechanisms for defence co-
operation and flexible solutions for non-member states to participate in their projects 
as well, the question emerges why the participating states of Nordic Defence Co-
operation, British-French security treaties and the Central European Defence Co-
operation prefer sub-regional solutions over the frameworks of NATO and/or EU in 
certain cases. Along these lines the thesis attempts to answer the following research 
questions: 
                                                 
6
 Ministry of Defence, Multinational Defence Co-operation, Policy Paper, Paper No. 2, (London: 
Directorate of Corporate Communications), 2001. 2.  
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 Why have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs 
in recent years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework 
of NATO and EU? 
 What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European 
states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than 
collaborate within NATO and EU? 
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CHAPTER 2.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter will first provide a background to developments in European defence co-
operation and then considers how MDCs have been examined within the academic 
literature to-date. It suggests that the literature can be sub-divided into four themes. 
First, one part of the literature highlights the creation of multinational mainly land 
formations. Secondly, scholars have studied collaborative equipment procurement 
concentrating on increasing European co-operation and the changing nature of 
transatlantic armament relations. Thirdly, the literature has also focused on the 
different aspects of co-operation on multinational capability development like the 
concept of pooling and sharing, which among others has been manifested in the 
concept of Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO) and the Ghent Process in the 
EU, and in the Smart Defence initiative in the framework of NATO.
7
 Fourthly, the 
chapter considers the literature on sub-regional MDCs and concludes that it has not 
been part of the major scientific debates and their thorough, comprehensive and 
comparative study has not been made either. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Following the fall of the Iron Curtain, circumstances supported military co-operation 
in Europe. Thanks to the end of the Cold War, governments could redefine their 
priorities and have been spending proportionately less on defence than before and 
more to fulfil social needs and sustain economic growth.
8
 In the meantime, European 
countries needed to adapt their armed forces to the emerging post-cold war security 
environment. Previously, on the European continent everyone prepared for a large-
scale conventional war with mass conscript armies trained to stop and repel territorial 
aggression. However, these times have passed and the conflicts of the 1990s – 
especially the NATO intervention in Kosovo – highlighted that European armed 
forces were not prepared for expeditionary warfare.
9
 Accordingly, while there was a 
                                                 
7
 Giovanni Faleg and Alessandro Giovannini, The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence - 
Making a virtue of necessity?, CEPS Special Report (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 
2012). 
8
 Hamid Reza. Davoodi, Military spending, the peace dividend, and fiscal adjustment (Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department, 1999). 
9
 Andrew M. Dorman, European adaptation to expeditionary warfare: implications for the U.S. Army 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002). 3; 14-15. 
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need for restructuring the European armed forces to meet the requirements of the new 
era, governments did not provide extra funds for it but rather decreased the defence 
expenditures considerably. This resulted in massive force reductions, and most of the 
European NATO countries cut their military personnel by 25-50 per cent over the 
1990s.
10
 It was not only necessary because of the defence budget cuts, but it was also 
needed to channel resources for modernization and transition from conscripts to 
professional armed forces. The latter was crucial, because professional troops are 
more prepared and equipped for expeditionary operations, and they are 
understandably much more expensive as well. These processes and circumstances 
provided a solid basis for multinational defence co-operation. 
During most of the 1990s, the emphasis was mostly on the creation of 
multinational land forces. The Alliance laid down the guidelines of its new force 
posture and the characteristics of its future forces in the 1991 Strategic Concept.
11
 In 
this manner it also determined the main directions of defence co-operation in Europe 
for the next decade. According to the document, even though the size and readiness of 
Allies’ forces was to be reduced and the concept of forward defence to be abandoned, 
the Alliance would possess ‘a limited but militarily significant proportion’ of 
immediate and rapid reaction elements to be able to respond quickly and flexibly to 
the ‘multi-directional’ risks of the new era. Besides these reaction troops, NATO’s 
conventional forces would be made up of the main defence forces and the 
augmentation forces, in addition the document supported strongly the creation of 
multinational forces.
12
 Thus, many bi- and multinational corps were created to ensure 
the ability of the Alliance to conduct Article 5 operations after the Cold War. Parallel 
with this, NATO also adopted crisis management to its security agenda, and 
developed the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept to have a tool for such 
operations outside NATO’s territory. According to the concept, CJTF was a 
‘deployable multinational, multiservice task force generated for and tailored [...] to 
military operations not involving the defence of the Alliance territory’.13 Thus, CJTF 
                                                 
10
 NATO. Public Diplomacy Division. ”Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence.” 








 NATO, “The Combined Joint Task Force Concept.” 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/pres-eng/16cjtf.pdf 
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was intended to be flexible and modular; it could have been augmented and composed 
from staff and force elements according to the requirements of the particular mission. 
This provided the possibility to create ‘coalitions of the willing’ which could have 
been led either by NATO or Western European Union (WEU), and also Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) members could have participated in CJTFs.  
The experience of post-Cold War military conflicts in the 1990s revealed that 
as a consequence of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),
14
 the assessment of 
military power based on quantitative measurements became inadequate, and the focus 
on capabilities is more important than on forces.
15
 Namely, the force approach has 
been changed by the capability approach, which concentrates not exclusively on the 
number of troops and assets, but mostly on the military effects which can be achieved 
by a means of action. The Gulf War and the interventions on the Balkans underlined 
that Europe lacked crucial capabilities necessary to deploy and sustain forces in 
operations abroad using precision weapons and the most advanced command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
technologies. Thus, in the end of the 1990s both NATO and EU initiated their own 
defence capability development programmes to overcome these shortfalls, mostly 
building on the capability approach instead of the force approach. 
NATO’s heads of state and government accepted the Defence Capabilities 
Initiative (DCI) at the Washington Summit in 1999 to improve the ability of member 
states to take part effectively in crisis management operations outside of the Atlantic 
Alliance’s area.16 DCI identified 59 shortfall areas and categorized them into five 
groups as deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; survivability; 
consultation, command and control and effective engagement. In the same year, the 
European Union established the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and 
member states agreed in the Helsinki Summit in 1999
17
 to establish a 50-60 000 
strong military force by 2003 capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks
18
 and 
capable to sustain itself for at least one year. This was called the Helsinki Headline 
                                                 
14
 Jeffrey Collins and Andrew Futter, Reassessing the revolution in military affairs: transformation, 
evolution and lessons learnt (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
15
 Jean-Pierre Maulny and Fabio Liberti, Pooling of EU member states assets in the implementation of 
ESDP (Brussels: European Parliament, 2008). 4-5. 
16
  NATO. ”Defence Capabilities Initiative”, News Release, April 25, 1999 
17
 Council of the European Union, Presidency conclusions, Helsinki, 10–11 December 1999, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm 
18
 Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking. 
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Goal (HHG). After the assessment of the commitments made by member states to 
meet this goal, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) found shortfalls almost in 
the same capability areas as NATO’s DCI did. The EU launched the European 
Capability Action Plan (ECAP)
19
 to obtain the missing capabilities from its member 
states by voluntary contributions on national and also multinational basis. However, 
both initiatives faced the same problem: European states did not spend enough 
sources on defence capability development.
20
 
Based on the lessons learnt from the earlier initiatives, NATO launched the 
NATO Response Force (NRF) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) at the 
2002 Summit in Prague.
21
 With the creation of the NRF, NATO intended to establish 
‘a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, 
including land, sea and air elements ready to react quickly whenever needed.’22 Two 
main considerations were behind the NRF concept. First, NATO needed a tool to be 
able to provide rapid and substantial military response to emerging crisis, thus, the 
initial concept was that the NRF would contain 20-25,000 troops to be deployed after 
five days’ notice and engaged in combat operations after deployment. Second, NRF 
was deemed a crucial facilitator of capability transformation especially for European 
Allies by common training, introducing new doctrines and new technologies.
23
 PCC 
covered identical shortfall areas as DCI, but PCC was more focused and also provided 
the possibility to assess and measure easier the progress of member states on the 
agreed capability development goals. Furthermore, PCC was intended to foster 
multinational defence co-operation by facilitating pooling of resources and role 
specialization among Allies.
24
 Even though PCC became more successful than DCI, it 
could not realize every capability target, and the Alliance decided to concentrate on 
specific ‘high priority capability development areas’ of the Comprehensive Political 
Guidance (CPG). The CPG was accepted at the Riga Summit in 2006, and gave 
further relevance and almost absolute priority to expeditionary capabilities in 
                                                 
19
 Presidency Conclusion, European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14-15 December 2001 
20
 Gerrard Quille, “The impact of EU capability targets and operational demands on defence concepts 
and planning” in Alyson Bailes, Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius, eds, The Nordic countries and the 
European Security and Defence Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 126-127. 
21
 Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 




 Sten Rynning, ”A new military ethos? Nato’s response force,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 3, 
no. 1 (2005): 6, doi:10.1080/14794010508656814. 
24




 The Lisbon Capabilities Package – accepted at the 2010 Summit in Lisbon – 
determined the direction of the Alliance’s capability development focusing on the 
need of NATO’s Afghan mission and other long existing critical shortfall areas.26 
In the same time, the European Union developed the EU Battlegroup concept 
and established the European Defence Agency (EDA). Although the European 
Council declared the Helsinki Headline Goal fulfilled in 2004, it was only a virtual 
achievement.
27
 Officially it was not admitted, but the military ambition of the EU was 
lowered significantly by the EU Battlegroup concept that was launched in the 
framework of a new process called Headline Goal 2010 (HG2010). EU Battlegroups 
were defined as battalion-sized forces (1500 troops) able to be deployed in 15 days 




According to the concept, two Battlegroups were to be available at any 
particular point in the time with individual battlegroups following a six month 
rotation. Battlegroups – as NRF in the Atlantic Alliance – were deemed the driving 
force of multinational military co-operation especially on training and 
interoperability, because most of the member states could not establish one 
Battlegroup alone, thus many of them had to collaborate on it. EDA was intended to 
be the catalyst of European defence co-operation on crisis management capabilities by 
developing capabilities, promoting co-operation on research and technology (R&T) 
and armaments and also fostering competitive European Defence Equipment 
Market.
29
 EDA, together with the EU Military Committee (EUMC), played a key role 
in elaborating the Capability Development Plan (CDP) in 2008, which defined ‘future 
capability needs from the short to longer term’.30  
More recently the Lisbon Treaty provided the opportunity for the creation of 
Permanent Structured Co-operation in defence for ‘those [European Union] Member 
                                                 
25
  NATO, “Comprehensive Political Guidance”, November 29, 2006. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_56425.htm. 
26
 Lisbon Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
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States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more 
binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding 
missions.’ 31  The launching of PESCO would require a qualified majority in the 
European Union; thereafter the participating states of the co-operation could set 
criteria regarding the participation in the mechanism, where the EDA would play a 
significant role.
32
 Throughout the years the concept about PESCO’s exclusiveness has 
eroded and disagreements have emerged concerning its implementation as well, thus 
PESCO has not been established yet.  
Because of the disagreements among European states regarding PESCO’s 
realization, the EU began to focus on more practical approaches of ‘pooling’ of 
capabilities to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis. Thus, EU defence ministers 
put the concept of Pooling & Sharing (P&S) to the top of the agenda of EU defence 
policy at their meeting in Ghent in September 2010.
33
 To facilitate the conceptual 
framework of P&S Germany and Sweden suggested that EU member states should 
categorize their military capabilities based on the level of sovereignty they want to 
keep regarding their individual capabilities.
34
 For this process the following three 
categories were offered: 1) capabilities ‘maintained on a strictly national level’; 2) 
capabilities to be pooled that do not ‘create too strong dependencies’ in the case of co-
operation; 3) ‘capabilities and support structures where mutual dependency and 
reliance upon European partners is acceptable in an international role- and task-
sharing framework’.35 During 2011, EU member states finished this categorization 
and indicated which capabilities they would be willing to co-operate on. At the 
Munich Security Conference in February 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen launched a very similar initiative to the Ghent Process in NATO, 
called ‘Smart Defence’.36 According to Rasmussen, ‘Smart defense is about building 
security for less money by working together and being more flexible’.37 The concept 
has three main elements: prioritization means ‘aligning national capability priorities’ 
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more with NATO’s capability goals, specialization aims at coordinating defence 
budget cuts in an organized manner in order to achieve ‘specialization by design’ and 
avoid the usual way of ‘specialization by default’ and finally co-operation is basically 
pooling and sharing of capabilities.
38
  
We can see that the most robust MDCs have emerged in the framework of 
NATO and EU until the early 2010s. It is understandable, because they are the 
organisations, which can provide the forum for Europe wide defence collaboration. 
Accordingly, this relevance of NATO and EU concerning MDCs has also been 
reflected in the literature. The following sections show this phenomenon and 
demonstrate that the literature of MDCs has focused on the topics of multinational 
forces, collaborative equipment procurement, multinational capability development 
and has dealt much less with the sub-regional MDCs. 
 
MULTINATIONAL FORCES 
Moskos, Allen and Segal highlight that one of the main characteristics of post-Cold 
War armed forces is their ‘internationalization’ brought about the creation of many 
multinational forces since the beginning of the 1990s.
39
 This is generally a new 
phenomenon compared to earlier periods although there are a few examples such as 
the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious brigade and the Franco-German brigade. During the 
Cold War the NATO countries coordinated their forces with individual nation corps 
committed to a NATO Army Group headquarters. With the end of the Cold War 
multinational formations began to proliferate, and nowadays even a battalion-sized 
unit may contain elements from different countries. According to Anthony King, this 
process was primarily commenced by the decreasing financial resources allocated to 
defence in Europe that made the concentration and transnationalization of Europe’s 
armed forces necessary.
40
 However, the financial pressure on defence budgets could 
not have triggered this process alone. Fréderic Mérand argues that the 
internationalization of armed forces could take place in Europe thanks to spreading 
the ‘model of the culturally interoperable professional soldier’, which took root 
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through the socialization of thousands of officers in the multinational organizations of 
NATO during the Cold War.
41
 
The literature regarding multinational forces has focused mostly on four main 
topics. The NATO multinational corps and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
concept was the centre of scholarly interest in the 1990s,
42
 and the EU Battlegroups 
and the NATO Response Force (NRF) marked the research on multinational forces in 
the 2000s.
43
 It was typical that when a new type of multinational force was invented, 
initially descriptive and policy related articles were published about the topic (see 
later). The more theoretical and conceptual pieces regarding the particular type of 
force appeared several years later and when other new concepts emerged the research 
concerning the older concepts went out of fashion. Thus, big theoretical debates were 
rarely applied to multinational forces. 
The development of multinational corps began in the beginning of the 1990s, 
and two multinational corps were in the focus of research of that time; the Allied 
Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the Euro-Corps.
44
 While the 
British-led ARRC was deemed as an ‘Atlanticist’ project, the Franco-German Euro-
Corps was seen as a controversial ‘Europeanist’ enterprise emerging outside the 
framework of the Alliance to undermine NATO and US presence in Europe. Not 
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surprisingly some British analysts called it a ‘Frankenstein’s Corps’.45 However, the 
debate was eased after European leaders agreed that the Western European Union 
(WEU) would represent the European Security Defence Identity (ESDI) of the 
Alliance, thus the Euro-Corps became available to NATO as well. According to 
George Stein, both the Euro-Corps and the ARRC were rather political projects, thus 
he questioned their potential military usefulness. Stein argued that the intended 
capabilities of these two multinational corps did not ‘have any reasonable relationship 
to any possible military use’, and without appropriate power projection capabilities 
their role was not clear in the emerging European security architecture.
46
 He also 
pointed out that the establishment of multinational forces often served symbolism 
rather than military purposes.
47
  
In accordance with Stein, many scholars perceived the political aspects of the 
creation of multinational formations in general and also in terms of NATO. For 
instance, Robert H. Palin clearly stated that ‘multinational forces are instruments of 
differing foreign policies not only in a military sense, but in the political interplay 
between nations. They are used to establish national status and credibility, and 
influence allies’ perceptions of each other.’48 Martin A. Smith highlighted that in the 
beginning of the 1990s NATO member states were primarily interested in saving 
money by restructuring their forces. Thus, NATO planners feared that unilateral cuts 
and withdrawal of NATO commitments that could result in the collapse of NATO’s 
force structure. However, emphasising the necessity of multinational forces and the 
need of greater military integration helped to save NATO’s structures from the 
disintegration by making it politically acceptable for member states.
49
  
At the same time, the creation of multinational corps caused many problems 
regarding the operational effectiveness of these land formations. John Whitford and 
Thomas-Durell Young pointed out that although NATO supported the creation of 
multinational forces, the commanders of multinational formations did not have the 
same authorities over their subordinate troops as national commanders had, especially 
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 Namely, ‘NATO political authorities have created multinational 
“corps commanders” in name only’, 51  thus Whitford and Young suggested the 
harmonization of regulations and delegation of more command authority to 
commanders.
52
 In the end of the decade, Young also noted that almost 10 years after 
multinational land formations began to appear and Allies had declared six 
multinational corps and four multinational divisions to NATO, it became clear that 
multinational land force structures were ‘not well suited to meet Allied Strategy’.53  
The other major issue regarding multinational forces in Europe in the 1990s 
was the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The debate over the CJTF 
concept was perceived by many scholars in the context of NATO, WEU and ESDI.
54
 
Among others, Nora Bensahel proved that the CJTF concept ended NATO’s 
existential crisis of the 1990s by changing the terms of the debate about European 
security.
55
 The CJTF concept was a compromise which placated Europeanists – 
especially France – who originally preferred a strong WEU instead of NATO. She 
highlighted that the debate between Europeanists and Atlanticists about ‘whether 
NATO should exist’ and ‘should NATO have a role in post-Cold War Europe at all’ 
changed by the CJTF concept to ‘how the new role should be constructed’. 56 
Alexander Moens claimed that in the second half of the 1990s a Gordian knot existed 
in the European security architecture, but the CJTF could not cut that. The Gordian 
knot was that France wanted a strong European defence identity within a ‘robustly 
European’ Alliance. However, the US involvement in this NATO would have been 
much smaller resulting in much less NATO capability for out of area operations. Up 
until this point the United States remained heavily involved in European defence 
issues, France was not interested in following NATO’s dynamic. Thus, Paris wanted 
to develop a second command chain in NATO for CJTFs, where the US would have 
had less influence. Furthermore, because the Alliance agreed to assist WEU-led 
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operations with NATO’s assets, France did not see why ESDI should be ‘locked’ into 
NATO’s command structure.57  
Understandably, military experts emphasized the military aspects of the CJTF 
initiative. According to US Army Lieutenant Colonel Charles Barry, the CJTF 
concept was not only unique and ‘unprecedented in military doctrine’, but it provided 
a tool for the Alliance to be capable to conduct ‘out of area’ operations, which 
ensured NATO’s relevancy for the future.58 At the same time, he also pointed out the 
main difficulties concluding that ‘there are formidable problems to solve before the 
concept’s minimum requirements are met’. 59  He highlighted the lack of political 
consensus concerning the operational concept for CJTF Command and Control (C2) 
among Allies and the differences between the United States and France on the level of 
political control in CJTF operations and the support role of NATO commanders 
during the missions lead by the WEU. As far as operational issues were concerned, he 
argued that the biggest problems layed in the areas of logistical support and 
communication, which stemmed from the ‘out of area’ nature of CJTF. However, in 
the final analysis, he stated that the CJTF initiative was worth making work because it 
could have been the answer to the major dilemmas – the utility of NATO, pulling 
closer the former communist countries to NATO, strengthening the ESDI – that 
emerged for the Alliance after the Cold War.
60
 In contrast to Barry, US Army 
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Cooke harshly criticized the CJTF concept, arguing that 
it ‘has too many moving parts for it to be a workable option for a political entity such 
as NATO.’61 Cooke described the difficulties regarding the process of augmentation, 
the potential incompatibility of equipments used in a multinational mission, the 
national political agendas of member states which could hinder the augmentation of 
forces and finally the problem of residual capabilities in NATO HQs during a CJTF 
operation. He suggested that the ‘lead nation’ concept could be the ‘best and simplest 
solution’ for out of area missions, because it does not have to face the problems 
mentioned above, and thus it ‘could provide the rapid crisis response capability 
NATO lacks’.62 
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During the 2000s most scholarly attention in regard to multinational forces 
was paid to the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the EU Battlegroups.
63
 Besides 
NRF the Alliance also created more NATO Rapid Deployment Corps similarly to 
ARRC, but this development has been barely studied.
64
 The NRF concept was 
proposed by Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler in  Survival in 2002.
 65
 They argued 
that the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) accepted at the Washington Summit in 
1999 to improve the capabilities of member states in order to take part effectively in 
out-of-area operations could not bring the expected results. According to them, DCI 
was too comprehensive and lacked ‘clear goals and concrete requirements.’ 66  In 
addition, capabilities as such were too abstract to appeal for politicians. However, a 
‘small, elite, mobile expeditionary force’, 67  which the authors called NATO 
Spearhead Response Force in their article, could solve these problems. According to 
them, it would provide the tool for Europeans to participate in demanding missions 
outside NATO’s territory relatively cheaply and quickly, as Europeans possessed 
most of the assets necessary for the development of this force, and could foster the 
transformation of the armed forces as well.
68
 
While some scholars have analysed NRF’s implementation, operational 
potential and its impact on the transformation of NATO forces,
69
 others have studied 
the issue from a conceptual viewpoint. Sten Rynning investigate the evolution of NRF 
in order to shed light upon whether Europeans wanted to continue to ‘emulate’ the US 
type of warfare characterized by concepts of jointness and expeditionary war as they 
did in the 1990s, and whether they want to begin to create a ‘European way of war’. 
Rynning’s conclusion is that Europeans in general are willing to copy the US model 
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of war, because they have actively supported the development of NRF based on 
American principles, but he also identifies some controversial issues (e.g. operational 
flexibility, question of planning authority) where Europeans are ambivalent.
70
 Jens 
Ringmose holds the view that despite NRF has played a crucial role in the 
transformation of NATO forces, the lack of troop commitments and the debate about 
NRF’s operational role made it a ‘qualified failure’. He points out that every member 
state perceives the Alliance’s goals differently, and this ‘strategic confusion’ has been 
mirrored in the development of NRF as well, which hindered its advancement. 
Furthermore, he insists that only political face-saving rescued the NRF, because many 
did not see its military potential after the troop commitments of Allies had not 
reached the appropriate level. Despite these results, Ringmose argues that the ‘criteria 
for success have been, somewhat creatively, redefined’ regarding NRF, thus, probably 
it will not be seen as a failure.
71
 
Similarly to the NRF, a significant part of the literature concerning the EU 
Battlegroups analyses strategic, operational and practical questions from policy 
related aspects.
72
 In contrast with this track, academic research often uses case studies 
comparing the approaches of two EU member states on EU Battlegroups, while such 
research also touches upon the question ‘Why EU Battlegroups have not been used 
yet?’ Wade Jacoby and Christopher Jones study the transformational impact of EU 
Battlegroups on the armed forces of two smaller member states; the Czech Republic 
and Sweden.
73
 They reveal that neutral Sweden has shown a much greater willingness 
to adapt the EU Battlegroup concept than the Czech Republic, whose defence policy – 
as a NATO member – should be closer to expeditionary warfare, and thus to the 
concept of EU Battlegroup. Jacoby and Jones argue that the main reason of this 
phenomenon is that the Battlegroup concept fits much better to the already ongoing 
national defence reforms in Sweden than in the Czech Republic. Namely, Sweden 
redefined its strategic concepts after the Cold War and shifted its military doctrine 
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from territorial defence to rapid deployment in order to be able to participate in 
international operations to improve her international role. At the same time, thanks to 
the security guarantees what NATO membership provides, the Czech Republic could 
continuously decrease its defence budget and has mostly been focusing on developing 
niche capabilities and providing ‘policy loyalty’ to NATO, instead of executing a 
much more expensive comprehensive military reform. Furthermore, in regard to the 
question of deployment of Battlegroups the authors suggest that the real problem is 
not on the supply but on the demand side, because European leaders have not really 
needed such capability yet, and could use more suitable alternatives to different 
operations. 
Laura Chappell compares the cases of Germany and Poland regarding the 
development of EU Battlegroups using the concept of strategic culture.
 74
 She points 
out that while the two countries share a regional outlook rather than a global one, their 
strategic cultures are different in many aspects. With regard to Germany, rejection of 
nationalism and the ‘culture of restraint on the use of military’ are the main 
characteristics of their strategic culture that lead to the German ‘reflexive 
multilateralism’ which respects and uses multilateral frameworks in international 
relations. Contrarily, Poland’s strategic culture contains an instinct Atlanticist view, 
the self-perception of a reliable ally, the want for a voice in European affairs and 
scepticism towards those multilateral organisations whose members build on different 
values, like the United Nations Security Council. Chappell argues that despite these 
differences the national strategic cultures of the studied countries have been 
converging regarding the Battlegroup concept, but the most important element 
whether a Battlegroup in a certain case was used, is still based on the national 
interests of particular participating states of the Battlegroup. Ludovica Marchi 
Balossi-Restelli draws similar conclusion studying the case when the United Nations 
asked for EU military support in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008, but the 
EU did not send Battlegroups despite a German-led and a British Battlegroup being 
on stand by that year. She claims that both Germany and the United Kingdom 
provided ‘a number of very good reasons and justification for non-deployment’ – 
economic constraints, shortfalls in capabilities, problems with troop availability and 
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strategic planning etc, while ‘their lack of political willingness to deploy was the main 
cause for inaction.’75 
 
COLLABORATIVE EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT  
According to Mark Lorell and Julia Lowell, three types of international weapons 
procurement collaboration exist: 1) reciprocal trade happens when countries agree to 
procure each others’ products, 2) co-operative production (coproduction) occurs 
when a) one country develops a product and produces it jointly with its partner or b) 
one country produces a product developed by its partner country under license 
agreement, while 3) codevelopment is the case when countries jointly develop and 
produce a weapon system.
76
 This type of co-operation is different from the previously 
introduced ‘multinational forces’, because while collaborative equipment 
procurement projects had already proliferated in Europe during the Cold War, the 
creation of multinational forces have emerged only after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Thus, not surprisingly, collaborative equipment procurement has a very rich literature 
both in the policy and academic domains. Since the early 1990s most works regarding 
collaborative equipment procurement have been dominated by the different aspects of 
the emerging European armament co-operation and the transatlantic defence industrial 
relations. 
In the early 1990s most scholars and policy makers attempted to find the right 
ways in regard to collaborative equipment procurement in the new strategic 
environment.
77
 Andrew Moravcsik, among others, studied the characteristics of the 
internationalization of European defence industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
78
 
Moravcsik’s article is still relevant not only because it was written just after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and thus provides an insight to those topics that concerned scholars 
that time, but it touches upon almost every relevant issue (free-market and juste 
retour, transatlantic relations, European procurement agency etc.) concerning 
collaborative equipment procurement which characterized the literature for the next 
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two decades. He notes that as the modern weapon systems became more and more 
sophisticated, the European defence industry found itself in crisis, and two main 
concepts were circulating designed to be able to boost European defence industry. 
The first one deemed that ‘the application of free-market principles would introduce 
competition […] thereby promising, […] increased efficiency and rationalization 
trough greater economic of scale.’79 However, Moravcsik points out that the defence 
market has never been functioning purely along free-market principles, and the usage 
of this principle could be highly problematic, especially because not only economic 
but also military and political reasons are taken into consideration. The second one, 
the juste retour principle, guarantees that every participating nation of the given 
armament co-operation develops and produces their share of the programme equal to 
their share of weapons being procured as part of the project. This method requires 
substantial amount of coordination and negotiation to proportionately distribute the 
different work phases among nations participating in a project. Namely, ‘juste retour 
works like a cartel, in which the participants divide the market share between them.’80 
However, juste retour has been criticized for preventing competition and causing 
delays and cost overruns, currently the mostly cited examples for this are the cases of 
the A400M military transport aircraft and the Eurofighter Typhoon multirole fighter 
jets, but Moravcsik argues that these views are not supported by adequate statistical 
data. 
Moravcsik also suggests that nations should find a balance between these two 
principles and outlines a model for it. According to his concept, juste retour based co-
development should be used only for the most expensive weapon systems (aircrafts, 
helicopters, large missiles etc.), and the free-market principle should be applied 
regarding lower cost products (small arms, small transport planes, minor aerospace 
items etc.). Between these two sides (like in the cases of tanks, electronics, radar and 
avionics systems etc.) multinational consortia should compete with each other, where 
every consortia would include companies from the participating countries of the 
programme, thus in these cases the juste retour and free-market principles would be 
mixed. Moravcsik also touches the issue of transatlantic trade, which – in his view – 
is not developing appropriately due to protectionist U.S. policies. Despite this 
phenomenon, he warns against developing a protectionist European defence industrial 
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policy, because it could be expensive and could also cause retaliation from the United 
States. Furthermore, Moravcsik does not recommend the establishment of a European 
armaments procurement agency either, because historical experience shows that 
similar organizations could only provide an environment for voluntary collaboration 
which does not necessary has an added value.
81
 
One of the recurring topics of the post-Cold War literature concerning 
collaborative defence procurement has been transatlantic armament relations. The 
debate of the mid 1990s was triggered by Ethan B. Kaptstein’s 1994 article in Foreign 
Affairs, where he argued that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States 
had found itself in a monopolistic position on the armaments market which the U.S. 
was to exploit and thus ‘Washington’s rational for engaging in international arms 
collaboration has disappeared’.82 He claims that US monopoly is good for the world 
economy, because her allies can abandon their inefficient weapons production 
capabilities and invest resources into their more competitive industries. Kapstein 
points out that the United States produces the most advanced military technologies, 
thus other arms producing countries with smaller domestic markets and decreasing 
defence budgets, coupled with the ever increasing cost of weapon systems will not 
have a real chance to catch with the US. He highlights that these states will not be 
able to achieve the appropriately long production runs of modern weaponry to 
decrease their unit costs by export sales either, because the shrinking export market 
had begun to be dominated by US products. 
Jens van Scherpenberg suggests that US monopoly in the defence industry and 
her technological lead in dual-use industries can have a positive spill-over effect for 
the United States on other industrial sectors as well, which will also result in loss of 
European global competitiveness regarding defence, dual-use and high-tech civilian 
products. This situation will also have an impact on transatlantic relations, because 
European Allies will have to decide whether they want to challenge the American 
defence industrial monopoly or subordinate themselves to US firms as subcontractors 
and specialize themselves in niche areas. Scherpenberg favours the former one, which 
would require deep co-operation among European arms producers. In addition, he 
proposes that governments should create a market oriented environment where 
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civilian and defence industries could successfully work together. These efforts could 
lead to real transatlantic defence industrial co-operation of equal partners, where 
Euro-American consortia would compete for contracts in the Transatlantic area. 
However, if Europe accepted the junior partner role of the US, it would lose its 
competitiveness not only in the defence sector, but also in the domain of 
technologically advanced civilian products.
83
 In 1997 Robert P. Grant analyzes the 
elements of transatlantic armament relationships and concludes that the fears of either 
the collapse of the European defence-industrial base or a transatlantic defence trade 
war caused by protectionist European policies are exaggerated and the most likely 
scenario would be keeping the status quo with some smaller transatlantic co-operative 
R&D projects emerging. He points out that although the dynamics of current 
processes show that transatlantic defence co-operation will slightly increase, the US 
still favours competition over co-operation with European allies. In order to create a 
‘mutually beneficial transatlantic armament relationship’ Europe has to concentrate its 
defence industry and the US should abandon its restricted technology transfer policies 
towards her European allies.
84
 
It is important to note that in the second half of the 1990s and the first half of 
the 2000s, significant changes occurred in the European defence industry. First, new 
intergovernmental agreements and organizations were set up to improve armament 
co-operation in Europe. The United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy – the four 
biggest European defence industrial nations – established the Organisation Conjointe 
de Co-opération en matière d'ARmement (OCCAR) in 1996
85
 to improve 
collaborative weapons procurement among them. Two years later, the same countries 
together with Sweden and Spain signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) to facilitate the 
integration of the European defence market. Finally, the European Union established 
the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2005 in order to develop defence 
capabilities, promote armaments co-operation, enhance collaboration on R&D and 
integrate the European defence market.
86
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Second, the European defence industry went through a high level of 
consolidation at the same time. A series of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that took 
place among European defence companies resulted in the establishment of three 
European ‘defence titans’, which could play in the same league as their American 
counterparts.
87
 Thus, BAE Systems, European Aeronautic Defence and Space 
Company (EADS) and Thales became the most important industrial actors in the 
European defence business. While BAE Systems was a solely British entity which 
emerged by the British Aerospace’s purchase of Marconi Electronic System, EADS 
turned into the first real pan-European defence firm with the fusion of the French 
Aérospatiale-Matra, Germany’s Daimler Chrysler Aerospace (DASA) and the 
Spanish Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA), and Thales was created with the 
French Thomson CSF’s acquisition of the British Racal Electronics. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s these processes sparked American fears and 
a lively debate about an emerging ‘Fortress Europe’, which would close its doors and 
would lock out the United States from the European defence market. However, 
Europeans have pointed out that a ‘Fortress America’ had already existed, and steps 
have been needed to ease the situation both in the United States and Europe.
88
 
Burkard Schmitt highlights that the evolution of two impenetrable Fortresses on both 
sides of the Atlantic may cause conflicts, which can have a spill-over effect and thus 
poison other aspects of transatlantic relations as well. At the same time he argues that 
the chances of creating such a situation are small because the ‘European objective is 
not a fight between “fortresses” but a balanced partnership.’ He also notes: ‘But it 
takes two to tango.’89 Debra R. Mohanty reasons that although Europe’s possible 
choice to create its fortress is understandable, it should strive to facilitate the 
establishment of an Atlantic Defence Industry (ADI) instead.
90
 Jeffrey Becker moves 
along this line and uses ADI as the unit of analysis in his realist research framework 
arguing that the countries of the Atlantic community have gone through a deep 
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Ethan B. Kapstein points out that Washington made significant changes in its 
technology-transfer procedures in order to facilitate transatlantic equipment co-
operation in the end of the 1990s, and contrary to some other papers Kapstein 
perceives the ‘radical restructuring’ of European defence industry as a positive 
phenomenon. According to him, this has provided the opportunity to European 
companies to become full partners of American firms like BAE Systems in the Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) programme and Thales in the development of air defence 
systems.
92
 The JSF, in this respect, is highly important, because it is the most 
expensive defence procurement programme in history; furthermore it has been the 
first time when the United States has allowed its partners to participate in the co-
development and co-production of a new and highly advanced military equipment 
based on US technology.
93
 Although only the United Kingdom has been deeply 
involved in every phase of the project (a Level 1 partner), Norway, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Italy are also collaborative partners in Europe. Kapstein highlights 
that the reason behind the intention of fostering international collaboration within the 
JSF programme was the American fear of a ‘Fortress Europe’ that would not allow in 
American weapons to the European market anymore which is the biggest export 
market of US defence equipments. Thus, JSF works as a Trojan horse, which ensures 




In the first half of the 2000s, independently from the ‘fortress debate’ many 
scholars have studied the implications of the restructuring and integration of the 
European defence industry.
95
 For instance, Terrence Guay and Robert Callum draw 
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attention to ‘the critical and underappreciated economic and political role of the EU’ 
in the transformation of the European defence industry.
96
 The two scholars identify 
two external and two internal factors concerning the EU, which played determining 
role and basically led to the defence industrial mergers and acquisitions mentioned 
earlier. According to them, the first external factor affecting the EU was the 
consolidation of US defence companies in the first half of the 1990s which resulted 
much fewer, larger and more competitive American defence firms. The second factor 
was the cumulative effect of mutually reinforcing processes in the field of technology 
and defence economics, like the American superiority in military technology; the sky-
rocketing costs of new weapon systems and equipments and their longer production 
runs; or shrinking defence export markets.
97
 The first internal factor affecting 
transformation within the EU was its general economic restructuring which also 
regulated some aspects of the defence market, and the intention of EU bodies to put 
the defence industry under the rules of European single market. The second internal 
factor was the evolution of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), because 
this process encouraged European defence industrial consolidation. Guay and Callum 
also make predictions for the future and claim that the EU, the US, national 




Seth G. Jones examines the post-Cold War European armament co-operation 
from a realist point of view.
99
 According to him, security co-operation among 
European Union member states has significantly increased after the Cold War, which 
was basically a response to the new characteristics of the international and regional 
(European) system. With regard to the international system, Jones points out that with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union the bipolar system became unipolar. Thus, in order to 
aggregate their power in order to decrease their ‘reliance on the United States and’ 
increase ‘their ability to project power abroad’ European states began to collaborate 
on an unprecedented scale regarding security. The second reason of strengthening 
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European security co-operation relates to regional dynamics. Namely European states 
wanted ‘to ensure peace on the continent and to prevent the rise of Germany as a 
regional hegemon.’ In his book Jones investigates four types of European security co-
operation
100
 and European armament collaboration is only one of them. In the chapter 
dealing with it, he studies almost 500 Transatlantic and European arms production 
collaborations (M&As, co-productions, co-developments) in the period between 1961 
and 2000, and compares the characteristics of Cold War and post-Cold War armament 
co-operation. He tests his arguments and concludes that ‘the “Europeanization” of 
governments and defence executives toward greater collaboration was a result of 
structural changes, not a constitutive process or solely of economics factors.’101 
Although market policies of nations relate only indirectly to collaborative 
equipment procurement,
102
 it is important to note that during the first decade of the 
21
st
 century much of the policy oriented research put forward the argument for the 
liberalization of the EU defence market, arguing that it would result in significant 
savings Europe-wide.
103
 A recurring element of the debate has been the problem of 
Article 346 of the Lisbon Treaty (earlier Article 296 of the European Community 
Treaty) which stated that ‘any member state may take such measures as it considers 
necessary for the protection of essential interests of its security which are connected 
with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material’. For EU member 
states this article provided an excuse for deeper collaboration and also gave a tool to 
continue their protectionist defence industrial policies causing sizeable inefficiencies 
in defence equipment procurements. Thus, not surprisingly Article 296 became a kind 
of symbol for many scholars that presented the biggest obstacle to defence market 
liberalization. 
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For the past several years, scholarly work on collaborative equipment 
procurement has flourished and although it has been eclectic, it has also produced 
high quality research. For instance Bastian Giegerich and Alexander Nicoll have 
surveyed European capabilities and co-operation including armament 
collaborations.
104
 They point out that only the 20% of the biggest European weapon 
acquisition projects were collaborative equipment procurement, and an ‘unhealthy 
proportion’ of multinational programmes began in the Cold War, including the 
Eurofighter Typhoon and A400M. In addition, European governments have spent 
much less on the development of new high-tech projects and have tended to buy 
equipments off-the-shelf.
105
 Some scholars set against different paradigms and logics 
concerning certain aspects of European equipment procurements. While Alrik Thiem 
studies European intergovernmental armaments co-operation by comparing six 
different paradigms
106
 using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis,
107
 Jozef 
Bátora investigates three pairs of conflicting institutional logics
108
 regarding EDA and 
its relationship to ‘the political order of EU on defence’.109 Others draw attention to 
the consequences of the emergence of European level collaboration in the defence 
industry. André Barrinha, among others researches the political discourse on this 
issue, arguing that the EU took over some of the national justifications of the 
necessity of developing defence industry while both the European and national levels 
remain important and in some aspects these parallel rationales have become rivals.
110
 
Catherine Hoeffler comes to a similar conclusion and suggests that while the 
liberalization and internationalization of the defence industry created a European 
supranational defence economic patriotism and improved the EU’s role in the defence 
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business significantly, this process also strengthened ‘national stakes’, and the EU is 
still under pressure by ‘transatlantic strategies’ of European defence companies.111 
Jocelyn Mawdsley studies the options that small states have in the 
environment where the EU has an increasing influence on armaments co-operation 
and bigger EU states have changed the dynamics of defence collaboration. She 
highlights that the EU plays an ever-increasing role in European armaments co-
operation by institutionalization and regulations. For instance, the Commission and 
the EDA attempt to liberalize the defence market and limit the application of Article 
296 in order to restrict protectionist defence procurements. This clearly weakens the 
position of less competitive defence firms of small states. In addition, Mawdsley 
points out that during the Cold War European small states demanded equality in 
intergovernmental armaments collaborations, claiming the application of the concept 
of juste retour or compensation, and they also used their domestic defence markets as 
bargaining chip, playing off foreign defence companies against each other. However, 
the possibility of using these tactics in the first decade of the 21
st
 century was fading 
away. For instance, as a result of the creation of European defence titans and the 
establishment of armament organizations led by the biggest arms producers, the 
argument of equality among European nations and their defence companies in the 
field of defence is not sustainable anymore. For instance, the creation of OCCAR and 
the adoption of a LoI mean that if smaller states want to join the biggest European 
arms producers, they will have to accept their rules, and they will probably still not be 
able to contribute to projects because their companies are not necessarily advanced 
enough to win contracts or subcontracts. Furthermore, smaller states will be pressed 
politically to acquire the products of European titans in the future, thus they will also 
lose the leverage to playing off foreign companies.
112
 
Applying the research framework of historic institutionalism Marc R. DeVore 
strives to answer the question ‘what impact will past organizational outcomes have on 
shaping future development of European’ armaments organizations?’ In his research 
he investigates 16 different European and transatlantic armaments organizations 
which have been created since the end of the Second World War. DeVore shows that 
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in the first half of the Cold War functional, transatlantic organizations developed 
fastest and deepest in this domain thanks to the American political, technical and 
financial support of transatlantic armament co-operation. However, from the mid-
1960s politically driven European organizations began to flourish because of the 
drying up of American subsidization and because certain conflicts emerged between 
the US and European nations. The majority of pre-existing transatlantic organizations 
survived and were not replaced by other European ones. After the Cold War, the 
evolution of the EU provided inspiration for armaments collaboration as well and 
supranational bodies attempted to control this field. But the existing transatlantic 
organizations have become even stronger and, although new pan-European 
institutions have been established, they have often taken over the responsibilities of 
earlier organizations. DeVore points out that early organizational choices influenced 
later processes, because the opportunity costs of replacement of efficient armament 
organizations are too high to substitute with new ones, in addition even the 
components of less successful organizations are usually preserved in their successors. 
Although it is clear that the current ‘polycentric’ dynamics of armament co-operation 
is inefficient, DeVore concludes that ‘due to their path-dependent development, it 
would be prohibitively costly to replace today’s organizations with a single new 
entity’ and thus ‘the EU’s role will likely remain limited to its current responsibilities 
and domains outside the mandates of existing organizations.’113 
 
MULTINATIONAL CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
With regard to the literature of multinational capability development, we can identify 
two major trends. One school of scholars has developed the conceptual background of 
multinational capability development and based on their concepts they examined 
certain issues, others have focused exclusively on policy analysis and advice without 
any conceptual work. In the first part of this subsection I attempt to show the 
literature concerning how the concept of multinational capability development has 
changed, thereafter I introduce the major policy issues and trends of the literature in 
the second part. 
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The Evolution of the Concept of Pooling & Sharing 
As the capability approach became dominant, the concepts on defence co-operation 
also became more sophisticated. The conceptual bases have been laid down by 
Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden in their paper ‘The arithmetic of defence 
policy’ published in International Affairs in 2001.114 The authors point out that not 
only decreasing defence budgets, but also their shrinking purchasing power resulted 
in the sharp decline of military capabilities in Europe. The reason for this is that 
defence inflation is significantly higher than ‘normal’ inflation, because although 
maintenance costs in the field of defence rise at the same ratio as inflation, personnel 
costs and equipment costs rise much higher than inflation.
115
 Consequently, the higher 
rate of defence inflation would normally cause a decline in the purchasing power of 
defence budgets even if they remained unchanged in real terms and did not decline, as 
it has happened in Europe for the last decades.
116
 These lead to continuous decreases 
in force levels and military capabilities to compensate the diminishing defence 
budgets and the effects of defence inflation. Alexander and Garden predicted that this 
‘arithmetic’ suggests that by 2020 the front line forces of the UK might be the half of 
the 2001 level. The authors identify only two options to counter this trend: increasing 
the defence budget significantly or establishing ‘real co-operation’ at European level. 
They conclude that the first option was very unlikely, thus they argued that despite 
many difficulties of the second one, it still remained a much more viable possibility. 
However, they also highlight that ‘real co-operation’ will not solve the problem of the 
arithmetic of defence policy either, but ‘it could put off the crisis for a generation or 
more’.117 
Alexander and Garden identify two types of co-operation, pooling and 
integration, but they do not elaborate the conceptual framework of these. They argue 
for EU-wide supranational pooling of forces and they proposed operational 
integration for sensitive capabilities. They point out that although duplication and 
multiplication basically exist in every field of European defence (e.g. headquarters, 
bases, logistics support, planning, training, procurement etc.), some areas of co-
operation can provide results faster. According to them, aircraft capabilities are the 
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most obvious choices for initial pooling, because in this field the procedures are 
harmonized, in addition the unit costs and the costs of infrastructure are very high, 
which may necessitate more co-operation. Thus, pooling of air transport capabilities 
or creating a European air-to-air refuelling fleet would be ideal candidates for 
collaboration. With regard to navies, the pooling of transport ships, supply support 
and integration of naval training could produce significant savings. However, 
according to them the Land domain offers less potential, because Land capabilities are 
usually very sensitive, and co-operation of land forces can save much less resources 
than the previous two fields. Still, logistical support, medical service, communication, 
IT systems can be the first areas where successful co-operation could begin regarding 
land forces. Alexander and Garden acknowledge that this type of supranational co-
operation could not be established regarding combat capabilities, thus they propose 
their operational integration, which later could lead to common procurement, training 
and maintenance. For developing new common European capabilities further, they 
suggest the creation of a European planning and budgetary system supported by a 
common European defence budget.
118
 According to Garden, the allocation of around 
5 percent of the defence budgets of every EU member state to this European defence 
budget would be a good start.
119
 Alexander and Garden perceive the sensitivity of 
pooling and rationalization processes, which could cause the closure of headquarters 
and bases and could raise problems regarding national sovereignty. However, they 
argue that ‘the arithmetic of defence policy is implacable and will not tolerate delay 
for very much longer.’120  
Volker Heise maps the potential for military co-operation to fulfil EU 
capability development programmes, but provides a vague conceptual framework.
121
 
First, he differentiates pooling of capabilities, specialization, task-sharing and 
collective capabilities as new approaches and provides some examples concerning 
every type of co-operation. However, he also uses the term ‘multinational approaches’ 
as a distinct category, and claims that European nations prefer to choose this type of 
collaboration based on multinational agreements, where countries can preserve their 
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interests, like in the case of co-operation on satellite assets between Germany and 
France. He does not elaborate how it is distinct from ‘pooling of capabilities’. Heise 
also introduces the concept of ‘pooling of sovereignty’ for areas, which ‘are not at the 
core of nations’ autonomy’. According to him, this field of co-operation can produce 
significant savings, where he uses the possible creation of permanent European 
Operational Headquarters as an example. He also points out that a ‘”European army” 
would be the perfect way to end nations’ duplication of capabilities and structures and 
consequently ensure the most economic use of resources. It would provide the highest 
level of military integration.’122 He acknowledges that for the creation of a European 
army, much higher level of political integration under a much stronger European 
Parliament would be needed; while an integrated European society would be a 
prerequisite for that as well. 
Jean-Pierre Maulny and Fabio Liberti provide the first coherent concept and 
set of definitions regarding ‘pooling’ in a study made for the European Parliament's 
Subcommittee on Security and Defence.
123
 Their concept has become the starting 
point for categorization of different defence co-operation initiatives. Maulny and 
Liberty identify four pooling categories: 
1. sharing of capabilities, whereby member states create common capabilities 
through the provision of national capabilities and there is no structure to 
organize their use;  
2. pooling of capabilities, which involves an integrated structure to organize the 
use of national capabilities; 
3. pooling through acquisition, where national capabilities do not exist and are 
substituted in favour of multilateral capabilities, and the multilateral 
organization owns the assets; 
4. role sharing, whereby certain capabilities are relinquished on the assumption 
that another country will make it available when necessary. 
The authors also investigate the standpoint of major member states on defence 
co-operation and study some of the current examples of defence collaboration. They 
observe that among the member states of the European Union too much duplication 
exists in the field of defence and this ‘represents a huge and irrational cost for 
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European taxpayers.’124 They do not believe that a full military integration is possible 
in Europe, but according to them ‘pooling’ provides the possibility for significant 
savings. 
After the financial crisis of 2008 Bastian Giegerich
125
 pointed out in one of his 
articles – similarly to Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden ten years earlier – that 
military equipment costs have been rising much higher than inflation. The problem 
existed already before the financial crisis, but he highlights that the current ‘budget 
crunch’ created by the negative effects of the crisis made the situation much grimmer. 
He identifies two types of solutions for the sharply diminishing defence budgets: 
lowering the level of ambitions of European armed forces, or using the crisis as an 
opportunity to deepen defence co-operation. He prefers the second one, and provides 
a balanced analysis highlighting not only the benefits but also the difficulties of 
multinational defence co-operation. Giegerich shows that multinational co-operation 
needs much more coordination than national capability development, while it may 
lower operational effectiveness, often reduces national autonomy and also can create 
losses of national industrial positions. He uses almost the same categories
126
 as 
Maulny and Liberti regarding the concept of pooling and sharing (P&S), but he 
perceives multinational procurement as a distinct element, which is not part of P&S in 
itself. He differentiates two types of multinational procurement; joint acquisition and 
co-development. Joint acquisition or pooling of acquisition takes place when several 
nations procure and maintain a capability together which they do not possess 
individually on a national basis. (It is the same category as pooling through 
acquisition by Maulny and Liberti.) Co-development, which is a new element in the 
literature of P&S but not of the MDCs, is when two or more nations develop and 
produce an asset that they individually could not afford. Giegerich shows that the 
biggest problem regarding this type of collaboration is that European nations do not 
harmonize their defence asset requirements, causing inefficiencies, cost overruns and 
longer development phases. It also means that countries will have national 
specifications making common maintenance and training difficult or impossible at all. 
Tamás Csiki and Bence Németh attempt to consolidate the earlier concepts 
and categories regarding P&S in their paper prepared for the first defence ministerial 
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meeting of the Central European Defence Co-operation.
127
 They do not perceive the 
concept of P&S as a new approach, but a framework which provide the opportunity to 
categorize every multinational military co-operation initiative. Thus, compared to 
earlier pieces of the literature they provide many examples for every category, and 
use P&S as a synonym to MDC. They take the categories of Maulny and Liberti as a 
basis with the distinction that they employ the two sub-categories for pooling through 
acquisition – joint acquisition and co-development – introduced by Giegerich. 
However, while Giegerich does not perceive them as part of P&S, Csiki and Németh 
use them as an integrated element of P&S. 
 
Pooling and Sharing in Practice – PESCO, Smart Defence and the Ghent Process 
The literature concerning the practical applications of pooling has almost exclusively 
been raised in the framework of the EU and NATO. Whilst in the case of the EU, 
Permanent Structured Co-operation of the Lisbon Treaty and the ‘Ghent Process’ 
have dominated scholarly works, in the case of NATO the literature has focused 
mostly on the ‘Smart Defence’ concept.128  
Among others Patrick Wouters, Colonel of the Belgian Air Force, offers a 
detailed analysis of possible ‘key performance indicators’ on PESCO in the light of 
the concepts emerged in different formal and informal negotiations. He distinguishes 
three main ‘strategic objectives’ during the development of PESCO’s criteria: 
building military capabilities, ensuring operational commitment and governing 
defence investment. By analysing different aspects of European defence (e.g. force 
generation, military statements of requirements, burden-sharing, funding) Wouters 
provides many thoughtful but not elaborated ideas.
129
 Nick Witney raises the 
questions of membership, criteria and types of co-operation in the framework of 
                                                 
127
 Tamás Csiki and Bence Németh, On the Multinational Development of Military Capabilities: 
Recommendations for the Central European Roundtable on Defence Co-operation, Long Post, June 12, 
2012, (European Geostrategy, 2012). 3-5. 
128
 Inter alia: Patrick Wouters, Balancing Defence and Security Efforts with a Permanently Structured 
Scorecard, Egmont Papers 23 (Brussels: Academia Press, 2008).; Nick Witney, Re-energising 
Europe's Security and Defence Policy (London: ECFR, 2008).; Tomas Valasek, Surviving Austerity - 
The Case for a New Approach to EU Military Collaboration. (London: Centre for European Reform, 
2011).; Christian Mölling and Sophie-Charlotte Brune, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European 
Defence (Brussels: European Parliament, 2011); Bastian Giegerich, “NATO's Smart Defence: Who's 
Buying?” Survival 54, no. 3 (2010): 69-77. doi: 10.1080/00396338.2012.690982.; Laura Chappell and 
Petar Petrov, “The European Defence Agency and Permanent Structured Cooperation: Are We 
Heading Towards Another Missed Opportunity?,” Defence Studies 12, no. 1 (2012): 44-66, 
doi:10.1080/14702436.2012.683973. 
129
 Wouters, Balancing Defence and Security Efforts with a Permanently Structured Scorecard, 27. 
 42 
PESCO. He points out that member states that are willing to provide more resources 
on defence are not necessarily the same that are contributing the most to operations. 
Thus, it is very hard to find a clear ‘pioneer group’ or the ‘hard core’ among European 
states regarding defence, and it is the reason why PESCO should be a ‘more inclusive 
system’. He argues for the creation of ‘specialist sub-groups’ instead of an 
overarching PESCO, because this way PESCO could optimize the different 
contributions of member states. He proposes that those member states who contribute 
most to most ‘specialist sub-groups’ would become the core group, and they could 
have bigger voice in determining the strategic direction of the whole PESCO. At the 
same time Witney suggests a minimum entrance criteria for participation even to the 
‘specialist sub-groups’ (e.g. 1% of GDP spent on defence and 1% of military 




Sven Biscop studies whether PESCO has the potential to solve the major 
difficulties of European defence, which he perceives as the inefficiency of defence 
spending on European level and intra-European duplications of defence capabilities. 
According to him, the most important problem of defence planning in Europe is its 
‘exclusively national focus’, and he argues that it can be solved by ‘pooling’ which 
can decrease duplications and provide more deployable capabilities.
131
 According to 
these, Biscop lays down principles, which should govern the development of 
PESCO’s criteria. Among others he argues for criteria which are quantifiable and 
verifiable, while at the same time aimed at precise qualitative objectives. These 
should apply to specific capabilities rather than to the whole armed forces, in addition 
they should be result-oriented commitments.
132
 In other pieces
133
 Biscop and Jo 
Coelmont elaborate a detailed and concrete proposal for the criteria of PESCO, where 
they suggest ‘no strict entrance criteria, but well-defined commitments to be achieved 
by pMS
134
 by an agreed deadline.’135 Namely, it would be an output-driven instead of 
input-driven system. These are the following:
136
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1. the improvement of deployability and sustainability of participating states 
according to an agreed percentage;  
2. harmonization of defence expenditures while the participating states that are 
spending less on defence than the EU average would not decrease their 
defence budgets;  
3. participating states will contribute in ratio of their GDP to the EDA-initiated 
projects aimed at addressing the shortfalls identified in the Headline Goal 
process;  
4. participating states will deploy in all CSDP operations requiring military 
assets with significant contributions. 
Furthermore, Biscop and Coelmont also suggest the creation of a permanent 
capability generation conference and the establishment of clusters of multinational 
defence collaborations also in PESCO’s framework. 
Since the Lisbon Treaty took effect from the end of 2009 many expert and 
high level negotiations on PESCO have been held during 2010, but member states 
could not reach consensus regarding PESCO, thus it has not been implemented yet. In 
the light of these events, Laura Chappell and Petar Petrov study PESCO using the 
concept of strategic culture, looking for the answers whether PESCO could stimulate 
the European capability development efforts, and what role EDA could play in this 
process.
137
 The authors identify four conflicting visions concerning European 
strategic culture: Atlanticism vs. Europeanism, regional vs. global, pro-active vs. 
restrictive in use of force, defence sovereignty vs. pooled defence resources. They 
analyse the possible impact of PESCO and EDA in easing of these different 
approaches. To support their argument, they use the evolution of EU Battlegroups as a 
case study, showing the possible barriers which PESCO’s implementation can face. 
Chappell and Petrov conclude that ‘European strategic culture is not advanced enough 
to provide a top down approach to military capability development’, thus instead of 
PESCO ‘a bottom up approach would most likely remain in the foreseeable future’ on 
the field of EU’s capability development.138 
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The idea of creating clusters or groups of countries to maintain and develop 
military capabilities together in the framework of either NATO or the EU is not a new 
one.
139
 However, scholars have begun to focus on this issue only after the financial 
crisis the EU launched its P&S initiative in the form of the Ghent process. Sven 
Biscop and Jo Coelmont perceive the Ghent initiative as an indirect way to establish 
PESCO,
140
 and claim that the ‘Ghent Framework is the first step towards what would 
be the first dimension of an integrated capability development process’. 141  Nick 
Witney also sees EU’s P&S as an episode to achieve something bigger in the 
framework of the EU, and suggests launching a European Defence Review and the 
creation of a ‘European Defence Review Commission to propose a redefined and 
rearticulated [EU] common strategy and an initial set of the decisions needed to make 
a reality of it.’142 In contrast to these views which put P&S in a pan-European context, 
Tomas Valasek argues for the creation ‘of multiple, discreet, regional “islands of co-
operation”, whose members will partly integrate their militaries’.143 According to him, 
significant regional differences exist among European states regarding their defence 
needs, which must be taken into consideration for establishing successful pooling and 
sharing initiatives. For this reason, establishing an overarching PESCO or identical 
islands of co-operation is not realistic. Among others Valasek highlights that MDCs 
works much better between states that share similar strategic culture, have armed 
forces with similar size and quality and have compatible defence industries.
144
 
Christian Mölling and Sophie-Charlotte Brune point out as well that defence co-
operation comprising all EU members ‘will certainly remain the exception rather than 
the rule’.145 They survey almost 70 MDCs and conclude that 60% of the studied 
projects have only five or less members, in addition defence collaborations mostly 
work either as ‘user groups’ around common and pooled equipments or are ‘clusters 
                                                 
139
 Michèle A. Flournoy and Julianne Smith, European defense integration: bridging the gap between 
strategy and capabilities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 80-
97. 
140
 Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, ”CSDP and the ‘Ghent Framework’: The Indirect Approach to 
Permanent Structured Cooperation?” European Foreign Affairs Review 16, no. 2, (2011): 149-167.; 
Biscop and Coelmont, Europe, strategy and armed forces: the making of a distinctive power, 75-98. 
141
 Biscop and Coelmont, ”CSDP and the ‘Ghent Framework’,”, 159. 
142
 Nick Witney, How to stop the demilitarisation of Europe (London, England: European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2011), 8-10. 
143
 Valasek, Surviving Austerity - The Case for a New Approach to EU Military Collaboration, 29. 
144
 Ibid. 21-27. 
145
 Mölling and Brune, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence, 43. 
 45 
of regional co-operation’. Furthermore, they highlight that the majority of the 
analyzed forms of co-operation are not integrated in the EU framework.
146
 
Smart Defence was high on the agenda during the Chicago NATO Summit in 
2012, but many scholars have perceived that the process slowed down and there is a 
need to ‘revitalise’ it. Claudia Major, Christian Mölling and Tomas Valasek point out 
in a short policy paper that Europeans still fear the dependencies which MDCs can 
cause, thus NATO should provide incentives to its member states to ease their 
concerns. The authors suggest more than half a dozen initiatives to invigorate Smart 
Defence like the creation of a NATO-wide ‘reinvestment pool’, ‘regional capability 
targets’, assistance in the specialization of Allies etc.147 Bastian Giegerich reviews the 
most important questions and problems decision makers have to face regarding the 
implementation of Smart Defence. Inter alia he highlights the possible difficulties that 
‘specialization by design’ could cause; he touches upon the problem of sovereignty 
regarding MDCs; also discusses Smart Defence’s defence-industrial aspects and the 
concerns on the access to multinational capabilities during operations. Furthermore, 
Giegerich shortly introduces three possible models, which NATO should take into 
consideration for ‘specialization by design’: NATO’s Centres of Excellences, islands 
of co-operation and ‘model based on mentoring’.148 
 
SUB-REGIONAL DEFENCE CO-OPERATION 
After the end of the Cold War some countries struggled with finding effective 
answers to the challenges of the new international environment and decreasing 
defence budgets, therefore began to co-operate with their sub-regional partners more 
intensively. Among them the Benelux, the Baltic and the Nordic states deepened their 
military collaboration significantly over the 1990s. Although these initiatives have 
achieved a high level of collaboration and integration between the armed forces of the 
participating countries, they remained the exceptions rather than the rule among 
European MDCs, and accordingly these issues have not received much scholarly 
attention.  
Belgium and the Netherlands integrated their navies to a large degree when 
they signed the Admiral Benelux agreement in 1995 upon, which they established a 
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binational joint command and binational and integrated military education. The two 
countries occasionally coordinate their procurements and have also agreed on role 
specialization in the maritime domain. In 1996 they established the Deployable Air 
Task Force (DATF) to pool some of their air assets and personnel in order to make 
their exercises and participation in operations more effective. DATF was engaged 
successfully during NATO’s Kosovo air campaign in 1999. 
The Baltic countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – established the Baltic 
Battalion (BALTBAT) in 1994 to participate in peacekeeping operations, and parts of 
it were deployed three times to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main aim of the Baltic 
Naval Squadron (BALTRON) – operational since 1998 – has been minimizing mine 
hazards, thus enhancing security on the Baltic Sea. Every state provides 1-2 mine 
hunters to the squadron, but these vessels remain under national authority and the 
staff positions rotate between the three states. The Baltic Air Surveillance Network 
(BALTNET) is a unified air space surveillance system based on partly common 
procurement and maintenance. Finally, the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) 
has been financed by all of the three countries since 1999. The Nordic countries could 
also build on their previous co-operation regarding peacekeeping operations of the 
Cold War when they established the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military 
Peace Support (NORDCAPS) in 1997. NORDCAPS provided joint training for 
peacekeeping operations and coordinated Nordic contributions to the security sector 
reform of third world countries. In 1994, Nordic Armaments Co-operation 
(NORDAC) was also founded to foster co-operation on certain capability 
development issues among Nordic states.  
During the first decade of the twenty-first century the aforementioned 
(Benelux, Baltic, Nordic) collaborations have slowed down and have been extended 
rarely to new areas, because processes within NATO and EU began to dominate 
defence collaboration in Europe, leaving less space for co-operation on sub-regional 
basis. Thus it is not surprising that with regard to the Benelux MDCs only several 
policy analyses have been published
149
 and although Baltic defence co-operation has 
received more scholarly attention, its literature has also remained thin. While some 
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scholars have studied the experience, the current state of affairs and the prospects of 
Baltic Defence co-operation,
150
 the question of defensibility of the Baltic States in 
case of a Russian attack were much debated in the late 1990s and early 2000s before 
the Baltic States’ NATO accession.151 The Nordic co-operation has been studied the 
most among these three collaborations, but this research has focused mostly either on 
the Nordic co-operation in peacekeeping operations
152
 or on the impact of the 
European Security and Defence Policy on the Nordic states.
153
 
Sub-regional MDCs have been boosted after the financial crisis of 2008. The 
three most important examples of recently emerged real multinational defence co-
operation are the Nordic Defence Co-operation, the UK-French defence treaties and 
the Central European initiatives for pooling and sharing capabilities. In 2009 the five 
Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – established 
Nordic Defence Co-operation (NORDEFCO) which covers almost the whole 
spectrum of their defence sectors in order to achieve cost-effectiveness and enhanced 
operational capability. In 2010 France and the United Kingdom signed a pact on co-
operation in strategically crucial fields like nuclear weapons testing; the operation of 
two aircraft carriers; sharing of training, resources and maintenance; the establishment 
of a division-size joint expeditionary force; and common research and development. 
In 2011 the Defence Policy Directors of six Central European countries – Austria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia – agreed to begin to map 
up the possible areas of co-operation where their countries could pool and share 
military capabilities, and also agreed to coordinate their standpoints on different 
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defence policy and planning issues. Understandably the British-French co-operation 
generated the most research among these MDCs as it has the biggest scale and may 
also influence the whole dynamic of European defence policy. These publications 
have been mainly initial policy oriented analyses, policy recommendations or 
opinions,
154
 similarly to the papers published related to NORDEFCO
155
 and the 





The main post-Cold War literature regarding MDCs has not contained the issue of 
sub-regional MDCs, because it has focused rather on defence collaborations in the EU 
and NATO. In this context scholars have mostly studied the different aspects of 
multinational land formations, collaborative equipment procurements and co-
operation on multinational capability development. While with regard to 
multinational land formations and multinational capability development NATO and 
EU frameworks and initiatives were the focal points of the literature, in the case of 
equipment procurement other institutions and agreements (OCCAR, LoI) and also 
European and transatlantic defence industrial collaborations have been significant 
research topics as well. However, the empirical literature connected to sub-regional 
MDCs is very thin compared to the scholarship of EU- and NATO-related MDCs. 
Furthermore, it is disjointed and typically includes policy analyses and even the very 
few academic papers are descriptive and a-conceptual.
157
 In addition, the sub-regional 
MDCs have been studied only separately or – especially in the cases of the sub-
regional MDCs created recently – have just begun to attract scholarly attention. This 
clearly establishes an empirical and analytical gap as there has been no attempt at 
scrutinising the sub-regional MDCs in a systematic and comparative manner. 
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CHAPTER 3.  
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
In my thesis I am studying why European nations have created new sub-regional 
MDCs and have re-energized old ones in the last couple of years, instead of using the 
existing NATO and EU institutional frameworks for military collaboration. To 
conduct my research I apply the multiple-case study research method elaborated by 
Robert K. Yin, who distances this approach from the classical survey based concept 
of case studies and adapts the logic of the experimental method. Based on this 
approach, I investigate three cases – the British-French ‘Lancaster House Treaties’, 
the Nordic Defence Co-operation, and the Central European Defence Co-operation – 
by testing three rival explanations using the method of pattern matching, which means 
that I generate predicted patterns regarding the studied phenomenon and compare 
them to empirically based patterns. The three rival explanations which I will compare 
regarding the creation of new sub-regional MDCs are 1) the lack of progress on pan-
European/Transatlantic defence cooperation 2) the impacts of the financial crisis, 3) 
different emerging shared threat perceptions of European states. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main aim of the research is to study why some countries turned from NATO and 
EU to their sub-regional partners in some aspects of military co-operation. The 
financial crisis clearly triggered the impression that the negative effects of the further 
decreasing defence budgets could be tackled only by tighter defence cooperation 
among European states. New initiatives have emerged both in NATO and EU in this 
regard as it was introduced in the literature review, but interestingly, new defence co-




Importantly this co-operation has tended to be exclusively military in form, 
which is a significant phenomenon, because – not counting some exceptions like the 
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Benelux and Baltic military collaboration – most of the sub-regional co-operative 
structures which were established after the Cold War in the 1990s focused primarily 
on practical, non- or soft security issues.
159
 Nevertheless, they contributed to 
European security by playing a crucial bridge-building role in ceasing the East-West 
divide created by the Cold War. In addition, many of them served as important space 
for the former communist countries during their preparation to NATO and EU 
accession.
160
 Thus, unsurprisingly sub-regional collaborations were never perceived 
as alternatives to pan-European organizations, but they were intended to complement 
them.
161
 Researchers in the 1990s pointed out that although sub-regional structures 
were more flexible and adaptable to the problems of the particular sub-region than big 
multilateral organizations, they had their own limits as well. For instance they were 
not big enough to tackle ‘major global issues’ or transmit normative principles. 
Furthermore, they were deemed inappropriate for co-operation in the field of 
‘strategic military security’.162 Alyson JK Bailes highlighted at the time that sub-
regional structures did not initiate regular Defence Ministerial or defence staff level 
meetings, and were not interested in ‘co-operation on defence modernization’ either. 
Moreover, they did not elaborate ‘hard’ arms control measures’ like the OSCE, and 
did not get involved in nuclear issues or discussing security guarantees.
163
 
However, the currently evolving sub-regional MDCs are significantly different 
from the typical sub-regional structures of the 1990s, as they are sub-regional 
collaborations focusing on military co-operation and are also organizing defence 
ministerial and/or senior military level meetings. While in the 1990s many Western 
and former communist countries established sub-regional co-operations to facilitate 
the evolution of their relationship with each other after the Cold War, nowadays this 
intention does not exist, because all participating states of the concerned sub-regional 
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collaborations are members of NATO and/or EU. Namely, their relations are so 
extensive in every field – including defence issues – that it is not evident why they 
have established new structures instead of using the existing ones inside the NATO 
and EU. Furthermore, it is often not politicians but the European defence policy elites 
and the armed forces – national defence policy communities – that are the major 
driving forces behind this sub-regional military co-operation, which is also a change 
compared with the 1990s. However, until now there has been no attempt to 
problematize the dynamics behind these collaborations, and no one has investigated 
why sub-regional MDCs had been used on many issues instead of using the 
institutionalized solutions of the NATO and EU. Along these lines the thesis attempts 
to answer the following research questions: 
 Why have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs 
in recent years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework 
of NATO and EU? 
 What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European 
states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than 




To study not pan-European MDCs we have to clarify what we understand under the 
term and what is the most useful definition for them. I propose that the most 
appropriate term is ‘sub-regional multinational defence cooperation’, because it 
describes their nature best, namely that these are defence related frameworks for 
cooperation between European countries, which are either neighbours or belong to 
one sub-region. 
However, the current primarily policy oriented literature defines not pan-
European MDCs in Europe loosely, and different authors identify them under 
alternative names. For instance, Mölling and Brune call them ‘clusters of 
cooperation’,164 and although Tomas Valasek also uses the term of Mölling and Brune 
he calls them ‘islands of cooperation’ and ‘regional clusters’ too.165 In the same time 
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an EUISS report applies the term of ‘regionalisation of military capabilities’.166 At the 
same time, Pieter-Jan Parrein points out that ‘Europe is regarded as a region with 
regional cooperation organizations such as the EU or the Council of Europe, therefore 
regional cooperation within Europe is in fact sub-regional’,167 thus he calls them ‘sub-
regional defence cooperation’. The different terms and definitions probably stem from 
the situation that while many new and older reenergized MDCs in Europe are based 
on membership of relatively well-defined and institutionalized regions/sub-regions 
(e.g. Baltic, Benelux, Nordic), other mostly bilateral collaborations are not necessarily 
significant in dimensions outside defence cooperation. Furthermore, in the case of 





) while others are perceived as 
exclusively bilateral co-operations (Dutch-German, German-French). 
During my research I am going to use the term ‘sub-regional multinational 
defence cooperation’ (sub-regional MDC), because I believe that the summation of 
the concepts of sub-region and MDC provides the best term describing the not pan-
European defence collaborations I am interested in. In order to introduce this term I 
clarify separately the concept of sub-region and MDC, and sum them up into one 
definition. 
According to John Agnew to ask what region is, is a  
‘worthy question, without doubt – or at least it used to be. Increasingly 
often, answering this question proves if not an impossible task, then at 
least one that is bound to produce multiple answers, once again, both 
politically and conceptually. Labelling regions has ceased to be – 
assuming that it ever was – a descriptive exercise in which observers 
held their mirrors – geographical, cultural and so on – to the(ir) world: 
what a region is always reflects ‘the biases, intellectual and political, 
of their originators.’170 
 
We face similar problems when defining the concept of sub-region. Andrew 
Cottey points out that ‘the term is not exact, since it is clear that the definition of any 
sub-region (like that of a region) reflects not only geography, but also history and 
politics – often making the issue contentious.’ In his research, Cottey perceives 
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Europe as a region and according to his definition ‘“sub-regional” refers to a 
geographically and/or historically reasonably coherent area within the OSCE space as 
a whole.’171 I accept this definition, but at the same time I would like to point out that 
the sub-regional co-operations I am interested in are situated in the territory of EU 
and NATO Europe, and do not include collaborations from other parts of the OSCE 
area. 
The concept of Multinational Defence Cooperation seems to be more concrete 
than the term of sub-region. MDC is basically collaboration between states on 
different military related issues. I use the already mentioned definition of the United 
Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence which says that an MDC can be ‘any arrangement 
where two or more nations work together to enhance military capabilities. This can 
include exchanges and liaison, training and exercising, common doctrine, 
collaborative equipment procurement, or multinational formations.’172 
According to these approaches, we can conclude that sub-regional MDC is 
any arrangement where two or more nations belonging to a European 
geographically and/or historically reasonably coherent area work 
together to enhance their military capabilities. 
 
Accordingly, I perceive Europe as a region, and under the term of Europe I 
understand the combined territory of the EU and the European NATO member states. 
In this respect regional MDCs are NATO and EU level collaborations in my thesis, 
because these two institutions cover the vast majority of the aforementioned 
territory.
173
 Thus, sub-regional MDCs are defence co-operations below NATO and 
EU level. 
 
Based on this definition and the literature the following eight defence collaborations 
in Europe are currently deemed relevant sub-regional MDCs: 
 Baltic Defence Cooperation: In order to prepare for NATO accession and 
create military capabilities they lacked the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania – established four major defence co-operative structures (Baltic 
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Battalion, Baltic Naval Squadron, Baltic Air Surveillance Network, Baltic 
Defence College) during the 1990s which are still operational.  
 Benelux Defence Cooperation: Belgium and the Netherlands integrated their 
navies in many aspects via the Admiral Benelux agreement (1995) and also 
established the Deployable Air Task Force (1996) to exercise and participate 
in air operations jointly. In 2012, the Ministers of Defence of the Benelux 
states signed a declaration on defence cooperation
174
 to reinvigorate their 
defence collaboration. 
 Central European Defence Co-operation: In 2011, the Defence Policy 
Directors of six Central European countries – Austria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia – agreed to begin to map up the 
possible areas of co-operation where their countries could pool and share 
military capabilities, and also agreed to coordinate their standpoints on 
defence policy and planning issues. 
 British-Dutch Amphibious Force: The co-operation between the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands regarding amphibious forces started in 1973. 
Currently the marines of the two nations use the same training and tactics, and 
are conducting operations in a fully integrated manner. 
 British-French Defence Cooperation: In 2010, France and the United 
Kingdom signed two treaties on co-operation in strategically crucial fields like 
nuclear weapons testing; the operation of two aircraft carriers; the sharing of 
training, resources and maintenance; the establishment of a division-size joint 
expeditionary force; and common research and development. 
 Nordic Defence Cooperation: In 2009, the five Nordic countries – Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – established the Nordic Defence Co-
operation which covers almost the whole spectrum of their defence sectors in 
order to achieve cost-effectiveness and enhanced operational capability. 
 South Eastern Europe Defence Cooperation: The South-Eastern Europe 
Defence Ministers Process began in 1996 that resulted in the creation of the 
South Eastern Europe Brigade by Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, 
Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey in 1999. Both the process and the brigade 
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have been working and providing fruitful fora for co-operation and confidence 
building in the region.  
 Visegrad Group: The Visegrad Group consists of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The co-operation was founded in 1991 with 
the aim to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of the four Central European 
countries in general. Although, regular meetings between the Chiefs of 
Defence and Ministers of Defence of the participating countries were held, the 
collaboration of the Visegrad Group was not strong on the field of defence 
until 2011, when they decided to establish an EU Battlegroup be operational 
and stand by in 2016.  
 
Threat Perception 
The magnitude of the threat perception literature is well illustrated by Janice Gross 
Stein who distinguishes two major approaches and seven sub-approaches how threat 
perception has been studied in the field of International Relations.
175
 Stein points out 
that the two major approaches are the rationalist and the psychological ones, and with 
regard to the rationalist approach five concepts exist that describe threat perception 
as:  
1) ‘changing balances of power and the attendant difficulty the sender faces in 
making commitments credible to the perceiver’  
2) ‘security and status dilemmas which make intentions difficult to read and 
threats difficult to assess’  
3) ‘institutional interests’  
4) ‘political culture’ and  
5) ’the violation of norms’. 
 
At the same time psychological approaches – pioneered by Robert Jervis176 – 
have focused either on psychological mechanisms which are influenced among others 
by beliefs and values resulting in ‘misperception’ and ‘miscalculation’, or highlights 
the problem of ‘two-level’ games, when ‘leaders may be speaking to multiple 
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constituencies simultaneously and therefore have an incentive to distort either their 
intentions or their capabilities or both.’177 During my research I will not be interested in 
how the threat perception of countries evolves and what kind of factors influence it in 
different situations as the vast majority of the literature does. I am rather interested in 
identifying whether such a common threat perception existed among the participating 
nations of sub-regional MDCs at all. Still I can use some of the indications certain 
concepts regarding threat perception provide. For instance F. Gregory Cause III points 
out that the approach of the realist school in International Relations with regard to 
balancing – when states align against an external threat – ‘presumes that identifying 
threats is the starting point of decision-making on alliances’.178  
In addition, Stephen Walt provided important contribution concerning the theory 
of alliance building when he developed the balance of threat concept. For Walt alliance 
means ‘a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more 
sovereign states’, 179  which basically includes the concept of sub-regional MDCs 
described earlier as well, thus in general Walt’s concept is applicable to them. One of the 
main arguments of Walt is that not power per se – as it was perceived by most of the 
realist thinkers that time – but rather threats are the basis of balancing behaviour in 
international politics. Although Walt accepts that distribution of power is highly 
important in this regard, he argues that a threat’s constituent elements are geographic 
proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions too and they have to be taken 
account for understanding the dynamics of alliances.180 Walt offers a solid but simple 
concept of threat perception which says that the independent variable is the ‘imbalances 
of threat’ and the dependent variable is ‘Alliances against the most threatening state’. 
According to him, ‘an imbalance of threat occurs when the most threatening state or 
coalition is significantly more dangerous than the second most threatening state or 
coalition. The degree to which a state threatens others is the product of its aggregate 
power, geographic proximity, offensive capability and the aggressiveness of its 
intentions.’181 
However, I am not interested in what kind of elements a threat has or how threat 
evolves in certain states; I will be only interested in whether the studied countries 
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possessed the same threat perception and whether it fostered the establishing of sub-
regional MDCs. At the same time, I would like to point out that Walt’s concept of threat 
is overly state centric, and does not allow taking into consideration transnational and 
subnational threats, which can also serve as the basis for common threat perception. Thus, 
with regard to my research ‘perception of the same threat’ – whatever the threat is – is 
used as independent variable instead of Walt’s variable of ‘imbalance of threat’. 
Similarly, ‘alliances against the most threatening state’ is too narrow and state centric for 




Case Study Research Method 
In order to answer the research questions of the thesis properly the case study research 
method seems to be the most appropriate approach. The question can be raised on 
what basis the researcher should choose between the different research methods. 
According to Robert K. Yin, three factors are relevant in this respect:
182
 the form of 
the research question (whether it needs exploratory or explanatory answer), whether 
the researcher has control over behavioural events and lastly whether the research 
focuses on contemporary events. For instance, if the research is explanatory – which 
is indicated by the research question using the how? and/or the why? interrogative – 
needs control over behavioural events and focuses on contemporary issues, the 
researcher should use the experimental method. In the case when the research is 
exploratory (uses who?, what?, where? like questions), there is no need for control 
over behavioural events and focuses on past events, archival analysis will be the most 
suitable method. However, if the research is explanatory, examines contemporary 
events, and the scholar do not have the opportunity to manipulate the relevant 
behaviours the preferred approach is the case study method. My thesis fits to this 
situation. Namely, it studies current events regarding European sub-regional MDCs, I 
cannot manipulate the relevant behaviours of the actors and although my research 
questions contain both exploratory and explanatory elements, the explanatory part is 
much more significant. Thus, I use the case study method for my research. 
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In political science the traditional view is that the method of single-case and 
multiple- case study researches differ. This phenomenon is signified in the names of 
these types of methods as well, because only the single-case study research is called 
‘case study’, and the multiple-case study is mostly called ‘comparative research’.183 In 
addition, political scientists apply different methods on the basis of the number of the 
studied cases regarding multiple-case studies, thus they differentiate small-N 
comparison (2-12 cases) and large-N studies.
184
 Contrarily, Yin argues that ‘case 
study research includes both single- and multiple case studies’,185 and developed a set 
of rigorous procedures which provides a comprehensive but still flexible framework 
for case study research thus mitigating the deficiencies suggested by critics of the case 
study method. Accordingly, I follow the case study research method and design 
proposed by Yin. 
Yin elaborated a twofold, technical definition for case studies. While the first 
part of the definition introduces the scope, the second part focuses on the technical 
characteristics of case study research. ‘In essence, the twofold definition shows how 
case study research comprises an all-encompassing method covering the logic of 
design, data collection techniques, and specific approach to data analysis.’ 186 
According to Yin’s definition:187 
1. ‘A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth in within its real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.’ 
2. ‘The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in 
which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as 
one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.’ 
 
Based on the approach introduced in this definition Yin proposes not only the 
components of a case study’s research design, but also establishes a set of procedures 
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to improve its quality and discusses the types of case studies as well. According to 
Yin, the research design of a case study has to contain at least five components:
188
 
1. a study’s question,  
2. its propositions,  
3. its unit(s) of analysis,  
4. the logic linking the data to the propositions,  
5. the criteria for interpreting the findings.  
 
It means that the research design should include not only the type of 
information and data which the researcher needs to collect – it can be inferred from 
the study’s question, the propositions and the units of analysis – but it has to tackle 
the situation after data collection by providing the logic which links data to the 





Figure 1 – Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests190 
 
At the same time, Yin provides detailed procedures to the four tests – 
construct validity, internal validity, external validity, reliability – common to every 
social science method (See Figure 1) in order to improve the quality of the case study 
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 For instance, with regard to construct validity – ‘identifying correct 
operational measures for the concepts being studied’ – he suggests to ‘use multiple 
sources of evidence, establish chain of evidence’ and ‘have key informants review 
draft case study report’. In the case of reliability – ‘demonstrating that the operations 
of study can be repeated with the same result’ – he proposes to ‘use case study 
protocol’ and ‘develop case study data base’.192 Of course, Yin does not list only 
these procedures, but elaborates them in detail. 
As I already mentioned Yin does not consider the distinction between single- 
and multiple-case studies as the ‘classic’ approach in political science does, and 
developed a case study research design that is applicable to both. According to Yin, 
for this we have to think about case studies analogous to experiments. Thus, the 
rationales which underpin the execution of a single experiment can justify conducting 
a single case-study, and multiple-case studies must be ‘seen’ as multiple experiments, 
where not the sampling logic of the ‘classic’ case study approach should be used but 
the replication logic of multiple experiments. Yin highlights that based on the logic of 
experiments at least five major rationales exist for developing single case design, 
which are emerging either when the case represents the critical case in testing a 
theory, or when it is an extreme case, or is a typical case, or is a revelatory case or is a 
longitudinal case. Although, multiple-case designs are deemed providing more 
‘compelling’ results, not every research can be done in this manner, and usually 
researches concerning the extreme case, the critical case and the revelatory case is 
conducted in a single-case study. 
However, we have to bear in mind that in general multiple-case studies are 
more ‘robust’ than single-case studies, thus if we have the opportunity to conduct a 
multiple-case study instead of a single-case study, it has to be the preferred type. Yin 
argues that the multiple experiments’ replication logic and not the survey based 
sampling logic is relevant regarding multiple-case studies. Thus, he proposes two 
replication logics and suggests that ‘each case must be carefully selected so that it 
either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting 
results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication)’. According to Yin, ‘an 
important step in all of these replication procedures is the development of a rich, 
theoretical framework’, because it provides the relevant factors – which will be found 
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Besides, the elaborating on the aspect of whether the research was a single-
case study or a multiple-case study Yin also distinguishes between case studies on the 
basis of whether they had more than one unit of analysis or sub-units of analysis. If 
so, he calls them ’embedded’ case studies, if not, and the case study investigates the 
case from a ’global’ perspective, it is a holistic case study (see Figure 2). Both types 
have their own advantages, but the researcher has to pay considerable attention to 
their weaknesses as well. For instance, with regard to the holistic case design usual 
pitfalls are that scholars can conduct the study ’at an unduly abstract level, lacking 
sufficiently clear measures or data’, or the case study may take a new orientation ’and 
the evidence begins to address a different research question’.194 A typical problem of 
the embedded case design can occur easily, if the case study focuses too much on the 
sub-unit level and ’fails to return to the larger unit of analysis’.195 
 
Figure 2 – Basic Types of Design for Case Studies196 
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We can see that for conducting case studies Yin developed a comprehensive 
approach and a set of procedures which he elaborated in detail. Accordingly, Yin’s 
approach provides a more rigorous and standardized research design than earlier 
approaches of case studies, thus it enhances the chances for a successful research. 
Using the suggested design and procedures by Yin I attempt to answer the research 
questions of the thesis.  
 
Research Design 
As it was mentioned earlier the two main research questions of the thesis are ‘Why 
have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs in recent 
years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework of NATO and 
EU?’ and ‘What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various 
European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than 
collaborate within NATO and EU?’ We can assume that the European countries 
which establish and/or renew sub-regional MDCs are not fully satisfied with those 
opportunities that NATO and EU frameworks offer, therefore deem the two 
organizations inadequate and inefficient for defence co-operation on certain issues. At 
the same time these countries deem co-operation in sub-regional MDCs more 
beneficial. The question is why they think that a new or a renewed sub-regional co-
operation, which is less institutionalised, would be more advantageous or more 
effective, than co-operative frameworks in organizations – EU/NATO – which have 
well institutionalized solutions for collaborations and negotiations? 
Different explanations exist. One of the understandings of this phenomenon in 
the policy sphere is best described by Pieter-Jan Parrein.
197
 He argues that new sub-
regional MDCs have been established and old ones have been reenergized, because of 
two main reasons. First, the evolution of pan-European structures regarding defence 
cooperation did not progress appropriately, as they have not mitigated significantly 
the European fragmentation on the field of defence. This phenomenon was also 
demonstrated by the Literature Review chapter. Secondly, European states also 
needed quick solutions for maintaining national capabilities after the austerity 
measures generated by the financial crisis.
198
 This explanation seems logical, as the 
new sub-regional MDCs were established after the beginning of the financial crisis. 
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Another possible answer can be inferred from the emerging different threat 
perceptions of NATO/EU member states, which generates concerns for many policy 
makers and scholars in NATO. Among others this problem has been noted by British 
Defence Secretary Philip Hammond
199
 and experts from many NATO member states, 
who deemed this issue highly significant regarding future alliance operations on a 
recent NATO workshop as well.
200
 Marko Papic – analyst at Stratfor – even argues 
that the main reason of the evolution of ‘a set of regionalized groupings’ regarding 
security is the different threat perceptions countries possess on the continent. Thus, he 
explicitly states that ‘in Europe, there is no such clarity of what constitutes a threat’ 
and because of ‘the regionalization of European security organizations’ basically 
‘NATO has ceased to effectively respond to the national security interests of 
European states.’201  
To find out which concept explains the phenomenon of the development of 
sub-regional MDCs for the recent years best, I will use the above mentioned three 
concepts as rival explanations and test them through different cases. The analytic 
technique I use is pattern matching, which ‘compares an empirically based pattern 
with a predicted one (or with several alternative predictions)’.202 Furthermore, using 
rival explanations as patterns provides an opportunity of pattern matching for 
independent variables. According to Yin,
203
  
This analysis requires the development of rival theoretical 
propositions, articulated in operational terms. The desired 
characteristic of these rival explanations is that each involves a 
pattern of independent variables that is mutually exclusive: If one 
explanation is to be valid, the others cannot be. This means that the 
presence of certain independent variables (predicted by one 
explanation) precludes the presence of other independent variables 
(predicted by a rival explanation). The independent variables may 
involve several or many different types of characteristics or events, 
each assessed with different measures and instruments. The concern 
of the case study analysis, however, is with the overall pattern of 
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results and the degree to which the observed pattern matches the 
predicted one.  
This type of pattern matching of independent variables also can be 
done either with a single case or with multiple cases. With a single 
case, the successful matching of the pattern to one of the rival 
explanations would be evidence for concluding that this explanation 
was the correct one (and that the other explanations were incorrect). 
Again, even with a single case, threats to validity – basically 
constituting another group of rival explanations – should be identified 
and ruled out. Moreover, if this identical result were additionally 
obtained over multiple cases, literal replication of the single cases 
would have been accomplished, and the cross-case results might be 
stated even more assertively. 
 
I apply this analytic method in a multiple case design, because – as it was mentioned 
earlier – a multiple case study is more ‘robust’ and can provide more compelling 
results. This means that I will use one of the replication logics suggested by Yin. This 
multiple-case design will be an embedded one and not a holistic one (see Figure 2), 
where the cases are certain sub-regional MDCs and the ‘embedded unit of analysis’ 
are different for the three possible explanations:  
1. Dissatisfaction with European-level defence integration  
2. Defence budget cuts after the financial crisis 
3. Threat perceptions of the states in the studied sub-regional MDCs 
 
The potential cases for the research are the sub-regional MDCs, which were 
presented in the Key concepts section. However, if we want to focus on recent trends 
and the reason why new sub-regional MDCs have been established or an older one 
reenergized, we have to find the most relevant ones for the research. The Nordic 
Defence Cooperation, the British-French Defence Cooperation and the Central 
European Defence Co-operation are obviously important sub-regional MDCs in this 
regard, because they have been established in 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively, thus 
they can be good cases to study current dynamics behind defence co-operation. At the 
same time, despite the fact the British-Dutch Amphibious Force represents a matured 
cooperation with a very high level of integration between the British and Dutch 
marines, but it had been established in 1973, and thus it clearly cannot be a good case 
for investigating current trends. The situation is similar with the Baltic Defence 
Cooperation and the South Eastern Europe Defence Cooperation, as both were created 
in the 1990s, and although the participating nations of these two MDCs have 
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discussed their revitalization recently, significant efforts have not been made to do 
that. Although the Benelux Defence Cooperation was also established in the 1990s, it 
has been renewed in 2012, but the problem with it is that its implementation is in a 
premature stage. I believe that the Visegrad Group could not be among the most 
appropriate cases for my study either, because despite the fact that the V4 countries 
decided to create a new EU Battlegroup in 2011, this initiative answers to an older 
request made by the EU in 2004 concerning the Battlegroup concept, and not 
necessarily reflects to recent phenomena.  
Accordingly, the Nordic Defence Cooperation, the British-French Defence 
Cooperation and the Central European Defence Co-operation seem to be the most 
significant cases for my research. These cases are also appropriate for using the literal 
replication logic, because it requires the selection of similar cases, where the 
predicted results are similar as well. These sub-regional MDCs are similar, because 
they have been established for the last several years, they are multidimensional co-
operations, are or intended to be permanently structured and in contrast to the 
development of sub-regional cooperation of the 1990s they are focusing exclusively 
on defence collaboration. Thus we can assume that the dynamics behind their creation 
are similar. 
For doing my research I will use three main sources: (1) official documents 
like National Security Strategies, National Military Strategies, official statements etc., 
(2) I will study the changing ‘material’ commitments – e.g. military exercises, 
cooperative capability development projects, cooperation on military technology – of 
these states regarding NATO, EU and sub-regional MDCs, (3) and finally I will 
conduct interviews with officials of the studied countries to get a more sophisticated 
picture about the investigated processes. 
 
Rival Explanations 
In order to undertake my research, I have to operationalize the patterns of the three 
earlier mentioned rival explanations to compare their predicted patterns with the 
empirically based ones. Thus, I develop generic predicted patterns for all three 
possible explanations mentioned earlier and will test them regarding my three cases 
(Nordic Defence Cooperation, the British-French Defence Cooperation and the 
Central European Defence Co-operation). In all cases, the dependent variable is the 
‘creation of sub-regional MDC’, and the independent variables will be established on 
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the basis of the propositions of the three rival explanations. As I use the literal 
replication logic, I am looking for similar predicted results regarding every case, 
which means that I suppose that one of the rival explanations will answer my research 
questions convincingly, and the other two will not be appropriate to explain the 
phenomenon of establishing sub-regional MDCs instead of using NATO and EU co-
operative structures. During the operationalization process I develop assumptions, 
which serve as prerequisites for verifying the studied variables of the patterns of the 
rival explanations.  
 
Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence 
cooperation  
One of the views is that European states have turned to sub-regional MDCs instead of 
NATO and EU on many issues because of the lack of progress regarding defence 
collaboration in the two organizations, which elements were described in detail in the 
Literature Review (e.g. problems of NRF, EU Battlegroups, NATO DCI and other 
capability packages, PESCO).  
 
 
Figure 3 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 1 
 
However, the independent variable of this rival explanation (‘lack of progress 
on pan-European and Transatlantic defence cooperation’) cannot be linked directly to 
the dependent variable (‘creation of sub-regional MDC’). Namely, the independent 
variable of ‘lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence cooperation’ 
would not trigger the search for alternative solutions per se for member states until 
they are not dissatisfied with the results of cooperative efforts in these two 
organizations. Accordingly, the intervening variable between the earlier mentioned 
independent variable – ‘lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence 
cooperation’ – and the dependent variable – ‘creation of sub-regional MDC – is the 
‘European nations are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ (see Figure 3).  
 Based on this pattern’s variables several assumptions can be inferred, which 
can serve as prerequisites for verifying this rival explanation. Each assumption is 
prerequisite for the variables of the rival explanation. This means that Prerequisite 1 is 
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prerequisite for the independent variable, Prerequisite 2 is the prerequisite of the 
intervening variable and Prerequisite 3 is prerequisite for the dependent variable. The 
prerequisites are the following: 
1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to 
be identified. 
2. The dissatisfaction of countries of the studied sub-regional MDC concerning 
the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to 
be detected. 
3. The creation of the sub-regional MDC needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction 
of the participating countries with the NATO/EU. 
 
If these prerequisites can be identified in the studied cases, we can say that 
Rival Explanation 1 can explain appropriately the phenomenon why European states 
have established new sub-regional MDCs instead of using EU and NATO co-
operative structures. 
 
Rival Explanation 2 – Effects of the financial crisis 
According to Rival Explanation 2 the independent variable is the significant defence 
budget cuts executed as a consequence of the financial crisis, and this contributed to 
the emergence of sub-regional MDCs. There is a similar problem as at the Rival 
Explanation 1 in the sense that the independent variable of ‘defence budget cuts as a 
consequence of the financial crisis’, cannot lead directly to the creation of sub-
regional MDCs, it needs an intervening variable. Nations have to clearly believe that 
they need to act quickly to retain national military capabilities and as such national 
military options in times of budgetary reductions for the European armed forces to 
think about establishing new multinational defence co-operations. Thus, the 
intervening variable of the ‘need for alternative solutions to maintain national military 
capabilities’ is needed to explain properly the relationship of the independent variable 
of ‘defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis’ and the dependent 
variable (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 2 
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The prerequisites for the variables of the pattern of this rival explanation are 
the followings: 
1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in 
the participating countries of the studied sub-regional MDC. 
2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative 
multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the 
participating countries of the studied sub-regional MDC. 
3. The creation of the studied sub-regional MDC needs to be linked to the 
participating countries’ search for alternative multinational solutions to 
maintain national military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
 
Rival Explanation 3 – Convergent threat perceptions 
As it was mentioned earlier, another explanation for the creation of new sub-regional 
MDCs is that countries in different sub-regions in Europe have increasingly sub-region 
specific threat perceptions, and they answer to these threats by establishing new sub-
regional military co-operations instead of using NATO/EU structures for military co-
operation. In the ‘Key concepts’ section I introduced briefly the approach I apply to study 
the supposedly convergent threat perceptions of European states. I mentioned that – based 
on Walt’s concept which I partly changed for my research – I use ‘perception of the same 
threat’ as independent variable and ‘alliances against the biggest threat’ as its dependent 
variable. However, in the predicted pattern, which assumes that convergent threat 
perceptions is the main cause of the creation of sub-regional MDCs, ‘alliances against the 
biggest threat’ will serve as an independent variable which links the independent variable 
of ‘perception of the same threat’ and the dependent variable of ‘creation of sub-regional 
MDC’ (See Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 3 
 
In this pattern if a group of countries perceive the same threat as the biggest 
threat, they will ally against it by creating sub-regional MDCs. It means that if I could 
verify that the participating states of the studied sub-regional MDCs share the same threat 
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perception which is differing from the threat perceptions of the other studied sub-regional 
MDCs, we can assume that they may be the basis of the creation of the researched sub-
regional MDC. In the same time, if I could verify this phenomenon, I also need to 
investigate whether these shared threats initiated discussions and negotiations among the 
participating nations of the studied sub-regional MDCs. In addition, a crucial issue may 
be whether the shared threat perceptions were related to the established sub-regional 
MDCs or they just accidently matched. Furthermore, if two or more sub-regional MDCs 
share the same threat perception, we can assume that the main cause behind these military 
collaborations is not this rival explanation, because the participating nations of the MDCs 
sharing the same threat perception should co-operate within one single MDC and not 
separately in different MDCs.  
Similarly to the previous explanation many assumptions can be inferred 
concerning this rival explanation as well, and they can serve as prerequisites for 
verifying the variables of this pattern: 
1. The participating states of the studied sub-regional MDC had to share the 
perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat. 
2. The participating states of the studied sub-regional MDC had to initiate 
discussions and co-operation regarding the shared threat and had to begin to 
co-operate on them before the creation of the sub-regional MDC. 
3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) the participating states of the 
studied sub-regional MDC discussed and co-operated on and the initiation and 




CHAPTER 4.  
CENTRAL EUROPEAN  
DEFENCE CO-OPERATION (CEDC) 
 
In 2011, the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) body was established by 
six Central European countries to facilitate collaboration focusing on military 
capability development. The participating countries of this co-operative body have 
been Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.
204
  The 
question this chapter attempts to answer is why these countries created this particular 
defence collaboration, while opting not to use numerous other opportunities to 
cooperate in EU and/or NATO frameworks.  
Some would argue that CEDC was created because not all of the participating 
countries shared the membership of either the EU or NATO, thus these organizations 
did not provide appropriate forum for them to co-operate on defence. In 2011, when 
CEDC was founded the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia were 
members of both NATO and EU, Austria was an EU member and had no intention of 
joining NATO to maintain its neutral status, and Croatia was a NATO member only. 
However, both NATO and EU are flexible and open to friendly non-member states 
regarding their participation in their defence co-operation initiatives. For instance, 
Norway – like Croatia in 2011 – is a NATO member only, but Oslo is active in EU 
defence collaboration as well. Among others Norway signed a co-operative 
arrangement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2006, thus Norway is 
allowed to participate in EDA projects and programmes,
205
 but it does not have voting 
rights. Furthermore, Norway contributes forces to the Nordic Battlegroup, which is 
part of the EU Battlegroup initiative.
206
 Thus, the situation that Croatia was not 
member of the EU at the time of the initiation of CEDC does not explain properly 
why the six Central European countries mentioned above opted for creating a new 
forum to facilitate defence cooperation rather than using existing EU frameworks to 
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encourage capability development. In addition, if we take into consideration that 
Croatia finished its accession negotiations with the EU in 2011,
207
 and joined to the 
EU in 2013, we can ask the question why these countries just did not begin to use 
some form of EU framework to co-operate, when they knew that Croatia would join 
to the EU soon.  
The CEDC countries could have worked together under the umbrella of 
NATO too, despite the fact that Austria is not a member of the Alliance. The reason is 
that similarly to other neutral European countries Austria has very close relationship 
with NATO. Austria is a member of the Partnership for Peace programme and 
contributes to NATO operations, attends in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and 
maintains a diplomatic mission to NATO in Brussels as well.
208
 Furthermore, NATO 
allows friendly non-aligned states to participate in its certain capability development 
projects. For instance, Finland and Sweden are members of the Strategic Airlift 
Capability (SAC) project, where they co-operate together with 10 NATO members ‘to 
acquire, manage, support and operate three Boeing C-17 strategic transport aircrafts’ 
under the auspices of NATO Support and Procurement Agency.
209
 
Accordingly, the CEDC countries could have co-operated either in the EU or 
NATO, if they had wanted, because both organizations provided opportunities for 
that. However, they rather decided to create a new defence co-operative framework 
outside the EU and NATO, which went against the trends of the 2000s when NATO 
and EU defence co-operations trumped regional ones.
210
 This chapter attempts to 
answer the question why this happened. The chapter first introduces CEDC and its 
implications. Thereafter it shortly introduces previous Central European defence 
collaborations to provide context for the research. The vast majority of the chapter is 
focusing on figuring out why these six Central European countries created CEDC 
instead of using EU or NATO by applying the research method introduced in the 
Research Framework chapter. Accordingly, I compare the three operationalized, 
predicted rival patterns with the empirically based pattern by checking whether the 
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assumptions developed to each rival explanation in the research framework chapter 
came true before and during the creation of CEDC. This way, I intend to identify the 
most applicable answer to the research question. 
 
CREATION OF CEDC AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
The origins of CEDC
211
 go back to an Austrian-Hungarian bilateral defence policy 
directors’ meeting in November 2009, when the two directors discussed the 
opportunities of organizing regional seminars on defence co-operation.
212
 The first 
such seminar was held in Vienna in May 2010, where experts of Austria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia exchanged their views concerning 
co-operating on different defence issues.
213
 The next seminar was organized in 
Budapest in October 2010, where the experts of the same countries showed up and 
focused solely on the concept of Pooling and Sharing of capabilities.
214
 At the end of 
this seminar Péter Siklósi, the Hungarian defence policy director (DPD) proposed that 
the DPDs of the countries participated in these two seminars should meet on the 
margin of the informal EU DPD meeting in January 2011 to discuss the possibilities 
of practical defence co-operation.
215
 On this meeting the DPDs of the above-
mentioned six Central European countries agreed to investigate the areas of possible 
defence collaborations among their countries, and decided to concentrate on practical 
co-operative initiatives, which might deliver added value for defence capabilities.
216 
They wanted to make this co-operation as flexible as possible, where the participating 
countries ‘could choose à la carte among defence co-operation initiatives without 
formal obligations.’217  It meant that CEDC was intended to become a forum for 
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raising ‘potential areas of practical co-operation and each and every country was free 
to join and contribute to it.’218  
The first step for this was a creation of an extended survey, a matrix, which 
was filled by all of the six participating Central European MoDs to figure out the 
possible areas of co-operation, and find overlapping interests.
219
 These areas were 
discussed on DPD level, and where the MoDs identified promising topics for co-
operation one country took the responsibility of the lead nation to draft a food for 
thought paper concerning the issue and organize expert level seminars for those 
CEDC countries that were interested in.
220
 If the expert level negotiations became 
fruitful, the practical co-operation could begin usually in a bi- or trilateral format. 
Some of the projects have been the followings:  
 The joint training of Czech, Croatian and Hungarian Air Mentor Teams for 
NATO’s ISAF mission in the framework of the Advisor Team Pre-
Deployment Training (AAT-PDT) started as a consequence of CEDC 
negotiations.
221
 Originally it was a Czech-Croatian bilateral initiative, and 
thanks to the negotiations in CEDC Hungary joined to this project making it 
more viable. The AAT-PDT course programme is funded by the Multinational 
Helicopter Initiative
222
 and takes place both in Ostrava, Czech Republic and 
Zadar, Croatia, as the Czech Republic provides the training on simulators 
while the real life training is organized in Croatia.
223
 
 Early on Austria and Croatia produced a ‘food for thought’ (FFT) paper on co-
operation of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Their intention was to facilitate 
SOF related co-operation among CEDC countries utilizing their already 
existed bilateral training programmes
224
 as a platform for further 
collaboration.
225
 Austria and Croatia probably hoped that other countries 
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would join to their SOF training programmes, but their initiative had a lesser 




 Hungary developed an FFT paper ‘on Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices 
(C-IED) co-operation and in this framework “Train the Trainers” and 
“Weapons Intelligence Team” (WIT) activities have been successful in 
sharing lessons learned.’227 
 On the basis of the multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear (CBRN) defence battalion located in the Czech Republic, CBRN 




 In 2010 the Multinational Logistic Co-ordination Centre (MLCC) in the Czech 
Republic was created. Three of the five founding members (Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary) of MLCC became later CEDC countries,
229
 and the 
negotiations about logistical co-operation in CEDC format made possible that 
Austria and Croatia later joined to the MLCC. The project became one of the 
Smart Defence projects of NATO.
230
 
 Although CEDC nations have discussed co-operation on disaster relief 
operations for years,
231
 a Letter of Intent on the ‘Central European Military-
Civil-Defence Assets Initiative (Use of military assets in disaster relief and 
options for enhancing cross-border cooperation)’ was prepared and signed by 
Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia only in 2016.
232
 The aim of this 
co-operation is supporting ‘cross-border regional disaster relief, by the use of 
military assets’ in the event of natural or manmade disasters.233  
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As the participating states of CEDC wanted to stay as flexible and practical as 
possible the DPDs did not intend to create costly bureaucracies to support the 
emerging projects, thus decided to maintain the lead nation and round table formats. 
While lead nations are facilitating the practical collaborations, the DPD level 
negotiations are organized in round table format mostly on the margins of EU, NATO 
and Visegrad Four meetings.
234
 Later the presidency system was also introduced, 
which meant that every year one of the CEDC countries took the leadership of the co-
operation and organize the ministerial level meeting. The first CEDC defence 
ministerial meeting was organized by Austria in Frauenkirchen in 2012,
235
 and since 
then the defence ministers of the participating countries meet annually.  
Although, the original aim of the creation of CEDC was to improve the co-
operation on capability development,
236
 the coordination of defence policy 
standpoints became a very important part of the initiative as well. The DPDs of 
CEDC countries often meet on the margin of EU and NATO DPD meetings to discuss 
and co-ordinate their standpoints before the plenary sessions.
237
 Another example for 
policy co-ordination is that due to the CEDC meetings Hungary and Austria 
intensified their co-operation in the EUFOR’s Althea operation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
238
 As a consequence of Hungary taking over the air policing tasks of 
Slovenia’s airspace in 2014, 239  the question of the establishment of a Central 
European regional air policing system was also raised in CEDC.
240
  
The latest example of defence policy co-ordination happened concerning the 
European migration crisis. Many CEDC countries have been directly affected by the 
waves of migrants arriving to Europe, and their defence ministers discussed this issue 
and signed a Joint Declartion in April 2016. They agreed that the CEDC ‘countries 
will support all initiatives aimed at reducing the migration pressure on Europe,’ and 
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‘are committed to enhancing coordination in taking action to solve the crisis.’241 Since 
then Austrian policemen and troops arrived to the borders of Hungary to assist to 
handle the situation.
242
 The Czech and Slovakian police and militaries have sent their 
personnel to Hungary earlier as well,
243




CEDC is a flexible and practical organization not only in terms of capability 
development issues and policy co-ordination, but also in terms of co-operating with 
countries outside the CEDC framework. For instance, Poland has an observer status in 
CEDC.
245
 The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia collaborate with Poland on 
defence issues in another sub-regional framework called the Visegrad Four (V4) co-
operation. Thanks to Poland’s observer status in CEDC, Warsaw is aware of the 
defence collaborative efforts of its V4 partners in CEDC, which helps to avoid 
creating duplications in the two sub-regional co-operative groups. Another example 
for this flexibility and practicality is that CEDC states invited the Balkan countries 
(Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) affected by the migration crisis to the CEDC 
defence ministerial meeting in April 2016.
246
 It was a logical step, as migrants can 
reach CEDC countries only through these Balkan countries, thus co-operating with 
them is essential. 
We can see that CEDC provides an open forum for incubating ideas and 
starting capability development projects in bi- and trilateral formats, thus it has an 
important clearinghouse role for defence co-operative initiatives in the region. 
Accordingly, CEDC is a useful framework for facilitating smaller multinational 
capability development projects among Central European countries. In addition, 
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CEDC allows its participating states to co-ordinate their defence policy standpoints on 
certain areas in NATO and EU and support each other on region specific issues 
(disasters, migration crisis). However, CEDC has its own weaknesses as well. Among 
others is that the visibility of this co-operation is low. Probably, the reason behind it is 
that it is a new form of defence co-operation, and it does not have a flagship project 
and the co-operation remains at the levels of MoDs. Another problem is that although 
the co-operation is flexible and practical, sometimes it means that it does not have a 
well-defined direction, thus it remains ad hoc in many aspects.  
 
DEFENCE CO-OPERATION OF CEDC COUNTRIES BEFORE THE 
CREATION OF CEDC 
The CEDC countries have never co-operated in this constellation on defence earlier. 
The closest thing to CEDC was the Austro-Hungarian Empire one hundred years ago, 
when the territories of the current CEDC countries were part of the Habsburg led 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and their population was recruited to the Austrian-
Hungarian armed forces. However, at that time the CEDC states did not exist in their 
current format, thus this comparison is not really adequate either. After World War I 
the Paris Peace Conference divided Austria-Hungary into pieces, accordingly several 
new countries emerged on the map of Europe: Czechoslovakia was established from 
the northern part of the empire, the territories of current Slovenia and Croatia were 
attached to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the south (the Yugoslav Kingdom also 
included current Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), while Austria and Kingdom of 
Hungary – the two ruling pillars of the empire – became also separate and 
independent states, though their territories became significantly smaller. Some other 
parts of Austria-Hungary were also given to Romania and Italy. 
Taking into consideration that several countries were winners and others were 
losers of the peace treaties of World War I, it is not surprising that not all of the 
countries of the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire co-operated with each other on 
defence over the next decades. In the interwar period Czechoslovakia, Romania and 
Yugoslavia established a military coalition called ‘little entente’ against Hungary and 
Austria to prevent the restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy in any form and intended 




 Although Austria and Hungary did not join their forces for revenge, 
Hungary sided with the Axis Powers for gaining back some of its former territories.
248
 
Immediately before and during World War II Austria became part of the Third Reich 
via the Anschluss, the Western part of Czechoslovakia (the current Czech Republic) 
was occupied by Nazi Germany, and although Slovakia earned its independence its 
Southern territories were taken by Hungary.
249
  
After World War II the borders established by the peace treaties of World War 
I were restored, but as a consequence of the new geopolitical situation of the Cold 
War defence co-operation between the countries of the region was not possible. 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary became the part of the Soviet sphere of influence, thus 
they had no choice but to join to the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Although, Yugoslavia was 
a Communist country like the Soviet Union, the relationship between Moscow and 
Belgrade broke after World War II, and Yugoslavia declared itself a non-aligned 
country. Thus, Yugoslavia also developed its own distinct doctrines and weapon 
systems and prepared to defend itself from NATO, as well as the Warsaw Pact.
250
 
Austria became a neutral country in 1955, which made sure that it did not have to join 
either to NATO or to the Warsaw Pact. However, the Soviet military operational 
plans intended to attack NATO through Austria as well. Accordingly, there was no 
opportunity for countries of the region to co-operate on defence issues during the 
Cold War, because they mostly prepared for war against each other. Despite the fact 
that Hungary and Czechoslovakia belonged to the same military bloc and thus used 
the same weapons and doctrines, their defence co-operation was limited too. The 
reason behind this phenomenon was that the Warsaw Pact countries were 
‘strategically subordinated to the Soviet High Command’,251 thus there was not much 
space for regional or bilateral initiatives. 
After the end of the Cold War the situation changed fundamentally in Central 
Europe. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact collapsed. Slovenia and Croatia 
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fought for their independence in the Yugoslav Wars and became sovereign states in 
1991. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist in 1993, when the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
divorced peacefully. All the CEDC countries have become member of the EU,
252
 and 
with the exception of Austria, all of them have joined to NATO for the last two 
decades.
253
 Thus a new political environment allowed these countries to begin to co-
operate on defence issues with each other in different formats.  
One of the most well-known Central European collaboration is the so-called 
Visegrad Four (V4) co-operation, which was established by Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary in 1991. After the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia both the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia remained member of this co-operative initiative. 
Although defence issues were raised early on in the framework of the Visegrad Co-
operation, originally the V4 did not focus on military aspects of co-operation. The 
main aim of the four Central European post-communist countries was to help each 
other to build democracy, establish the rule of law and ensure state sovereignty in the 
region.
254
 In addition, they represented themselves as a bloc during accession 
negotiations with NATO and the EU,
255
 thus representing their interest much more 
effectively than they would have been able to do that individually. The V4 co-
operation was very successful in the 1990s, but when the participating countries 
joined both the EU and NATO the need for collaboration slowed in many aspects in 
the 2000s. Still the four countries have been meeting regularly at heads of state, prime 
ministerial, and expert levels to discuss and co-operate on many policy areas (foreign 
policy, culture, environment, economy, defence etc.).  
Defence co-operation has not been a very visible and relevant part of V4 co-
operation until recently. Promising initiatives have always emerged, but they never 
developed. A typical example for this is the agreement, which was signed by the V4 
defence ministers in 2002 to modernize Mi-24 attack helicopters together in a 
common V4 project,
256
 but because of the competing economic interests of the 
participating states the project was cancelled. Although defence collaboration on V4 
level had not been fruitful in the 1990s and 2000s the defence ministers, the Chiefs of 
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Defence (ChoDs) and different groups of subject matter experts met regularly. The 
turning point was in 2011, when the V4 countries agreed to provide a V4 EU 
Battlegroup in the first six months of 2016. The Visegrad Battlegroup consists of 
approximately 2500 troops from the four countries (950 troops from Poland, 750 
troops from the Czech Republic, 510 troops from Hungary and 450 troops from 
Slovakia),
257
 and the preparations, the trainings and exercises organized concerning 
the development of the battlegroup re-energized not only the V4 defence co-operation 
but the whole V4 project as well. The Visegrad countries already decided to make 
sure that the V4 Battlegroup will be on stand-by in the second half of 2019 too.
258
 
Another example for Central European sub-regional defence co-operation was 
the Central European Nations’ Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP). 
CENCOOP was initiated by Austria in 1996 in order to foster common participation 
of Central European countries in peace support operations. The project started in 1998 
with Austria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, while Switzerland and Croatia joined 
to the initiative in 1999 and in 2001 respectively.
259
 The Austrian assumption behind 
the initiation of CENCOOP was that in the post-Cold War era more and more 
peacekeeping troops were needed, which seemed to be logical if we take into 
consideration that after the Yugoslav wars many international peace support 
operations were launched in the Balkans in the 1990s.
260
 Austria’s peacekeepers 
earned a solid reputation thanks to its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations 
during the Cold War, thus for Vienna it was self-evident that it should help and lead 
the Central European nations in this regard. However, to the second half of the 1990s 
most of the post-communist Central European countries focused more on joining to 
the NATO and participating in NATO initiatives like the Partnership for Peace 
programme, than on sub-regional initiatives.
261
 Accordingly, the interests of the 
neutral (Austria and Switzerland) and the NATO membership aspirant (Hungary, 
Slovakia, Romania, Croatia) participants of CENCOOP began to diverge. This 
became more serious after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when many 
Central European post-Communist countries sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan to 
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support the US war against terror. Austria and Switzerland were less eager to 
participate in these missions and did not have the experience and expertise to provide 
support and leadership to other countries concerning counterinsurgency operations 
and on the area of more intensive war fighting. Accordingly, CENCOOP basically 
died out for the second half of the 2000s.
262
 
Another regional defence co-operation in Central Europe is the Multinational 
Engineer Battalion Tisa established by Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine in 
1999 for disaster relief operations.
263
 The four participating countries often experience 
severe floods of the river Tisa, and they created this multinational battalion to help 
each other during floods. The battalion has a multinational command element and 
approximately 700 troops.
264
 Every participating country provides one company for 
that, but the troops are not located in one garrison, but rather are on stand-by status in 
their respective countries. Although multinational staff exercises are held regularly,
265
 
the battalion has not deployed yet, despite the common floods of the Tisa river.  
The Multinational Land Forces (MLF) is an Italian-Hungarian-Slovenian 
trilateral brigade-level unit. Italy provides a regiment and most of the combat support 
and combat service support elements, while Hungary and Slovenia contributes to the 
unit with one battalion each. Although these units are based on the territory of their 
countries, they regularly train together. The elements of MLF were deployed to 
multinational operations several times in Kosovo and Afghanistan, in addition on the 
basis of MLF the three participating countries provided a 1500 troops strong 
battelgroup to the EU Battlegroup rotation in 2007 and 2012.
266
 
Besides of the above mentioned multilateral sub-regional defence 
collaborations a plethora of smaller bilateral co-operation endeavours exist between 
the CEDC countries mostly on the area of education, training and sharing experiences 
concerning operations. One of the most notable bilateral defence co-operation in the 
region is between the Czech and Slovakian armed forces. It is not surprising, if we 
take into consideration that the military personnel of the two countries served in the 
Czechoslovakian military until the early 1990s, thus both the cultural and institutional 
ties between the two armed forces could remain strong. In addition, the language 
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barrier between the two militaries as relatively small, as the Slovak and Czech 
languages are similar to each other. Although, in the 1990s the two armed forces 
looked mostly inward to organize themselves as individual armed forces,
267
 in the late 
1990s and early 2000s Czech-Slovak bilateral defence co-operation started to work 
very well. For instance, the two countries deployed together a battalion to Kosovo in 
2002
268
 and a CBRN battalion in Iraq,
269
 they also organized large-scale bilateral 
military exercises,
270
 and provided an EU Battlegroup that was on stand-by in 
2009.
271
 Another relevant bilateral co-operation exists between Hungary and Slovenia 
most notably, Hungarian fighter jets have been providing the air-policing tasks over 
Slovenia since 2014 for an indefinite period.
272
 Slovenia is a small country with a 
population of 2 million, and does not have fighter jets, thus under NATO agreements 




We could see that before CEDC the participating states had not co-operated on 
defence in this format. Although, the territories of the CEDC countries were part of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire one hundred years ago, we cannot trace back the 
origins of CEDC to this previous historical period, because the political situation of 
that time was so radically different. Sub-regional or even bilateral defence co-
operation between CEDC countries or between their predecessors was very rare until 
the end of the Cold War, as the geopolitical situations of the interwar period, World 
War II and Cold War did not permit it. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia created new opportunities and CEDC countries have 
begun to co-operate with each other in different regional frameworks (V4, 
CENCOOP, Tisa Batallion, MLF) and also bilaterally since the 1990s. At the same 
time, the six CEDC countries have never collaborated on defence in the current 
framework, despite the fact that the defence collaborations between the six 
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participating states have been dense not only in the sub-regional and bilateral levels, 
but also in the EU and NATO too.  
 
CREATING CEDC INSTEAD OF CO-OPERATING IN NATO AND EU 
The next parts of this chapter attempts to answer the question why these six Central 
European countries created CEDC, a new framework for defence co-operation, which 
did not have any historical precedent, and why they did not use rather EU or NATO 
for their defence co-operative efforts. This is a very important question especially 
regarding the former post-Communist countries, as their main aim after the fall of the 
Berlin wall was to join these two organizations. Joining the EU and NATO was not 
only a technical or legal issue, but it had a symbolic relevance for them. In the early 
1990’s the former Communist countries believed that they had the chance to leave the 
‘East’ and the Soviet influence and could move back to ‘Europe’ or the ‘West’, where 
they believed that they historically belonged.
274
 They wanted to reconnect with 
Europe to reclaim ‘a heritage that, in political terms, entailed the creation of liberal 
democracy, and, in economic terms, the establishment of a market economy’.275 Thus, 
not surprisingly the priorities of Central and Eastern European countries became the 
accession to NATO and EU,
276
 the two organizations that represented ‘Europe’ for 
them and hoped that these organizations would help them to become prosperous, safe, 
democratic and ‘European’ countries.  
The aspiration of post-Communist CEDC countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) regarding joining the EU and NATO was 
successful, as currently all of them are member states of both organizations. Thus, it is 
intriguing why they created a new sub-regional Multinational Defence Co-operation 
(MDC) instead of working in the organizations (NATO and EU), of which they 
wanted to be part, and they worked hard for years to fulfil their accession criteria. In 
the end, this meant so much for them concerning their national security, economic 
development and even in terms of identity.  
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Why the CEDC countries opted for co-operating in an MDC? 
As I delineated in the Research Framework chapter I attempt to answer my research 
questions by using multiple case design, and in regard to every case I test three rival 
explanations introduced earlier. Thus, I try to identify the prerequisites of the 
operationalized generic predicted patterns of the three rival explanations regarding 
CEDC. If I can identify the prerequisites of one of the rival explanations regarding 
this case, we can say that a rival can explain why the CEDC countries established the 
CEDC instead of co-operating in NATO or EU. The three rival explanations are 1) the 
lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation 2) the impacts of 
the financial crisis, 3) different emerging shared threat perceptions of European states. 
 
Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence 
cooperation  
 
Figure 6 – Rival Explanation 1: Predicted CEDC Pattern 
 
According to ‘Rival Explanation 1’, (see Figure 6) defence co-operation in NATO 
and EU did not progress well (independent variable), and CEDC countries became 
dissatisfied with this situation in NATO and EU (intervening variable), this led to the 
creation of an alternative body, which is CEDC (dependent variable). For this rival 
explanation I established three generic assumptions, which serve as prerequisites for 
verifying ‘Rival Explanation 1’. The prerequisites are the following: 
1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to 
be identified. 
2. The dissatisfaction of CEDC countries concerning the lack of progress of 
defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected. 
3. The creation of the CEDC needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction of CEDC 
countries with NATO/EU. 
 
If all of these prerequisites can be confirmed, we can assess that ‘Rival 
Explanation 1’ has explanatory power concerning the case of CEDC. Based on this 
framework I attempt to identify these prerequisites one by one. 
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Prerequisite 1: 
The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to be 
identified. 
This is the only prerequisite among the prerequisites of the three rival explanations, 
which is not directly associated with the participating states of the studied MDCs. In 
addition, the lack of progress concerning relevant EU and NATO defence cooperation 
– especially in the area of military capability development – was introduced and 
demonstrated in the Literature Review chapter. Thus, in this section I am not going to 
repeat the events and processes in this regard, but based on the Literature Review 
chapter I will take Prerequisite 1 of Rival Explanation 1 as a given regarding every 
case. 
 Accordingly, Prerequisite 1 based on the Literature Review is confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 2: 
The dissatisfaction of CEDC countries concerning the lack of progress of defence co-
operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected. 
As I mentioned earlier the post-communist CEDC countries wanted to be members of 
the EU and NATO not only because of legal issues or economic gains but because of 
symbolic reasons too. When they successfully joined these organizations, they were 
inexperienced and first attempted to find their places and figure out the dynamics in 
these organizations. Accordingly, they were not dissatisfied with the lack of progress 
of defence co-operations in EU and NATO, rather they were criticized by others, 
because they often lagged behind concerning military modernization and did not keep 
their defence budgets at an appropriate level.  
The CEDC countries, which joined NATO after the Cold War, have been 
criticized regularly both openly and behind close doors by NATO officials and 
representatives of older NATO member states. For example, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary joined NATO in 1999 (along with Poland) and faced harsh criticism from 
NATO officials in the early 2000s. Ferenc Juhasz the Hungarian defence minister that 
time received several critical remarks because of the severe defence budget cuts in 




 In 2002, he acknowledged ‘after meeting with NATO Secretary-
General Lord Robertson that Hungary has failed to meet its NATO commitments over 
the past four years to such an extent that the alliance has unofficially told him that 
Hungary would already have been expelled if an expulsion were possible.’278 General 
Joseph Ralston, the Alliance’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe that time told 
Juhasz that ‘Hungary had not met any of the commitments it had freely undertaken 
earlier’.279 At the same time, Western NATO members were concerned about the 
corruption and lack of transparency concerning defence contracts in the Czech 
Republic.
280
 In this regard one of the major issues was the Czech aircraft tender. 
Namely, the Czech armed forces intended to buy more than twenty new aircrafts, 
which according to the NATO Secretary General was ‘unnecessary from the NATO 
point of view’, and these costs could have been spent on the procurement of more 
demanding capabilities.
281
 Similarly to Hungary the Czech Republic was also 
criticized for implementing defence reforms too slowly and narrowly.
282
 
Western NATO states were disappointed with the contribution of new NATO 
members to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in early 2000s too. One of the senior 
defence diplomats of a Western NATO member argued that many NATO countries 
believed that Hungary ‘could have done more in Afghanistan’. 283  Similarly to 
Hungary, the Czech Republic was also reluctant to provide military assistance to the 
ISAF mission in the first years of the operations in Afghanistan.
284
 In 2007, Liam Fox 
the British shadow defence secretary that time criticized several NATO countries 
including Hungary, because according to him these NATO members did not provide 
enough support for their allies in Afghanistan. Referring to the new Eastern European 
member states he argued that ‘they have come into NATO, pocketed the security 
guarantee and have cut defence spending,’ and he stressed that NATO should ‘be able 
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to suspend NATO members who do not spend the levels of funding that we 
agreed.’285 
In 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen criticized both the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia for reducing their defence budgets, thus moving farther 
from reaching the goal of spending 2% of their GDP on defence, on which all NATO 
members agreed on. In this regard, Rasmussen sent a letter to the Czech prime 
minister ‘warning that his government might not be able to fulfil its commitments to 
the alliance should these cuts continue in the coming years.’286 In addition, according 
to the Czech media, a draft NATO report was leaked which concluded that the ‘Czech 
Republic would not be useful for NATO if a real war broke out unless it adds money 
to the armed forces’. 287  Rasmussen met the prime minister, the president, the 
ministers for defence, foreign affairs and interior of Slovakia in May 2011, when he 
expressed his dissatisfaction regarding Slovakia ‘for providing too few financial 
resources for its military’.288 
We can see that the above-mentioned three CEDC NATO members (Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) were not dissatisfied with NATO rather NATO 
officials and NATO members were dissatisfied with them. Thus, it is not surprising 
that there is no evidence that they would have expressed any dissatisfaction 
concerning NATO on defence co-operation. There is no record about open NATO 
criticism towards Slovenia or Croatia, and there is no sign of Croatian or Slovenian 
dissatisfaction from their governments towards the Alliance either. Croatia joined to 
NATO in 2009, thus between the date of Croatian admission to NATO and the 
creation of CEDC only two years passed, which time may be too short to determine 
whether there were serious clashes between Croatia and NATO. Slovenia’s case is 
also a special one. Before Slovenia’s 2004 admission to NATO Slovenia’s critics had 
‘legitimate issues to raise especially concerning its limited force projection 
capabilities’.289  However, the possibilities the relatively small sized Slovenia was 
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clear for NATO members, thus their expectations about Slovenia’s future 
contributions had to be remained realistic.
290
 
If we look at the defence budgets of the CEDC NATO members, we can see 
that they have been consistent underperformers in providing sufficient financial 
resources to their defence capabilities, as none of them have ever reached the above-
mentioned 2% of GDP threshold on defence spending.
291
 Not surprisingly the 
question whether these new NATO members are free riders in the Alliance has been 
raised from time to time.
292
 Wade Jacoby argued that new NATO members attempted 
to compensate their slow military transformation and low defence budgets by ‘policy 
loyalty’ in the 2000s.293 He pointed out that, when older NATO members realized that 
they can expect only limited military contributions from the Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) NATO members, they rather asked for policy loyalty, diplomatic 
support, niche capabilities and troop contributions to NATO missions instead of 
significant defence capabilities.
294
 ‘Thus, NATO’s recognition of the factors blocking 
real defence reform led it to refashion its key demands to stress the policy loyalty of 
CEE states’. 295  Accordingly, CEDC NATO members were not dissatisfied with 
NATO, as they benefited from the situation. Namely they could avoid costly 
structural defence reforms by providing ‘policy loyalty’, and still could benefit from 
NATO’s security guarantees.  
We can see that the main debates that affected CEDC NATO members 
concerning security and defence were linked to NATO and not to the EU. It is not 
surprising, if we take into consideration that NATO is a much more mature 
organization regarding defence, as its primary functions has always been being a 
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military alliance, while the EU based defence co-operation is younger and not as deep 
as NATO’s (see Literature Review chapter). In addition, the United States, militarily 
the most powerful country on Earth and the leading member of NATO, pushes the 
Alliance towards much more elaborated and challenging military demands. 
Accordingly, CEDC NATO members have prioritized defence co-operation in NATO 
over EU mostly using the argument that the two organizations were complementing 
each other, as NATO possesses better tools on the military domain while the EU has 
more suitable tools concerning the civilian tasks of crisis management operations. 
This means that CEDC NATO members were even less concerned about the lack of 
progress in EU defence initiatives, because they focused on NATO. 
Austria’s situation has been different, because it has been an EU member since 
1995, but has never joined to NATO. As I pointed out earlier, Austria built a very 
close relationship with NATO, Vienna has even been contributing to NATO 
operations on the Balkans, and at some point in the 1990s it seemed that the political 
will might exist in Austria to join the Alliance.
296
 In addition, the public would have 
supported Austrian NATO accession as well, but especially the controversies of 
NATO’s Kosovo intervention in 1999 and Operation Iraqi Freedom (which was not a 
NATO operation) in 2002 made Austrians more cautious about NATO membership 
and strengthened the status of permanent neutrality – taken by Austria in 1955 – as an 
important element of Austrian identity.
297
 However, the EU’s initiative for creating a 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) questioned the sustainability of 
Austria’s permanent neutrality status. Furthermore, Vienna was aware of the changing 
international security dynamics, and intended to be a constructive and solid member 
of the EU concerning security and defence issues as well.
298
 Accordingly, it changed 
the slogan of neutrality to solidarity,
299
 and decided to reduce the concept of neutrality 
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to its core, which meant that they would not join a military alliance and would not 
permit the stationing of foreign military troops on Austrian territory.
300
 
However, despite the fact that Austria supported ESDP, there is no sign that 
the Austrian government would have been dissatisfied with the lack of more serious 
EU defence co-operations. This might be partly explained first by the ambivalent 
Austrian standpoint with abandoning or reducing its neutrality further. Namely, 
deeper EU defence co-operation could have created situations when new debates 
might have emerged on Austria’s stance on neutrality. Secondly, already in the Cold 
War the Austrian political elite never believed that the Austrian Armed Forces (AAF) 
would fight,
301
 and accordingly the AAF’s war fighting capabilities were limited. 
Austrian troops have rather focused on participating in international peace operations 
since the 1960s,
302
 thus for Vienna the EU’s less developed defence co-operation and 
lesser focus on actual warfighting fit to its identity and its operational military 
experience. Based on the above-mentioned ambivalent Austrian standpoint on its 
neutrality and its limited war fighting capabilities, probably Austrians were less 
interested in a quickly progressing EU defence collaboration. Thus, these two factors 
might be likely the reasons, why Vienna was not dissatisfied concerning the lack of 
progress in ESDP. 
We can conclude that none of the CEDC countries were dissatisfied with the 
lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts at the EU and NATO. They were not 
critical towards these organizations, rather some of them were criticized. We could 
see that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have received open criticism 
several times from NATO members and NATO officials because of their lack of 
progress on military reforms, small contributions to NATO’s ISAF mission and their 
defence budget cuts. Because of different reasons Croatia and Slovenia have not been 
criticized by the Alliance and allies, and they were not critical to NATO either. 
However, all these countries have struggled to catch up with their NATO 
commitments, especially on military reform and defence budgets, thus they were not 
in the position for being dissatisfied or critical concerning NATO’s defence co-
operations. Although the aforementioned five countries have been both EU and 
NATO members, for them NATO have been the more important organization 
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concerning defence collaborations. Not surprisingly they were less focused on EU in 
this regard, and accordingly have cared less whether ESDP progressed appropriately 
or not. Thus, ESDP’s slow progress was not a concern for them. Austria has been an 
EU member only, and Vienna was not dissatisfied with ESDP either, as a less deep 
co-operation and less focus on war fighting capabilities fit to Austria’s identity and 
the capabilities of its armed forces. 
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 3: 
The creation of the CEDC needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction of CEDC countries 
with NATO/EU. 
This section looks at whether the creation of the CEDC is linked to CEDC countries’ 
dissatisfaction with NATO/EU. Taking into consideration the findings regarding 
Prerequisite 2, we can conclude that dissatisfaction with EU/NATO was not a factor 
in creating CEDC. The situation seems to be quite the opposite, because many CEDC 
countries perceived CEDC as a platform, which might help to fulfil their EU and 
NATO obligations.  
Among others Austria regarded CEDC as the Central European realization of 
EU’s Ghent process about Pooling and Sharing of defence capabilities, 303  and a 
framework where Vienna could work together with its NATO member neighbouring 
states
304
 after CENCOOP died out.
305
 Croatia also saw CEDC in the context of the 
aforementioned EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiative, but Zagreb deemed CEDC as a 
possible tool for contributing to NATO’s Smart Defence initiative and an opportunity 
to co-operate with Visegrad countries as well.
306
 One of the original ideas the 
Hungarians intended to realize via CEDC was the creation of a Central European 
regional air-policing system.
307
 The Hungarian MoD had realized that many countries 
in the region struggled with the procurement (Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia) and 
maintaining (Hungary) of modern fighter jet fleets, and thus believed that co-
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operation on this area would be economical and logical.
308
 The Hungarian MoD did 
not intend to create an independent Central European capability, but it wanted to 
incorporate it into the NATO Integrated Air Defense System. The scheme could have 
been similar to the agreement between Slovenia and Hungary, which provides the 
legal basis for Hungarian aircrafts to execute air-policing tasks over Slovenian 
territory.
309
 However, the idea of regional air policing seemed to be a too big step for 
CEDC countries, thus it was side-lined at a very early stage of the creation of CEDC. 
Although the Czechs, Slovaks and Slovenes did not oppose CEDC, they were 
not as enthusiastic about it as the other three CEDC states (Austria, Croatia, 
Hungary). The Slovenes were neutral all the time, and was not against any ideas but 
did not advocate any initiative concerning CEDC either.
310
 The Czechs thought that 
too many multinational defence initiatives (EU pooling and sharing, NATO Smart 
Defence, regional groupings in NATO Defence Planning Process, V4 Battlegroup, 
CEDC) were launched in the early 2010s, and saw the situation as a ‘mess’.311 As the 
Czechs main focus was on NATO and their sub-regional preference was in V4, they 
attempted to use CEDC to somehow facilitate NATO projects among Central 
European states and channelled some of their projects in this regard to CEDC.
312
 
According to the MoD officials of some CEDC countries,
313
 Slovakia was very 
sceptical about CEDC in the beginning. Similar to the Czech Republic, Slovakia also 
prioritized NATO and V4 over other options regarding multinational defence co-
operation. Thus, it is not surprising that Slovakia wanted to use CEDC for supporting 
NATO and EU projects and brought Poland to the CEDC as an observer. Probably, 
Bratislava did not want its biggest neighbour and the most powerful member of the 
V4 to miss out from any major regional defence initiative. More importantly, 
Slovakia perceived the CEDC mainly through a NATO and EU lens, as other CEDC 
members had done. One Slovakian MoD officials framed the general feeling about the 
relationship between CEDC and EU/NATO the best: 
‘CEDC was established to support initiatives of EU and NATO as 
well. EU and NATO offer many projects and initiatives where 
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CEDC countries doesn’t have enough resources (financial, personal, 
technical etc.). Together we have a potential to support EU and 
NATO projects and operations effectively. I wouldn’t see CEDC 
cooperation as a competitor to the EU and NATO initiatives. During 
the first CEDC meetings there was matrix of projects identified, in 
which are participating countries willing to cooperate. All of them 
are in line with EU and NATO Pooling&Sharing and NATO Smart 
Defence [initiatives]. We are searching for partners to join already 
existing projects.’314 
 
To sum up we can see that dissatisfaction with the EU/NATO did not play a 
role in creation CEDC. As Prerequisite 2 was not confirmed, this should have been 
enough per se to confirm that this variable is not relevant in this case. This section not 
only supported the findings of Prerequisite 2, but highlighted that a major factor in 
establishing CEDC was that the participating countries wanted to use CEDC for 
fulfilling NATO Smart Defence and EU Pooling and Sharing projects.  
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed. 
 
Conclusion 
We can conclude that Rival Explanation 1 has no explanatory power about why 
Central European countries created CEDC instead of using the NATO and EU 
frameworks (see Figure 7). Only Prerequisite 1 was verified and Prerequisite 2 was 
not, which mean that the independent variable of ‘Lack of progress on pan-European 
and Transatlantic defence co-operation’ was not proved to be the source of the 
intervening variable of ‘CEDC countries are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’. 
Accordingly, this cannot be the reason why CEDC was established. Furthermore, we 
could see that CEDC was established for fulfilling NATO Smart Defence and EU 
Pooling and Sharing projects in a Central European framework.  
 
 
Figure 7 – Rival Explanation 1: Actual CEDC Pattern 
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Rival Explanation 2 – Effects of the financial crisis 
This rival explanation assumes that as a consequence of the financial crisis CEDC 
countries decreased their defence budgets (independent variable), accordingly they 
needed alternative multinational solutions to maintain their national military 
capabilities (intervening variable). The prerequisites for this rival explanation are the 
following: 
1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in 
the CEDC countries. 
2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative 
multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the CEDC 
countries. 
3. The creation of the CEDC needs to be linked to CEDC countries’ search for 
alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as 
a consequence of the financial crisis. 
 
 




Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in the 
CEDC countries. 
The financial and economic crisis of 2008 had a severe impact on the CEDC 
countries, and they implemented austerity measures to balance their budgets similarly 
to most of the European countries. In this section, I investigate whether defence 
budget cuts have happened in the consequence of the financial crisis in the CEDC 
countries.  
According to a 2010 decision of the Austrian government the Austrian MoD 
could spend 530 million Euros less between 2011-2014, than it was planned earlier.
315
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Austria’s defence budget in 2010 was approximately 2.2 billion Euros,316 thus the 
Austrian defence budget cut for the 2011-2014 period was around 6%. This measure 
was a direct impact of the financial crisis. Croatia began to reduce its defence budget 
because of the financial crisis earlier and cut its defence spending by 11.39% already 
in 2009.
317
 However, as a consequence of continuous reductions, Croatia spent 18% 
less on defence in 2014 than in 2009,
318
 and thus the defence budget could not reach 
2% of GDP to 2010 as it was originally planned,
319
 and instead fell from 1.62% of 
GDP to 1.41% of the GDP in five years (2009-2014). According to the data provided 
by the Czech Ministry of Defence,
320
 Prague cut its defence budget every year 
between 2009 and 2014, and spent 25% less on defence in 2014 (39.1 billion Czech 
koruna) than in 2009 (51.8 billion Czech koruna). However, if we compare these data 
on 2010 constant US dollars, the reduction is more than 30%.
321
 
Similarly to Croatia, Hungary’s defence budget was 18% less in 2014 (1.2 
billion USD) than in 2009 (1.47 billion USD) on 2010 prices.
322
 Nevertheless, if we 
take into consideration that the Hungarian government made a pledge in 2009 that it 
would increase its defence budget by 0.2% of its GDP – from 1.1% of the GDP to 
1.3% of the GDP – in the next four years,323 we can see that the difference between 
the original planned and the actual defence spending was more than 30%. In the case 
of Slovakia, the trend was similar to the other CEDC countries, and Slovakia’s 
defence expenditure also decreased in most of the years between 2009 and 2014, 
which resulted in a 25% smaller defence budget in 2014 than in 2009.
324
 
Proportionately Slovenia’s defence budget suffered the biggest hit among CEDC 
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We could see that all of the aforementioned countries decreased their defence 
budgets as a consequence of the financial crisis. Namely, on average they reduced 
their defence spending by 25% in the period between 2009 and 2014. The smallest 
decrease happened in Austria by a defence budget cut of 6% and the biggest one was 
in Slovenia, where defence spending was reduced by 38%.  
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 1 has been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 2: 
The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative 
multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the CEDC 
countries. 
The previous section showed that all CEDC countries reduced their defence spending 
after the financial crisis. Now I study how the CEDC MoDs handled this situation and 
what kind of answers they gave to the emerging problems stemmed from the defence 
budget cuts. In this regard this section also attempts to find out whether CEDC 
countries have searched for alternative multinational solutions in MDCs 
(multinational defence co-operation) to maintain their national military capabilities. 
For this, first I investigate the major measures made by the CEDC MoDs to manage 
the defence budget cuts. Second, I also look at the white papers, national military 
strategies and national security strategies that CEDC countries developed right after 
the financial crisis, because these documents might help to understand the 
institutionalized views of the CEDC MoDs concerning MDCs and multinational 
capability development opportunities. 
As a consequence of the Austrian defence budget cuts, the Austrian MoD 
decided to decrease its personnel, decommission military equipment, reduce trainings 
and sell some of its properties. In this regard, one of the major measures was that 
AAF’s personnel were cut by 1000 (from 27,300).326 Approximately half of them 
were pensioned off, others were transferred to the Finance and Interior Ministries and 
the unfilled positions were eliminated. The MoD also decommissioned 500 tanks, 
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closed several caserns and reduced training hours significantly.
327
 Accordingly, the 
first Austrian response to the defence budget cuts was traditional, and Vienna 
intended to solve its problems on the national level. If we look at the latest Austrian 
White Paper published in 2012,
328
 we can see that Austria did not consider alternative 
multinational solutions for maintaining its national capabilities. Austria considered 
the major multinational co-operation on defence in the framework of EU’s 
initiatives,
329
 which cannot be considered a new alternative multinational solution. 
Furthermore, interestingly although a sub-chapter of the document described CEDC 
as an important MDC it was not considered as a forum for co-operation on capability 
development.
330
 Accordingly, there is no sign that Austria would have searched for 
alternative multinational solutions to mitigate the effects of its defence budget cuts. 
The Croatian armed force was in the middle of the execution of its 2006-2015 
long-term development plan,
331
 when the financial crisis hit the country and its 
defence budget. The defence budget cuts had a serious impact on most of the parts of 
the Croatian armed force. The most well-known problems emerged with the aging 
Croatian MiG-21 fighter jet fleet, as two fighter jets crashed in 2010 on the same 
exercise
332
 and an additional one crashed in 2014.
333
 Although, in regards to the first 
two cases of 2010 the Croatian prime minister dismissed that the defence budget cuts 
had any relationship with the crashes,
334
 in 2014 referring to the new case the defence 
minister admitted that ‘defence cuts were in some degree responsible for the crash’.335 
Despite its hardships Zagreb did not try to explore possibilities concerning 
multinational defence co-operations on capability development in the late 2000s and 




 Austria, Bundesminister Für Landesverteidigung Und Sport, Weissbuch 12 (Vienna: 
BMLVS/Heeresdruckzentrum, 2013). 
329
 Ibid. 34-35. 
330
 Ibid. 33-34. 
331
 The Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, The Croatian Armed Forces Long-term Development 
Plan 2006-2015 (Zagreb, 2006). 
332
 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, “Two MIG-21 Crashed during an Exercise on 




 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, “Croatian Air Force Commander and MIG 21 Pilot 




 “Budget Cuts Not Responsible for MIG Accident, Prime Minister Says,” Croatian Times, 
September 24, 2010, http://www.croatiantimes.com/news/General_News/2010-09-
24/13993/Budget_cuts_not_responsible_for_MIG_accident,_PM_says. 
335
 Sven Mikelic, “Croatian Jet Crash Blamed on Defence Cuts,” Balkan Insight, August 6, 2014, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatian-jet-crash-blamed-on-defence-cuts. 
 98 
early 2010s. Earlier Croatia considered the possibility of bilateral fighter jet 
procurement with Slovenia, and was ready to co-operate with other nations on this 
issue too.
336
 A four-way fighter jet procurement amongst Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania 
and Turkey project was also floated, but this idea did not materialize either, and in 
2007 Croatia decided to procure fighter jets alone.
337
 However, Croatia does not have 
the resources for that so far. Thus, we can see that although Croatia searched for 
alternative multinational solutions to maintain certain national military capabilities 
(fighter jets), this did not relate to the defence budget cuts of the financial crisis, 
because Zagreb already abandoned the idea of multinational fighter jet procurement 
before the financial crisis.  
The Croatian Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 2013 shows as well that 
Croatia did not take MDCs into consideration for alleviating the negative effects of 
the economic crisis on its defence budget. The document states that the Croatian 
MoD’s answer for the defence budget cuts resulted by the economic crisis was the 
‘decrease and rationalization of expenditures, […] improved management, proper 
determination of priorities, more effective use of resources’ etc. It means that Croatia 
intended to solve its problems nationally and not in a multinational way. Although the 
document has a short chapter about ‘international defence co-operation’, 338  it 
highlights that the emphasis for Croatia concerning MDCs lay on ‘defence diplomacy 
and participation in arms control activities as well as confidence and security building 
measures’,339 and only a lesser degree on capability development. Accordingly, we 
can conclude, that Croatia did not want to use multinational solutions to mitigate the 
defence budget cuts resulted from the financial crisis. Although it attempted to 
procure fighter jets in a multinational way in the 2000s, it abandoned this idea before 
the financial crisis broke out. Furthermore, the 2013 Croatian SDR shows that the 
Croatian MoD intended to handle the defence budget cuts with rationalization, and 
did not perceive multinational defence co-operation as an important tool for capability 
development let alone a possible answer for the defence budget cuts. 
First and foremost the Czech Republic dealt with the problems stemmed from 
its decreasing defence budget by the traditional national way. Namely, the Czech 
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armed force intended to absorb the negative effects generated by reduced resources 
itself, at the same time the Czech MoD was open to multinational solutions on 
capability development, but did not focus on it. The Czech armed force significantly 
cut its personnel, as the number of its employee was reduced from 24 000 to 18 000 in 
2010.
340
 In this regard, altogether 4500 positions were dismissed at the MoD and 
among the troops, while the General Staff and the Joint Support Command were 
restructured into three agencies resulting in a 1600 personnel reduction.
341
 Besides 
this, among others the Czech armed force reduced its level of ambition, withdrew 
most of its forces from NATO’s Kosovo mission (KFOR), sold military properties 
and postponed the procurement of several major weapon-systems and equipment.
342
  
The Czech MoD was open to multinational solutions, but was not looking 
actively for alternative multinational solutions on capability development, and 
according to the Czech White Paper of 2011 the Czechs concentrated on the existing 
co-operative frameworks of NATO and EU.
343
 Accordingly, Prague saw NATO and 
the EU as especially useful in establishing strategic capabilities on areas, where 
individual countries were not able to develop them alone.
344
 The document also 
mentions that the Czech Republic ‘naturally co-operates’ with neighbouring countries 
and it is willing to collaborate with other states as well, but these projects ‘have to be 
based on the principles of mutual advantage and balanced sharing of costs and 
returns’. 345  The White Paper underlined the importance of the Czech Republic’s 
military co-operation with Slovakia because of historical and cultural reasons.
346
 
Based on these, we can conclude that the Czech Republic dealt with the effects of the 
defence budget cuts individually, and did not consider multinational solutions 
seriously in this regard. It does not mean that the Czech MoD was not open to 
multinational defence co-operative efforts, but they did not perceive MDCs as a 
solution for the shrinking defence budgets. Rather they saw multinational defence co-
operation as an opportunity to develop and share costly strategic capabilities in 
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NATO/EU frameworks, and as natural activity with neighbouring countries especially 
with Slovakia. 
Unlike the Czech Republic, Hungary maintained its level of ambition and its 
troops in international operations, but it stopped most of its major procurement 
programmes and postponed them until after 2016. Besides the freeze on procurement, 
the Hungarian MoD renegotiated its lease contract with SAAB concerning Hungary’s 
Gripen fleet extending the contract another 10 years in order to free financial 
resources for the period of 2012-2016.
347
 In 2011, the MoD cut the administrative and 
command positions of the Hungarian Defence Force and MoD by 1000,
348
 and 
decided to sell some of its properties as well.
349
 At the same time Hungary seriously 
considered that projects in MDCs might be alternatives for national capability 
development on certain areas. As the Hungarian National Military Strategy of 2011 
states  
‘in capability development we must increasingly rely upon NATO, 
EU, regional and bilateral programmes. […] Keeping cost efficiency 
in mind, the opportunities lying in the development and sharing of 
defence capabilities in international cooperation must be exploited. 
In this regard, it is advisable to rely upon regional defence and 
military cooperation, among others the cooperation of the Visegrad 
Four and other Central European partners.’350 
 
Similarly to the Czech Republic Hungary perceived NATO and EU as 
frameworks, which were appropriate for developing costly capabilities ‘that the 
country could not procure or maintain on its own and that are also absent in the 
international domain’.351  However, the difference between the Hungarian and the 
Czech stance on MDCs was that while Hungary openly advocated the usage of sub-
regional (which the official documents called ‘regional’) MDCs, the clear priority for 
the Czech Republic remained the co-operation in NATO and the EU. The Hungarian 
openness to MDCs was evident in the implicit remarks of the previous
352
 and the 
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explicit statement of the current
353
 defence policy directors of Hungary about the 
possibility that MDCs could mitigate the effects of the financial crisis on defence 
capabilities. Not surprisingly Hungary took a significant part in the creation of CEDC, 
furthermore in the first half of the 2010s it was very active in deepening defence 
collaborations in V4 format as well.
354
 Based on the aforementioned processes and 
phenomena, we can conclude that Hungary took seriously that MDCs could help 
maintain its certain national military capabilities and thus MDCs could mitigate the 
negative effects caused by the financial crisis on national defence capabilities. 
 After the financial crisis the Slovak Armed Forces (SAF) was reorganized 
significantly in 2009,
355
 in addition the newly elected government initiated a Strategic 
Defence Review (SDR) in 2010,
356
 which was outlined in a new White Paper.
357
 The 
Slovak MoD, similar to its Hungarian counterpart, prioritized its contributions to 
international operations and its troop readiness over capability development, thus 
postponed its major procurement programmes and reduced some of the staff 
personnel as well.
358
 The replacement of the MiG-29 fighter jets was perceived as one 
of the most pressing and costly issues, but the SAF will not have funds for that in the 
foreseeable future. According to Slovakia’s 2011 White Paper, Bratislava is ready for 
co-operating on many defence capability areas in multinational format, but its 
emphasis is on collaborations in NATO and EU.
359
 Although, the White Paper does 
not emphasize explicitly the prevalence of NATO in this regard, the list of potential 
areas of multinational capability development suggests that NATO is the most 
important multinational framework for Slovakia on capability development.
360
 While 
in terms of sub-regional defence co-operation only one remark can be found in the 
document, and it is about the Visegrad Group, it states that bilateral military co-
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operation has to be pragmatic, economically feasible and long-term.
361
 We could see 
that Slovakia’s measures, which intended to handle the decreasing financial resources 
after the economic crisis, were also national ones. Although, the Slovak MoD 
supports MDCs, according to its new White Paper it prioritizes defence co-operation 
in NATO above any other forms. Accordingly, in the case of Slovakia the financial 
crisis did not foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to 
maintain national military capabilities. 
Slovenia’s case is similar to the cases of Hungary and Slovakia in the sense 
that Ljubljana decided to postpone or cancel its procurement programmes, but did not 
cut its personnel as much as the Czech Republic. Right after the financial crisis the 
resources for modernization were decreased by 50%, and the Slovene MoD did not 
have the funds to recruit more soldiers as it was planned earlier.
362
 Slovenia published 
a new National Security Strategy in 2010, and although it touches the effects of the 
economic crisis several times,
363
 it does not contemplate about how the Slovene MoD 
should handle the defence budget cuts resulted by the financial crisis. Interestingly, 
the document does not mention multinational defence co-operation at all, and does not 
states how they should be used to meet policy objectives. In addition, even the 
General Long-Term Development Plan of the Slovenian Armed Forces published in 
2011 barely touches MDCs. It only says that ‘the legal basis allowing the 
implementation […] of multinational modernization and equipping projects of the 
Slovenian Armed Forces
 should also be provided’. 364  This shows, that Slovenia 
probably does not possess the legal framework for multinational capability 
development projects. Based on the national measures to the defence budget cuts, and 
the total lack of interest in MDCs in Slovenia’s strategic documents, we can assume 
that Slovenia did not take into consideration that it should look to alternative 
multinational solutions to manage its shrinking national capabilities. 
In this section, we could see that the individual CEDC countries intended to 
solve the problems caused by the defence budget cuts after the financial crisis mostly 
in a national way. Although they had different priorities, basically CEDC armed 
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forces rationalized themselves and cut defence expenses by reducing personnel, 
postponing or cancelling procurement programmes, decreasing training hours, 
withdrawing their troops from international operations etc. However, they rarely 
looked at MDCs as a tool for alleviating the impacts of the economic crisis on defence 
budgets, if they looked at them at all. Thus, except Hungary they did not searched for 
alternative multinational solutions on defence co-operation.  
This is logical, if we take into consideration that defence budget cuts for 
CEDC countries were imminent, and CEDC MoDs had to manage their worsening 
budgetary situation immediately. Developing multinational projects takes time, which 
CEDC countries did not have. Accordingly, it is not surprising that they reacted 
nationally on handling the defence budget cuts, and if they had to choose they 
preferred already existing multinational frameworks. Austria focused on EU, and the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia prioritized NATO over any other options concerning 
capability development. It means that these three countries were open to multinational 
capability development programmes, but they did not search for alternative ones, and 
as we could see, none of them considered MDCs as a cure for the decreasing defence 
budgets. Slovenia did not concentrate on multinational capability development at all, 
while Croatia focused on integrating to NATO and preparing for joining the EU. 
Although Croatia intended to procure fighter jets in a multinational programme 
earlier, Zagreb abandoned this idea to the second half of the 2000s. Hungary was the 
only one CEDC country that really believed that MDCs could be the solution of the 
problem caused by the economic crisis. Accordingly, we can conclude that the 
defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis did not foster the search 
for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military 
capabilities in the CEDC countries except Hungary. 
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 3: 
The creation of the CEDC needs to be linked to CEDC countries’ search for 
alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a 
consequence of the financial crisis. 
In regards to Prerequisite 2 we could see that CEDC countries, except Hungary, were 
not searching for alternative multinational solutions to alleviate the effects of the 
financial crisis on defence budgets. Accordingly, in terms of the relationship between 
 104 
the creation of CEDC and the financial crisis, we can say that most of CEDC MoDs 
did not see how CEDC could alleviate the problems of the defence budget cuts, which 
is supported by the views of CEDC MoD officials as well. 
Referring to the effects of the financial crisis Peter Slovak, the Head of 
Defence Policy Division at the Slovak MoD, pointed out that ‘capability planning 
with pooling and sharing […] is one of the ways how to get more capabilities for less 
money, but it will be quite difficult to reach this goal due to an uncertain resource 
(financial) perspective’. 365  Accordingly, some perceived the financial crisis as an 
obstacle and not an opportunity for multinational defence co-operation. Austrians 
perceived that CEDC was more a political project than a financial one. Johann Pucher 
the Austrian defence policy director highlighted that ‘enhancing co-operation in 
capability development would enable cost saving as well as preservation of existing 
capabilities that otherwise could not be maintained; co-operation should not be 
focused on economic goals only but has to take into account the political dimension 
of pooling and sharing incentives.’366 Accordingly, Austrian officials believed that 
CEDC might bring cost-savings in the long term, but this would take time and huge 




Czech officials perceived the financial crisis as a factor in creating CEDC
368
 
and believed that the impact of the financial crisis on defence budgets was part of the 
‘official’ narrative for establishing CEDC. However, the ‘unofficial’ reason for the 
Czechs was not related to economic issues, but rather the biggest added value of 
CEDC was that it brought Austria and Croatia into a Central European framework, 
where the Czech MoD could work with them together with other countries from the 
region.
369
 Thus, the possible economic benefits of the co-operation for the Czech 
Republic played a much less part than other considerations. The Croatian MoD 
supported any initiatives, which provided opportunities for working together with 
NATO and EU members. Croatia joined NATO in 2009 and was before its accession 
to the EU (2013) at the time of establishing CEDC. Accordingly, the Croatian MoD 
was less concerned with the economic issues concerning defence co-operation, and 
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focused more on how they could integrate into different multinational defence co-
operative frameworks. CEDC just fit to this effort. Hungary perceived CEDC as a 
possible tool for alleviating defence budgetary constraints, but other considerations 
were taking into account as well. Hungary held the EU Presidency in the first half of 
2011, and the Hungarian MoD wanted to gain political capital and support from its 
Central European partners for its presidency tasks as well. Probably, this also played a 
role why at the end of 2010 the Hungarian defence policy director initiated formal 
talks with his CEDC counterparts for the time of the Hungarian EU Presidency in 
2011. We can conclude that most of the CEDC countries did not search for alternative 
multinational solutions to alleviate the negative effects of the financial crisis on 
defence budgets, thus it cannot be linked to the CEDC either. Namely, the individual 
MoDs had different motivations concerning CEDC, but gaining economic benefit in 
the short term was not among them. 
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed. 
 
Conclusion 
We can conclude that Rival Explanation 2 has no explanatory power about why 
Central European countries created CEDC instead of using the NATO and EU 
frameworks, because none of the arms of the predicted pattern of this rival 
explanation was proved (see Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9 – Rival Explanation 2: Actual CEDC Pattern 
 
Only Prerequisite 1 was verified, but Prerequisite 2 and 3 were not. Thus, the 
independent variable of ‘CEDC defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial 
crisis’ is valid. However, no signs were found which would verify Prerequisite 2, that 
means that the defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis did not 
foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national 
military capabilities in CEDC countries. Accordingly, the existence of the proposed 
intervening variable of ‘Need for alternative solutions to maintain national military 
capabilities’ was not found regarding CEDC countries with the exception of Hungary. 
As the intervening variable is not verified and no signs were found for its existence, 
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there cannot be a link between the dependent variable of ‘Creation of CEDC’ and the 
non-existence intervening variable (see Figure 9).   
 
Rival Explanation 3 – Convergent threat perceptions 
Rival Explanation 3 supposes that the main reason why CEDC was created is because 
the CEDC countries have perceived the same threat or threats as the biggest threat for 
their security. Accordingly, their threat perception has converged and began to differ 
from their NATO and EU allies, and thus they decided to co-operate against this 
threat and finally institutionalized this co-operation in a sub-regional framework 
outside the NATO and EU frameworks.  
 
 
Figure 10 – Rival Explanation 3: Predicted CEDC Pattern 
 
As I introduced in the Research Framework chapter in ‘Rival Explanation 3’ 
the  ‘perception of the same threat’ as independent variable is linked through the 
intervening variable of ‘alliances against the biggest threat’ to the dependent variable 
of ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’. It means, if the CEDC countries share the same 
threat as the biggest threat (independent variable), they will begin to discuss this with 
each other and decide to ally against this threat (intervening variable), and at the end 
of the process they formalize this alliance by creating the CEDC (dependent variable).  
For this rival explanation I established three generic prerequisites for verifying 
its pattern, which I modified by incorporating CEDC countries to the appropriate 
places in the prerequisites. In this section I investigate them one-by-one. These are the 
followings: 
1. The CEDC countries had to share the perception of the same threat or threats 
as the largest threat. 
2. The CEDC countries have to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding 
the shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of 
CEDC. 
3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) CEDC countries discussed and 
co-operated on and the initiation and creation of CEDC have to be detected. 
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Prerequisite 1:  
The CEDC countries had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the 
largest threat. 
In order to identify whether CEDC countries shared the perception of the same 
threat(s) as the largest threat, I compare the threats the CEDC countries’ relevant 
national security documents describe. I am focusing on these documents and do not 
take into consideration public perceptions about security issues and threats. Public 
perceptions are volatile, can change quickly, thus they are not reliable sources for 
comparative analysis concerning threat perceptions of countries. In addition, national 
security documents are the foundations of foreign and security polices of 
governments, thus they are more relevant concerning multinational defence co-
operations. 
During this section I compare the national security documents of the 
individual CEDC countries, and use those documents which publications were the 
closest to the establishment of CEDC in 2010-2011. An additional criterion for 
choosing the appropriate national security documents is that the concerned documents 
had to be published between 2009 and 2013 to reflect to the international security 
environment of the time when CEDC was launched. Although an old strategic 
document could be valid, after a while it does not necessarily reflect the views of 
governments anymore, and a new strategic document, which was published just after 
the creation of CEDC might provide a better picture how the governments perceived 
threats that time. Accordingly, if a relevant strategic document in a country was valid, 
but e.g. was published 10 years earlier than the creation of CEDC and another 
relevant strategic document was published e.g. two years after the launch of CEDC, I 
use the latter one.  
The reason behind this is that between 2008 and 2012 major shifts happened 
in the international security environment that could not be reflected in earlier national 
security documents. Namely, around the establishing of CEDC the effects of the 
financial crisis could already be felt everywhere in 2008-2009, the Arab spring was 
happening in 2010-2012 and the Syrian civil war was started (2011). However, the 
studied national security documents can not be newer than 2013, because from the 
beginning of 2014 another series of major geopolitical events happened, which 
probably made several aspects of the documents published between 2009 and 2013 
obsolete. Among others, Russia occupied Crimea and the war on Donbas began in 
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2014, the migration crisis in Europe became very severe in 2015 and the vote on 
Brexit in 2016 questioned many assumptions concerning the future of Europe. 
Accordingly, the national security documents of CEDC countries published between 
2009 and 2013 provide the most relevant information about how CEDC countries 
were thinking about threats at the time of the creation of CEDC.  
The ideal national security documents for my research are the national security 
strategies  and the White Books of CEDC countries, as these documents are on the top 
of the hierarchy of national security documents in Central European states. In 
addition, they usually delineate the threats in detail the concerned Central European 
country faces or perceives to face. If neither a national security strategy nor a white 
book was published in the defined timeframe in a CEDC country, than any other 
relevant national security document that came out in that defined period and provides 
some information about threats is used. 
In regards to Austria I use the Austrian White Book of 2010,
370
 as its’ 
development and its’ publication was going on at the same years (2010-2011), when 
CEDC was established. Although, another White Book was published in 2012
371
 too 
and a new Security Strategy was published in 2013,
372
 as the previous one was more 
than 10 years old,
373
 the publication of these two documents were not as close to the 
creation of CEDC as the publication of the 2010 White Book. For Croatia I employ 
the Croatian Strategic Defence Review of 2013.
374
 Unfortunately, Croatia has not 
updated its 2002 National Security Strategy yet
375
, despite the fact that Zagreb 
developed a draft document for its replacement in 2010,
376
 and has been criticized 
recently for not adopting a new holistic national security strategy.
377
 During the 
defined timeframe Croatia did not publish any other national security document than 
the Strategic Defence Review, thus it is the only possible choice for my research. The 
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Czech Republic published both a White Paper
378
 and a Security Strategy in 2011,
379
 
and I am going to use the Security Strategy 2011 for my analysis.
380
 Similarly to the 
Czech Republic, Hungary also developed two national security documents in the 
period I am interested in. In 2012 Hungary’s National Military Strategy and 
Hungary’s National Security Strategy381 were published too, and I apply the threats 
provided by Hungary’s National Security Strategy. Slovakia came out with a new 
White Book on defence of 2013.
382
 Unfortunately, the last Slovakian Security was 
published in 2005,
383
 thus I use the White Book regarding Slovakia’s threats. Slovenia 
published its National Security Strategy in 2010,
384
 which will provide the basis for 
my study.  
The national security strategies of Central European countries were compared 
and analysed in regional projects
385
 or together with other European countries in 
comprehensive studies.
386
 However, these researches were either not studying the 
national security documents of the period of 2010-2013,
387
 or were not Central 
European focused enough,
388
 or they did not incorporate all the CEDC countries.
389
 
Threat perceptions of Central European countries using their security strategies were 
studied too,
390
 but they did not analyse all of the CEDC countries either. Thus, the 
literature does not provide an appropriate guidance for comparing the threat 
perceptions of CEDC countries. 
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The national security documents I chose to study contain the threats of the 
CEDC countries. The number of threats, how they are structured and whether they are 
perceived either threats or risks or challenges can differ significantly in different 
documents. (See Figure 11) On average, the CEDC countries perceived 11-12 threats 
according to their studied strategic documents. The fewest threats were mentioned by 
the Austrian White Book and the Czech Security Strategy (9 threats), and the most 
threats were perceived by the Slovenian security strategy (15 threats). While Croatia, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia call threats the phenomena that have negative 
impacts on their national security, Hungary calls them threats and challenges, 
Slovenia names them threats and risks. Austria the only CEDC country, which does 
not use the expression of ‘threat’, rather it uses the labels of challenges and risks. 
Despite the different labels, there is no significant difference regarding issues the 
strategic documents of CEDC countries raise about their security concerns. 
 
Figure 11 – Characteristics of Threats in the Strategic Documents of CEDC 
Countries 
 
Although these strategic documents introduces the threats the concerned 
countries deem relevant, they do not prioritize them. Accordingly, it is not clear 
which threats are perceived as the largest threat by CEDC countries. The studied 






 list and shortly 
describe the perceived threats. In these three cases, we may assume that the list might 
be a priority list as well, and the threats described earlier on the list are more 
important for these countries than the latter ones. However, this cannot be the case 
concerning the strategic documents of the other three CEDC countries. Slovenia’s 
security strategy also lists and shortly describes the threats, but it does not provide a 
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priority list rather it categorizes them based on the sources (global, transnational, 
national) of the threats.
394
 Therefore, we do not know which threats are the most 
important for Slovenia.  In the Croatian SDR we find a description about the security 
environment of Croatia, which contains threats, but they are neither elaborated nor 
prioritized.
395
 The Slovakian White Paper also gives a security environment analysis 
and not a threat list.
396
 Although, the Slovakian document is much more structured 
than the Croatian one, based on the information of the Slovakian White Paper 
provides we cannot be sure about the most important threats regarding Slovakia 
either.  
As I cannot identify which threats are the largest threats for all of the CEDC 
countries, I am just looking for threats that can be identified in the studied strategic 
documents. If we compare these threats we find six common themes, which means 
that all documents mention them as individual threat categories. These are the 
following: 
 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 Terrorism 
 Regional conflicts 
 Organized crime 
 Cyber security 
 Natural and man-made disasters 
 
Although we cannot compare how relevant these threats are in different CEDC 
documents, the number of common themes shows that CEDC countries perceive 
national security threats similarly. In other words this means that Austria and the 
Czech Republic share 66% of their perceived threats with other CEDC countries. 
Croatia shares 60%, Hungary shares 50%, Slovakia shares 43% and Slovenia shares 
40% of their perceived threats with the other CEDC states. Accordingly, we can 
conclude that CEDC countries have similar threat perception, as many of their 
perceived threats are shared with the other CEDC countries. However, we cannot 
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identify whether they share the perception of the same threat or threats as the largest 
threat, as their concerned strategic documents do not prioritize their perceived threats.  




The CEDC countries had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the 
shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of CEDC. 
I could only partially identify prerequisite 1, which means that based on the relevant 
national security documents, I could conclude that CEDC countries share six national 
security threats. However, I could not identify, whether these threats are the largest 
threats for the individual CEDC countries, because CEDC countries do not prioritize 
them in their strategic documents. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that 
they did not share the same threat as the largest threat, which could help to create 
CEDC. To figure this out, I study all the six shared national security threats to figure 
out whether any of them initiated discussions that generated some level of co-
operation among CEDC countries before establishing CEDC. If I can detect the 
discussions and the beginning of co-operation on any of the aforementioned six 
threats concerning CEDC, I can conclude that prerequisite 2 is confirmed. However, 
if CEDC countries either did not initiate discussions among themselves on any of the 
confirmed shared threats, or they did not begin to co-operate on this national security 
threat or they began to co-operate but in another format or institution with other 
countries on these threats, prerequisite 2 cannot be confirmed. The latter issue is 
relevant too, as this would mean that CEDC was not created against that shared threat, 
as the concerned countries deemed other co-operative frameworks and/or countries 
more appropriate to collaborate against a particular national security threat.  
In regard to the threat of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD), we can say that all CEDC countries deemed this issue as an important 
security problem. However, there is no sign that they intended to co-operate on this 
topic exclusively with each other, as no discussion and no co-operation was initiated 
regarding this question before the creation of CEDC among CEDC states. Probably, 
its reason was that the CEDC countries had already been collaborating on this issue in 
different and probably more effective frameworks than CEDC. The three V4 member 
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CEDC countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia – have very similar 
position on nuclear issues. As researchers pointed out: 
‘Since the 1960s Central European states have been quick to join the 
relevant arms control agreements and export control regimes. Active 
participation in this field was encouraged by the Soviet Union and is 
in line with the priorities of the European Union and NATO, which 
guarantees that the non-nuclear stance of these states is likely to 
remain firm in the future. Despite a few cases in which Central 
European states hold slightly different positions, they mostly think 
alike and the key determinant of their rather conservative and 
cautious behaviour seems to be their NATO membership.’397 
 
In regards to chemical and biological weapons, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovakia are members of the same conventions (Chemical Weapons Convention, 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Australia Group and 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention),
398
 which show that they had already co-
operated on this issue on different international formats. Although, a multinational 
CBRN battalion was established in the Czech Republic in 2004, it was a NATO 
project and not Central European one.
399
 The Czech Republic intended to use CEDC 
to involve more Central European countries into this NATO project, as from the 12 
participating nations
400
 only the Czech Republic and Hungary were CEDC countries. 
However, besides the Czech Republic, none of the CEDC countries were interested in 
CBRN cooperation in CEDC, and even the Czech Republic intended to buttress a 
NATO project with the help of CEDC. Accordingly, we could see that the three V4 
member CEDC countries did not intend to create CEDC on non-proliferation of 
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WMD, as they had already co-operated in different formats on it and prioritized 
NATO level co-operation
401
 over other options in this regard.
402
  
 Similarly to the above-mentioned three countries, Croatia’s aim was to 
mitigate the problems of the proliferation of WMD via larger organizations than 
CEDC. Croatia’s National Strategy for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction of 2013
403
 highlights that Zagreb deemed the UN, NATO and the EU the 
most relevant actors on this field, and in regards to sub-regional collaboration in 
general the document mentions South-Eastern Europe
404
 only and does not mention 
Central Europe at all. Slovenia was also committed to NATO concerning non-
proliferation of WMDs,
405
 while Austria deemed the UN and the EU the main forums 
for collaboration on this area.
406
 Thus, we can conclude that CEDC countries did not 
initiate a discussion about the proliferation of WMD and instead used other 
internationals frameworks for co-operation on this issue. 
According to the studied strategic documents another possible threat, which 
could initiate discussion and cooperation before the creation of CEDC might be 
terrorism. It is important to note that according to the EUROPOL only a handful 
terrorist attacks happened in the CEDC countries between 2006 and 2013
407
. Thus 
these states are not affected significantly by terrorism. However, based on this data 
we cannot exclude that Central European countries perceived terrorism as a threat,
408
 
which could initiate discussion and co-operation amongst them. At the same time, 
such kind of discussion did not happen among CEDC countries. Hypothetically, the 
idea of a V4 co-operation on terrorism emerged among analysts in Central Europe 
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before the creation of CEDC, and one year after the establishment of CEDC in 2012 
an official V4 document stated that ‘the Polish Presidency believes that it is 
imperative to consistently reinforce and improve coordination between the counter 
terrorism systems of the V4 states while responding to the tasks set forth in relevant 
counter terrorism strategies’409. However, this intention has not been translated into 
the policy field since then, and it was not an issue before and during the establishment 
of CEDC either.  
In regard to V4 counter-terrorism co-operation Péter Marton highlights that 
Central European countries are members and participating states of a plethora of 
international (EU
410
 and non-EU) co-operative frameworks, where they can 
collaborate on different areas concerning terrorism
411. He also points out that ‘the 
perception of the threat of terrorism is a rather feeble basis for launching enhanced 
cooperation in this field. In the meantime, the actually emerging challenges typically 
require ad hoc, specific exchanges of information in a demand-driven as opposed to a 
pre-institutionalised format.’412 Thus it is not practical ‘to “V4-ize” cooperation over 
the related challenges’.413 These mean that Central European countries not only co-
operated on many international frameworks concerning terrorism, but analysts even 
deemed unnecessary and problematic the creation of new sub-regional institutions for 
that. This sub-regional institution was even understood as a co-operative initiative in 
V4 format and not in CEDC. Thus, no discussions and collaboration happened on 
CEDC level about terrorism before the establishment of CEDC. 
The situation was different concerning the threat of organized crime in the 
sense that countries in a very similar format as CEDC have already created a co-
operative framework on this issue in 2000. Actually co-operation on police and 
internal issues had already been going on earlier as well, but the institutionalization of 
this collaboration was established that time. The ministers of interior affairs of 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia founded the so-
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called Salzburg Forum in 2000, which has been focusing on internal security and 
police co-operation in the Central European region.
414
 The goals of the co-operation 
for the period of 2010-2020 are ‘Cooperation and Lobbying within the EU’, ‘Regional 
Cooperation’ (changing experience and lessons on operational expert level meetings 
and working groups) and ‘Cooperation with Third Countries’. 415  Bulgaria and 
Romania joined to this initiative in 2006, and Croatia joined in 2012.
416
 The case of 
Croatia is relevant here, because Zagreb joined to the Salzburg Forum as a full 
member
417
 after the creation of CEDC. Accordingly, Croatia’s joining in the co-
operation and the goals of the Salzburg Forum for 2010-2020 mean that the Salzburg 
Forum was deemed the most appropriate framework for Central European co-
operation on organized crime or any other internal and police issues. 
In 2013, Austria and the Czech Republic initiated the Central European Cyber 
Security Platform (CECSP), which provides a forum for five Central European states 
(Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia)
418
 ‘to assist each other in 
the future in the field of cyber security by sharing information, best practices and 
methods, in order to deal with cyber threats.’419 This means that although CEDC 
countries perceived cyber defence as a relevant national security problem, CEDC was 
not deemed a framework for co-operation on cyber issues despite the fact that CEDC 
was created two years earlier than CESCP. I have to point out that all CESCP 
countries took into consideration the elements of the cyber security frameworks of EU 
and NATO,
420
 which shows that these two organizations had a significant impact on 
Central European cyber policies. In regards to Croatia and Slovenia, we can observe 
that they did not join to or create any sub-regional collaboration on cyber security, 
and according to their national strategies on cyber security their focus concerning 
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international co-operation are collaborations via international organizations especially 
via the EU and NATO.
421
  
Natural and man-made disasters are important topics in all CEDC countries. 
The most common natural disaster in Central Europe is floods from major rivers. One 
of the biggest rivers in Europe the Danube is running through the Czech Republic, 
Austria, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia, and if a major flood happens on the river, it 
affects all five CEDC countries. Despite this situation no structured co-operation was 
established among CEDC countries on this issues, and it is particularly true on 
defence co-operation. The Czech Republic initiated the only related co-operation in 
1998, when Prague together with Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia 
established the so-called Central European Disaster Prevention Forum (CEUDIP). 
CEUDIP’s original goal was to improve early warning systems in Central Europe, 
‘and through the cooperation of the meteorological and hydrological services of the 
participating countries, a regional radar network was established that enabled 
improved region-wide weather forecasting.’422 Later CEUDIP also intended to deepen 
the co-operation on training, education and exchanging information,
423
 but for the last 
several years the intensity of the co-operation has decreased significantly. The only 
Central European MDC on disaster relief operation is the earlier mentioned 
Multinational Engineer Battalion Tisa established by Slovakia, Hungary, Romania 
and Ukraine in 1999 for disaster relief operations.
424
 However, such kind of co-
operation was not discussed among CEDC countries before the creation of CEDC. At 
the same time, Austria intended to use CEDC for co-operation on natural and man-
made disasters from a very early stage,
425
 but Vienna was the only one, who was 
eager to co-operate on this issue with military capabilities in the beginning. Despite 
the lack of enthusiasm from the parts of other CEDC countries, now discussions have 
been going on disaster relief issues in CEDC for years. However, as this topic was 
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almost exclusively a concern for Austria at the creation of CEDC, natural and man-
made disasters could not be the shared threat, why CEDC was created in the first 
place. 
The last shared threat of CEDC countries, which I identified in the previous 
section is regional conflicts. CEDC countries have participated in many peace support 
operations in conflict zones for the last two decades, and many projects, which were 
incorporated into CEDC were related to military operations (MLCC, AAT-PT, SOF 
training, CBRN co-operation, Austrian-Hungarian co-operation on EUFOR Althea). 
Accordingly, CEDC countries discussed and co-operated a lot on multinational 
military operations before the creation of CEDC. However, I have to point out that 
co-operation on multinational military operations and co-operation on the ‘threat of 
regional conflicts’ are not the same thing. CEDC collaboration on regional conflicts 
would mean that the participating countries decide how to handle or mitigate the 
effects of regional countries with a CEDC framework. However, as we could see in 
previous sections, the different CEDC co-operative projects were not established 
directly against the ‘threat of regional conflicts’, as they were rather intended to 
support NATO and EU operations. Accordingly, they were only indirectly related to 
regional conflicts via EU and NATO efforts, and the primary focus of CEDC 
countries in this regard was to fulfil they obligations towards EU and NATO. 
To sum up we can see that no significant discussions were initiated which 
could generate co-operation before the creation of CEDC regarding the shared threats 
of the studied countries. Even in the cases, when co-operations on a shared threat 
were created in Central Europe, they were not initiated among CEDC countries, but 
they were launched in different Central European formats.  
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 3: 
The links between the shared biggest threat(s) CEDC countries discussed and co-
operated on and the initiation and creation of CEDC have to be detected. 
As Prerequisite 2 was not verified, Prerequisite 3 cannot be confirmed either. Namely, 
as there were no discussions and co-operation on the shared biggest threat of CEDC 
countries, they cannot be linked to the creation of CEDC. These findings are 
underpinned by the results of the interviews conducted with MoD officials in CEDC 
countries as well. Although some of them said, that shared threats had a role 
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concerning the creation of CEDC on some extent,
426
 others were clear that according 
to their opinion shared threat perceptions did not play a role in establishing this 
MDC.
427
 However, even the officials who said that shared threat perceptions might 
have a role in launching CEDC, none of them deemed it as a major factor in this 
regard. 
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed. 
 
Conclusion 
We can conclude that Rival Explanation 3 does not have explanatory power about 
why Central European countries established CEDC instead of using NATO and EU 
frameworks for defence co-operation. 
 
 
Figure 12 – Rival Explanation 3: Actual CEDC Pattern 
 
Prerequisite 1 was verified only partially, but Prerequisite 2 and Prerequisite 3 
were not verified. It was not possible to validate entirely the independent variable of 
‘Perception of the same threat’, but it was not possible to dismiss it either. The reason 
was that the CEDC countries shared many threats, but because they did not prioritize 
their shared threats in their national security documents, I could not verify whether 
they deem the same threat(s) as the largest threat(s). Accordingly, I studied all shared 
threats regarding the investigation of Prerequisite 2. Prerequisite 2 could not be 
verified, as no significant discussions were initiated on the identified shared threats 
among CEDC countries, which could generate co-operation before the creation of 
CEDC. Although, Central European countries including many CEDC countries 
created different sub-regional frameworks for co-operation on different threats or they 
used NATO or EU for that, they did not intend to co-operate exclusively with CEDC 
countries on these issues. Accordingly, Prerequisite 3 could not be verified either, 
which means that there is no link between shared national threats of CEDC countries 
and the creation of CEDC.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The research questions of my thesis ask why have European countries established and 
revitalized sub-regional MDCs in recent years, when similar pan-European structures 
exist in the framework of NATO and EU? What have been the circumstances, which 
have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on 
military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU? To answer these 
questions for the case of CEDC I tested the three rival explanations, which I 
operationalized in the Research Framework chapter. One of the rival explanations 
says that the studied MDCs including CEDC were created, because the participating 
states of the MDCs were dissatisfied with the progress of defence co-operation in 
NATO and the EU. The second one assumes that the financial crisis had a negative 
impact on the defence budgets of these states that forced them to find alternative 
multinational solutions to maintain their national military capabilities. The third rival 
explanation supposes that the participating countries of the MDCs created new co-
operative frameworks, because they shared the same threat(s) as the biggest threat(s) 
and they allied against this threat and institutionalized this alliance by establishing 
CEDC. For figuring out, whether any of the studied rival explanations could explain 
the creation of the studied MDCs I operationalized them. I developed independent, 
intervening and dependent variables for them and set prerequisites for each of the 
variables, which had to be verified for proving them right. 
The first rival explanation’s independent variable was the ‘Lack of progress on 
pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’ which, according to the rival 
explanation, leads through the intervening variable of ‘CEDC countries are 
dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ to the dependent variable of ‘Creation of CEDC’. 
Although, the prerequisite of the independent variable was verified during my 
research, the prerequisite of the intervening variable was not, thus the independent 
variable could not be the cause of the dependent variable. This means that there was a 
lack of progress in NATO and EU regarding defence co-operation, but CEDC 
countries were not dissatisfied with this situation, and they did not establish CEDC 
for this reason. Accordingly, taking into consideration the findings concerning this 
rival explanation, we can conclude that dissatisfaction with EU/NATO was not a 
factor in creating CEDC. The situation seems to be quite the opposite, because many 
CEDC countries perceived CEDC as a platform, which might help to fulfil their EU 
and NATO obligations. CEDC countries believed that they could contribute with their 
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co-operation in CEDC to NATO’s Smart Defence and EU’s Pooling and Sharing 
initiatives. Therefore, we can say that CEDC countries intended to give answers to the 
new requirements of EU’s and NATO’s initiatives by collaborating in CEDC. 
The second rival explanation’s independent variable is ‘CEDC defence budget 
cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis’, the intervening variable is ‘Need for 
alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities’, while the dependent 
variable is ‘Creation of CEDC’. This rival explanation assumes that because of the 
defence budget cuts, CEDC countries realized that they needed alternative 
multinational solutions, and the multinational solution for their decreasing defence 
budget was the creation of CEDC. In regard to this rival explanation I verified that 
although significant defence budget cuts happened in all CEDC countries, this 
phenomenon did not facilitate the establishing of CEDC. CEDC armed forces rather 
intended to solve their budgetary problems in national ways by rationalizing 
themselves and cutting defence expenses and not in multinational format. Thus, the 
CEDC countries, except Hungary, did not search for multinational solutions for 
alleviating their budget constraints. My research highlighted that CEDC countries had 
very different motives for joining CEDC, and their levels of enthusiasm towards 
CEDC also varied, but most of them did not perceive scarce resources as the main 
reason for creation CEDC. 
The third rival explanation presumes that the CEDC countries perceived the 
same national security threats as the largest threat by all of the studied countries 
(independent variable), and they began to ally against this threat by discussing on and 
co-operating to counter this threat (intervening variable), and finally they 
institutionalized this alliance by establishing CEDC (dependent variable). Based on 
their national security documents we could see that the CEDC countries shared six 
national threats, but they did not begin to discuss and co-operate on these threats. 
Many CEDC countries either began to co-operate on certain threats in other sub-
regional formats, or they have already co-operated in existing frameworks or they did 
not begin multinational co-operation on certain threats at all. In addition, the 
interviews conducted with officials of CEDC countries also support the findings that 
shared threat perceptions did not have a major role in establishing CEDC. 
Accordingly, the creation of CEDC cannot be linked to the dependent variable of this 
rival explanation. 
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We could see that my research concluded that none of the rival explanations 
have explanatory power over the creation of CEDC. The actual empirically based 
pattern (see Figure 13) rather suggests that two new independent variables played the 
most important roles in establishing CEDC. The first one is that the EU and NATO 
generated a milieu via the Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing initiatives that 
supported the creation of sub-regional MDCs. This milieu facilitated the CEDC 
countries to co-operate on NATO and EU multinational projects (intervening 
variable). The other independent variable highlights that all CEDC countries had their 
individual motivations to co-operate in a CEDC format. These motivations varied 
country by country, but all CEDC countries had a particular interest to participate in 
this collaborative framework.   
 
 
Figure 13 – Empirically Based CEDC pattern 
 
What kind of implications the case of the CEDC countries has on the research 
questions? Namely why have CEDC countries established CEDC, when similar pan-
European structures exist in the framework of NATO and EU? What have been the 
circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional 
co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU? 
My research pointed out that CEDC countries did not perceive CEDC as an 
alternative to NATO and EU, rather it was deemed an opportunity to support NATO’s 
and EU’s new initiatives. Accordingly, we can conclude that NATO’s and EU’s 
initiatives created a milieu, which supported the creation of MDCs on capability 
development, and this environment highly facilitated the creation of CEDC. Thus, the 
policies of NATO and EU may play a highly important role and can encourage 
significantly the creation of sub-regional MDCs. This case also showed that although 
the identification of common themes in establishing MDCs can help to understand 
certain processes, we have to take into consideration the individual interests and 
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motivations of participating countries as well to understand fully the dynamics behind 







CHAPTER 5.  
THE LANCASTER HOUSE TREATIES 
 
Two treaties on the deepening of security and defence co-operation between France 
and the United Kingdom, known as the Lancaster House Treaties,
428
 were signed by 
French President Nicholas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron at 10 
Downing Street on 2
nd
 November 2010. While one of the two treaties
429
 focused on 
co-operation regarding defence capability development, research and development on 
military technologies, defence industry, defence market and also on military 
operations, the other one facilitated nuclear collaboration between Paris and 
London.
430
 The two treaties, as we will see in this chapter, were deemed historical by 
both politicians and analysts thanks to their comprehensiveness and their implications 
to nuclear issues.  
However, the question arises why Britain and France created the Lancaster 
House Treaties for bilateral co-operation, when they, together with other Allies, also 
had the opportunity to co-operate within existing NATO and/or EU frameworks. With 
regards to capability development and R&D they could have opted for collaboration 
either in EDA or in the several dedicated NATO agencies instead. Alternatively, they  
could have chosen the pre-existing Pooling & Sharing initiative of the EU launched in 
September 2010. Besides, they could have strengthened the co-operation in defence 
markets via the EU. The nuclear co-operation is the only issue, which did not have an 
appropriate EU or NATO structure in place for the type of co-operation France and 
Britain sought for. Although NATO has the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), France is 
not member of it. In addition, NPG does not discuss the creation of joint facilities and 
the kind of practical collaborations the two countries agreed on. Moreover, the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), which has the authority to foster 
nuclear co-operation in Europe, only dealing with the peaceful application of nuclear 
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energy. Accordingly, Britain and France had several opportunities to co-operate on 
the issues the Lancaster House Treaties implied, except the nuclear ones, in EU and/or 
NATO institutional frameworks. The question is why they did not do so given that 
this was the mainstream approach during the 2000s as we have seen it in the literature 
review? 
This chapter attempts to answer this question by comparing the three rival 
explanations elaborated in the research framework chapter with the empirically based 
one. First, the chapter introduces the Lancaster House Treaties in more details, the 
second part delineates the historical background of British-French defence co-
operation putting the current events into context. In the last part, based on the first two 
sections, I compare the three operationalized, predicted rival patterns with the 
empirically based pattern by checking whether the assumptions developed to each 
rival explanation in the research framework chapter came true before the signing of 
the two Treaties. Thus, I attempt to identify the most applicable answer to the 
research question. 
 
THE TREATIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
The two treaties signed by Sarkozy and Cameron in 2010 established the basis and a 
new general framework for defence co-operation between Britain and France. A 
separate joint Letter of Intent (LoI) was also signed by defence ministers of the two 
countries in which they agreed on a number of collaborative projects. The first part of 
this section focuses on the contents of the two treaties and the LoI, and the second 
part introduces how politicians and analysts interpreted the Lancaster House Treaties, 
and what kind of justifications they used regarding them. In addition, it also 
summarizes the progress on defence co-operation that the two  have made since. 
 
The Treaties and the joint LoI 
One of the two treaties determines the objectives and different aspects of the 
mechanism regarding Anglo-French defence co-operation.
431
 In the first article of the 
document, the two countries agree on five main objectives: 1) coordination on 
capability development, maintenance, procurement, facilities and equipment; 2) 
reinforcing the defence industry, co-operation in research and development; 3) 
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collaboration on common deployments; 4) co-operation on national (nuclear) 
deterrents; 5) supporting each other regarding actions in the UN, NATO and within 
CSDP
432
. The later parts of the treaty omit discussing the last two issues almost 
entirely, and instead focus on the details of the first three objectives. Accordingly, it 
lays down several principles with regard to the common deployment of troops, about 
how the two states can access each other’s facilities or equipment, and it also sets 
some baselines for market access, costs and benefits of the joint projects as well as for 
the co-operation on defence industrial issues. The Treaty touches upon the issue of 
exchanging information on various aspects like consulting on future operations or 
sharing classified information. In addition, the agreement states that the ‘Parties 
undertake to consult before taking any decision on significant capability programmes 
or procurement’.433 Thus, we can see that the document sets the requirement of a very 
high level collaboration in pooling and sharing of military capabilities between France 
and Britain. 
The Treaty also determines how the co-operation will be managed. The 
guidance for defence collaboration comes from the French President and the British 
Prime Minister. They can rely on the binational Senior Level Group (SLG), whose 
national delegations’ heads are directly appointed by the French President and the 
British Prime Minister. The SLG’s main task is to co-ordinate the preparations for the 
defence and security element of the British-French annual summit. The SLG adopts 
decisions in consensus and in this capacity determines the long-term aims and 
priorities of the co-operation, oversees the progress of respective projects, identifies 
new areas for co-operation and resolves the emerging disputes. The agreement 
strengthened the High Level Working Group for collaboration on armaments and 
industrial issues (established in 2006), but the HLWG has not directly been inserted in 
the mechanism mentioned above. Accordingly, co-operation is supervised and guided 
by the highest political level in both countries and their decision-making is supported 
by non-permanent working groups. 
The second treaty focuses on co-operation on technologies related to the 
stewardship of nuclear stockpiles
434
. In this regard, France and Britain agreed on 
exchanging classified information concerning the safety and security of nuclear 
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weapons, stockpile certification and countering nuclear or radiological terrorism. 
They also agreed to build and operate jointly a radiographic/hydrodynamic facility in 
France and a facility for radiography and diagnostics technology programmes in the 
United Kingdom. The facility in Britain was set to be operational by 2014, the first 
phase of the facility in France was due to be finished in 2014 with its second phase 
completed in 2016. While construction and operational costs of the facility in Britain 
are paid for by the UK, France is responsible for the same regarding the first phase of 
the facility on its soil. A joint team from both countries is responsible for the 
construction and operation of the facilities. Their activities are supervised by a 
steering committee, which is co-chaired by the Directeur des Applications Militaires 
and the Chief Scientific Adviser of the UK Ministry of Defence, who are serving as 
the Principals of the projects, and they are also responsible for coordinating the 
activities of other agencies at their home countries regarding this co-operation. They 
are to meet at least once a year, and will report to the SLG established in the other 
treaty. The two countries guarantee access for each other to the facilities for 50 years 
or until the date they mutually agree. While in the facility in France the experts from 
both countries will be able to conduct experiments in separated and jointly used areas, 
in the facility in Britain there will be only shared areas although there is no obligation 
to do joint projects only in any of the facilities. 
A joint Letter of Intent and a Package of Joint Measures was also signed about 
a number of concrete projects in the framework of the first treaty described above. 
These were the following: 
 Development of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force: The 10,000 strong 
unit will be a bi-national, non-standing force and will imply elements of all 
three services: ‘a land component comprised of formations at national 
brigade level, maritime and air components with their associated 
headquarters, and logistics and support functions’.435 
 Co-operation on aircraft carriers: France and Britain decided to establish 
an integrated carrier strike group from the assets of both countries by the 
early 2020s. The aim is to achieve that at least one aircraft carrier of the 
two countries always be available for joint operations. 
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 Common support to A400 transport aircrafts: The two countries agreed on 
developing a common support plan for the A400s to decrease related costs, 
moreover a bilateral Joint User Group has been established in order to 
enhance co-operation on training regarding A400s. 
 Collaboration on development of submarine technologies and systems: 
The parties would develop jointly certain technologies and systems for the 
next generation nuclear submarines. The work would begin in 2011 with 
the goal to rationalize the two countries’ industrial base and save costs by 
‘sharing of development activities, procurement methods and technical 
expertise’.436 
 Maritime mine countermeasures: France and Britain agreed to harmonize 
their plans concerning the development of ‘elements of mine 
countermeasures equipment and systems’.437 A common project team was 
set to be established in 2011 to discuss the details of a prototype mine 
countermeasures system. 
 Co-operation on future military satellite communication: The two states 
decided to develop a joint concept study in 2011 about the possibilities of 
collaborating on military communication capabilities for their satellites 
entering into service between 2018 and 2022. 
 Air-to-air refuelling and military air transport: The parties study the 
possibilities of how the UK’s Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft 
programme’s potential spare capacities could be used by France for air-to-
air refuelling and military air transport tasks. 
 Collaboration on Unmanned Air Systems: Britain and France agreed to 
work together on the development of the next generation of Medium 
Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Air Surveillance Systems. A jointly 
funded, competitive assessment phase was to be launched in 2011 to 
deliver a new UAV between 2015 and 2020. Several options have been 
drafted for long term co-operation in this field as well. 
 Defence industrial co-operation: The two countries agreed on a 10-year 
strategic plan for the British and French Complex Weapons sector. They 






intended to create a single European prime contractor and achieve up to 
30% efficiency savings. Many joint weapon projects (e.g. on anti-surface 
missile, cruise missiles, short range air defence technologies) were set to 
start in 2011. 
 Research and technology: The two biggest military powers in Europe 
decided to continue their R&T co-operation with a 100 million Euro 
annual budget providing 50 million Euros by each of them. The co-
operation would focus mostly on the areas mentioned earlier (satellite 
communications, UAVs, naval systems, weapon projects) but would also 
include new areas like sensors, electronic warfare, materials etc. 
 Cyber security and counter-terrorism: Britain and France agreed upon 
strengthening their co-operation regarding cyber security and created a 
framework to coordinate their collaboration in this field. 
 The parties agreed on a series of issues concerning counter-terrorism co-
operation from the early detection of terrorist activities through sharing 
information on changes in the national threat level to the prevention of 
CBRN terrorism, security of commercial aviation and many more.  
 
The two treaties and the joint LoI show that Britain and France aspired to 
achieve a deep but practical co-operation avoiding the creation of unnecessary 
bureaucratic institutions. They rather focused on concrete projects which can be 
beneficial for both of them in the mid- to long-term.  
The official justification for the agreements emphasized the commonality of 
the two countries and thus it was claimed that Britain and France were ‘natural 
partners in security and defence’.438 According to the official argument, this natural 
partnership was based on four main common characteristics of the two countries. 
First, the United Kingdom and France were members of the same formal and informal 
groups, as they were permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, 
they were NATO and EU members and were also members of the group of nations, 
which possess nuclear weapons. Second, they spent the most on defence in Europe 
and they were the European countries that were willing to use military force in 









biggest defence budgets in the world,
439
 which altogether provided 50% of all 
European defence expenditure.
440
 In addition, UK and France invested two thirds of 
the budgets for defence research and technology in Europe. Moreover, they were 
contributing the most to international military operations and were ‘able and ready to 
fulfil the most demanding military missions’441 as well. Third, they faced the same 
‘new challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
missiles, terrorism, cyber attack, maritime and space security’.442 Lastly, they stated 
that the UK and France could not imagine a serious security threat that would not 
impact on them both. At the same time, both politicians and several analysts 
emphasized that the treaties and the LoI were of historical importance. The French 
President Nicholas Sarkozy said that the ‘unprecedented’ agreement showed ‘a level 
of trust and confidence between the two countries never equalled in history’443 and 
commentaries in the press also called the deal ‘unprecedented’ and ‘historic’.444 
 
The Implications of the Treaties 
In the short term the most tangible impact of the treaties was on the co-operation of 
the two countries regarding military operations especially in Libya but also to some 
extent in Mali and the Central African Republic. The Libyan situation seemed to be 
escalating into a full scale civil war during early 2011, thus a Western-led military 
intervention began on 19 March 2011 to enforce an arms embargo with a naval 
blockade and implement a no-fly zone over Libya, preventing Muammar Gaddafi’s 
forces from attacking its own citizens from the air. Although, the operation became a 
NATO one after a few days, it was initially led by France and the UK with the 
support of the Unites States. As a result, many commentators and analysts perceived 
                                                 
439
 Patrick Wintour, ”Anglo-French Defence Agreement Hailed by Leaders,” The Guardian, November 
02, 2010, , http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/nov/02/anglo-french-defence-agreement. 
440










 Michael White, ”Michael White's Sketch: The Anglo-French Defence Treaty - Make Lunch, Not 
War!” The Guardian. November 02, 2010. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/nov/02/anglo-
french-defence-treaty.; Daily Mail Reporter, ”Britain and France to Share Nuclear Secrets as Cameron 
and Sarkozy Sign Historic 50-year Military Agreement,” Mail Online, November 02, 2010, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1325863/Britain-France-sign-historic-50-year-military-
agreement.html.; Edward Cody, ”France, Britain Sign Treaties Calling for Unprecedented Military 
Cooperation,” The Washington Post, November 02, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/02/AR2010110203390.html. 
 131 
the conflict as a ‘French and British War’.445 Britain and France were not only the 
biggest proponents of the intervention and coordinated effectively their diplomatic 
efforts in the UN, but they also provided the most troops and assets for the operations. 
Perceptions about the results of the Libyan intervention are mixed,
446
 but it clearly 
had a very positive effect on British-French defence relations. The Libyan conflict 
proved for many people in the British and French foreign and security establishment 
that the two countries could work and fight together
447
. This sentiment was shown in 
the 2012 UK-France declaration on security and defence which stated that ‘our 
cooperation in Libya has been a defining moment – and one on which we will 
continue to build in the future’.448 
The situation was different in Mali and in the Central African Republic, where 
France intervened alone and British contributions to these operations remained 
limited. In January 2013 after the government of Mali asked for military assistance to 
take back the Northern part of the country from separatists, France quickly deployed 
4000 troops and fighter jets to assist the Malian government. Before the beginning of 
the French intervention, Francois Hollande called David Cameron and asked him to 
support the French operations in Mali.
449
 The British prime minister contributed to the 
French efforts by two C-17 heavy lift transport aircraft and a Sentinel R1 surveillance 
plane, in addition he promised to send 40 military trainers to assist the Mali Army in 
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the framework of the EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM).
450
 Later the number of 
British troops supporting the French increased to 330 with the majority focusing on 
training those West African soldiers who would take over tasks from the French in 
Mali.
451
 In December 2013, France sent additional 600 troops to the Central African 
Republic in order to reinforce the 1000 French troops already stationing there in 
response to the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation. There a serious 
religious conflict between Christians and Muslims resulted in the fleeing of hundreds 
of thousands of people. The United Kingdom assisted France by providing a C-17 
transport aircraft.
452
 Although, the French probably expected bigger contributions 
from the British, still Britain was the fastest and most generous contributor to the 
French operations in Africa. Moreover, it provided capabilities that the French lacked. 
Besides operations, another very visible manifestation of the Treaties has been 
the surge in Franco-British military exercises, mostly related to development of the 
10 000 strong Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF). The first major French-
British military exercise after signing the Lancaster House Treaties was ‘Flandres 
2011’ which took place in Mailly-le-Camp, France in June 2011. Altogether 1050 
French and 450 British military and civilian personnel took part in this event in order 
to identify the areas where significant work was needed to enhance the ability of the 
two armed forces to fight together.
453
 During 2012 some British and French units 
trained together at the company level using facilities in both France and the United 
Kingdom
454
. The biggest British-French exercise of 2012 was conducted off Corsica 
in October, when 2600 British and 2400 French army, navy and air force personnel 
had been deployed on 11 surface ships and a submarine to practice joint naval and 
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 In 2013 the frequency of common British-French 
trainings and the usage of each other’s facilities increased significantly. Among others 
one company of the Commando Royal Marines took part in the exercise of French 
Marines,
456
 ten French military cadets had an internship in the British Army’s rapid 
reaction force (16 Air Assault Brigade),
457
 French units participated in a British live 
firing artillery exercise,
458
 200 French troops, 43 vehicles, four helicopters, two 
landing craft and a catamaran practiced amphibious tasks on Hampshire Beach in the 
United Kingdom and thereafter they used British training facilities.
459
 In addition, 300 
French paratroopers parachuted together with 1300 British soldiers in Scotland,
460
 and 
French Mirage 2000 and RAF Typhoons fighter jets exercised together in the UK.
461
  
Even though the nuclear co-operation between the two countries is not so 
visible and is not covered by the press, they are ongoing according to the plans and 
will generate savings for both London and Paris.
462
 The progress in this regard is 
remarkable, especially if we take into consideration that nuclear co-operation is one of 
the most sensitive projects in the Lancaster House Treaties.  
However, although the collaboration between France and the United Kingdom 
is quite successful regarding operations, training, creation of the CJEF and nuclear 
issues, there has not been significant progress in terms of joint capability 
development. According to Edgar Buckley, who was senior vice president of Thales 
and also took part in the work of the UK-French High Level Working Group, ‘joint 
procurement has not yet become a reality, with a strong tendency on both sides to 
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judge each co-operative opportunity separately on its merits rather than within the 
overall context of the treaty’ 463 . Although certain major joint projects had been 
discussed between London and Paris, implementation has not begun, and even the 
targeted 100 million Euro annual budget for common R&T projects has not been 
spent
464
. Buckley points out that only co-operation in the area of Complex Weapons 
met with success, but this co-operation, especially on missiles, had been quite 
effective much before the Treaties were signed.
465
  
For instance, the biggest project laid down in the Letter of Intent in 2010, the 
co-operation on aircraft carriers suffered significant problems, because the UK 
decided to switch back to the short take off and vertical landing variant of the Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF), instead of the conventional variants
466
 which would have been 
compatible with the French Charles De Gaulle aircraft carrier’s launching and landing 
systems. Thus, the British and French aircraft carriers will not going to be able to 
operate each other’s aeroplanes. That said it will not prevent them from coordinating 
the operating cycles of the aircraft carriers and providing escorts to each other. 
Although it seemed that there would be great potential in the co-operation on UAVs. 
On the French-UK Summit of 2014 Prime Minister Cameron and French President 
Hollande agreed on launching 120 million GBP worth feasibility studies for future 
combat air systems involving six companies. The main aim of this work is to provide 
concepts and technologies for Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles, and it will only be 
decided after the two years long feasibility phase whether the two countries would 
wish to co-operate on the demonstration and manufacturing phases.
467
 However, with 
regard to the medium altitude long endurance (MALE) drones France finally decided 
to buy the American Reaper off-the shelf.
468
 Besides these, there are several other 
projects where practical co-operation is going on (e.g. the anti-ship missile Sea 
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Venom, an anti-mine underwater system, Future combat air systems),
469
 but there has 
not been a breakthrough in major capability development projects yet.  
 
BRITISH-FRENCH RELATIONS AND DEFENCE CO-OPERATION 
BEFORE THE LANCASTER HOUSE TREATIES 
British-French relations have always been complicated, and during the last centuries 
France and the United Kingdom competed more than co-operated with each other, 
thus the mutual suspicion of these two countries is not surprising. Nevertheless, the 
two countries share very similar values and cultural attitude; in addition, they were 
allies during the two World Wars and during the 1956 Suez crisis. However, as 
Philippe Chassaigne and Michael Dockrill very diplomatically stated, ‘in spite of all 
these encouraging elements, the history of the last 100 years [1898-1998] of Franco-
British relations is marked by difficulties, such they appeared on more than one 
occasion to be hardly possible to overcome’470. Still they also point out that ‘with the 
benefit of hindsight, we can see now that most of these crises, however acute they 
seemed to be at the time, were in fact nothing more than gut reaction’471. Among 
others, the rivalry for colonies during the early 1900s, the great crisis in Franco-
British central bank relations between the two world wars
472
 and the ‘Problem of de 
Gaulle’473 during the Cold War did not help to foster a better understanding and 
creating an appropriate environment for defence co-operation either. Even before 
World War II, when Britain and France should have prepared together for defeating 
Nazi Germany, their military doctrines were basically focused on how to buck pass 
the costs of defence to each other
474
. 
The Franco-British defence relations during the Cold War were described by 
Jean Chabaud as ‘succession of misunderstandings and missed opportunities’. He 
points out that ‘there were many occasions on which the French and British positions 
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could have been identical. However, prejudices and misunderstandings prevented 
this’475. Accordingly, the foreign and defence policies of the two countries diverged 
significantly during the Cold War despite the two countries signing a Treaty of 
Alliance and Mutual Assistance in Dunkirk in 1947,
476
 both of them were founding 
members of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948 and NATO in 1949. The 
roots of the divergence can be traced back to before and during World War Two, 
stemming from different world views, experiences and different relations with the 
United States. For instance, while after the Second World War Britain remained a 
great power and forged a very strong relationship on every level with the United 
States, France felt humiliated and wanted to restore its greatness which it believed had 
been lost during the war. The situation became more complicated as the French 
believed that after the World War II they would be degraded to a servile status 
towards the United States. In addition, Washington distrusted Charles de Gaulle – the 
leader of the Free French during the war and President of France later – from the 
beginning, what in turn also had a negative impact on de Gaulle’s views about 
Americans. These dynamics had an impact on the relations of Britain and France, and 
among others de Gaulle had the impression ‘that the British […] would never stand 
up to the Americans’.477  
After the Second World War both Britain and France were in similar positions 
in the sense that they had to handle their relative declining power and both knew that 
they needed the United States for that. The United Kingdom decided to become a kind 
of ‘loyal courtier’ of the United States in order to be able to persuade Americans to 
make the British policy their own. Although France was convinced too that the United 
States had to be involved in European affairs via some transatlantic structure, Paris 
wanted to create a European organization where France was in a dominant position, 
from where it could be able to speak with Washington on an equal basis and make an 
end of its inferior status.
478
 However, the evolution of NATO did not favour France, 
which led to repeated French disillusionments in the Alliance – NATO did not 
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provide help in France’s colonial wars, NATO rearmed Germany, Anglo-Saxons 
dominated the organization
479
 and the United States who did not provide ‘sufficient’ 
military aid to Paris and humiliated France again during the Suez Crisis in 1956. 
These processes led to France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military 
command in 1966, and put France and Britain to different paths on many aspects of 
defence policy. France decided to become an independent great power to restore its 
greatness, thus followed a distinctive foreign policy from that of the United States and 
overtook the lead in the integration process of the EC/EU. Parallel with these Paris 
developed, its indigenous doctrines and weapon systems in every area independently 
from NATO and the United States. At the same time the United Kingdom put NATO 
into the focal point of its defence policy, co-operated more intensively with the 
United States on foreign and defence policy, and when London could not allocate the 
appropriate resources for the development of certain military technologies, it procured 
them from Washington. In addition, in the framework of NATO Britain followed and 
adjusted to US military doctrines as well. 
Despite the aforementioned processes, Franco-British defence relations never 
ceased during the Cold War. The closest military co-operation between them was 
Operation Musketeer in 1956, when Franco-British troops invaded Egypt to take over 
the Suez Canal
480
. From the 1960s the two countries co-operated on several armament 
programmes like the Martel missile, the Jaguar aircraft, the Lynx, Puma and Gazelle 
helicopters.
481
 However, later both countries embarked on multilateral armament 
programmes instead of bilateral ones and, besides the previously mentioned 
collaborations of the 1960s, they did not initiate other British-French major 
armaments programmes during the Cold War. In 1962 the two countries discussed the 
possibility of an ‘entente nucléaire’, a framework where they could combine their 
nuclear forces and could co-operate on developing technologies necessary for new 
nuclear weapon systems. However, at the same time the United States offered Polaris 
missiles for both countries, and while Britain accepted the American offer, France 
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declined it. In the subsequent years the idea of nuclear cooperation emerged between 
London and Paris on several occasions, but it did not take root.
482
 
British-French relations became more institutionalized after 1976, when the 
annual Franco-British summit was established. That year London and Paris also 
signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Placing of Services and Facilities of 
the Government of the French Republic at the Disposal of British Forces in times of 
crisis’ 483 . In the long term these Franco-British summits significantly helped to 
improve defence co-operation between the two states, which culminated in the 
agreement of 1982, when Paris and London decided that their defence ministers 
would meet twice a year. Two years later at the 1984 Franco-British summit the 
parties also agreed on that none of them would begin any new armaments programme 
without discussing it with the other.
484
 However, they could not agree on the 
development of a new fighter aircraft with the result that the French developed the 
Rafale whilst the British participated in the development of the multinational 
Eurofighter.  
The end of the Cold War transformed the strategic environment significantly 
and opened up new windows of opportunity for many new defence collaborations in 
Europe as we have seen an overview in the Literature Review. Co-operation this time 
was driven mostly by decreasing European defence budgets, newly emerging military 
technologies, new tasks – expeditionary warfare – for the European armed forces and 
the joint allied operations of the 1990s (the Gulf War in 1991, peace support 
operations on the Balkans in the 1990s and the Kosovo War in 1999). These processes 
affected the British-French relations as well and created the momentum for an 
improvement of defence co-operation between London and Paris, which was never 
seen during the Cold War. Thus, a series of British-French bilateral agreements and 
initiatives regarding defence were established during the 1990s and the 2000s:
485
 
 In 1992 the Anglo-French Joint Nuclear Commission was established, 
which became the main forum for discussion on nuclear issues between 
the two countries. 
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 In 1995 the Franco-British European Air Group was created. (The 
membership of this initiative was extended later and currently it is called 
‘European Air Group’, where seven European nations are co-operating on 
air defence training and reciprocal air support.) 
 In 1996 the Franco-British Joint Commission on Peacekeeping was 
established for harmonizing the doctrines and procedures of the two armed 
forces regarding peace support operations. In the same year a Letter of 
Intent was signed on maritime co-operation. In the LoI France and the 
United Kingdom established 20 working groups to study among others 
amphibious operations, operational doctrine and personnel exchanges and 
also aircraft carrier development. 
 In 1997 a Letter of Intent between the British and French armies was 
signed. 
 In 1998 a Franco-British Joint Declaration was adopted at St. Malo which 
declared that the European Union ‘must have the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military force’486. This declaration created 
the basis for the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. 
 In 2000 a Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operative Defence 
Research and Technology was updated by the two countries which 
covered several co-operative initiatives between the UK and France (e.g. 
jet engines and airborne radar, armoured fighting vehicles, ship propulsion 
systems).In the same year France and Britain together with Germany, 
Italy, Spain and Sweden signed a Letter of Intent on the Framework 
Agreement on Defence Industrial Restructuring. 
 At the Franco-British Summit of 2003 the two countries reached an 
agreement on further defence co-operation both bilaterally and in an EU 
framework. On this occasion, they agreed upon improving their co-
operation on aircraft carriers, proposed the creation of the European 
Defence Agency and suggested that the EU should take over the NATO 
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 In 2006 the United Kingdom and France agreed to co-operate on future 
aircraft carrier design and established a High Level Bilateral Working 
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Group for studying the possibilities for improving the collaboration on 
current and future armament programmes between the two states 
 At the 2008 summit London and Paris decided to co-operate on the A400 
transport aircrafts, initiated a joint helicopter trust fund, proposed the 
creation of European carrier group interoperability and a joint industrial 
strategy for complex weapons. 
 In 2009 the UK and France proposed initiatives on UAVs and next 
generation military communication satellites. 
 
In addition, France and the UK have also co-operated with other countries on 
several armament programmes. Good examples for this are the British-French-Italian 
PAAMs surface-to-air missile system for destroyers and the Meteor air-to-air missiles 
for the Eurofighter Typhoons and A400s.
487
  
However, not every collaborative effort was beneficial for both countries and 
in some cases there were misperceptions about the intentions of the other. For 
instance, the UK withdrew from the British-French-Italian Horizon destroyer 
programme in 1999 and Britain developed the Type 45 destroyer instead.
488
 The UK 
also withdrew from the British-French-German Trigat Mr third-generation anti-tank 
missile programme in 2003 and instead procured American and Israeli weapon 
systems off the shelf.
489
 Furthermore, the UK and France occasionally saw the raison 
d'être of their common initiatives differently, which later caused misunderstandings 
between them and could slow their collaborations. The most obvious example is the 
St. Malo agreement, because while the initiative was seen by the British mostly as a 
capability development issue where CSDP could develop into the ‘European wing of 
NATO’, the French perceived the agreement as a political issue that would lead to a 
‘European alternative to NATO’.490  
To sum up, Franco-British defence collaborations during the Cold War were 
the exceptions rather than the rule, while at the same time the institutional framework 
for a fruitful co-operation had been laid down already during the 1970s and 1980s 
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thanks to the establishment of the Franco-British summits and the regular defence 
ministerial meetings. However, only the geopolitical changes that stemmed from the 
fall of the Soviet Union and the new tasks undertaken by the armed forces in the 
1990s that created the proper environment for a much closer Franco-British co-
operation.  
 
CREATING LANCASTER HOUSE TREATIES INSTEAD OF CO-
OPERATING WITHIN NATO AND EU  
Having introduced the Lancaster House treaties, this part attempts to answer the 
question why France and the United Kingdom chose to co-operate bilaterally in the 
framework of the Lancaster House treaties instead of within the framework of NATO 
and/or EU. Revealing the dynamics why certain countries opt for MDCs instead of 
co-operation in NATO and EU is relevant per se, but the relevance of the Lancaster 
House treaties excel from other currently created or reenergized MDCs in Europe. Its 
reason is that the United Kingdom and France have often functioned as the engines of 
NATO and the EU’s defence policy for the last decades, and invested huge amount of 
resources and energies into them. Accordingly, it is even more important to figure out 
why these two countries, that have such prominent roles in NATO and EU, decided to 
co-operate in an MDC in 2009 instead in one of the two institutions they nurtured. 
 
The role of the United Kingdom and France in NATO and EU/CSDP 
Since the beginning of the Cold War the United Kingdom has been the ‘staunchest 
supporter of the Atlantic Alliance as the dominant organisation for the provision of 
military security’491 in Europe, and has been the second most influential member of 
NATO after the United States
492
. In addition, after the 1975 defence review NATO 
and European defence became irrevocably the focal point of British defence policy, as 
the UK had to abandon the vast majority of its overseas commitments and bases 
because of financial constraints
493
. Even after the Cold War the central objective of 
British defence policy was to make sure that NATO would remain the continent’s 
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principal defence organization. Thus, the UK not only undertook the responsibility of 
the framework nation of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in 1991, but played a highly 
important role in the transformation of NATO to adapt to the new strategic 
environment of the 1990s and 2000s and among others London was a major actor in 
the NATO-led Kosovo war.
494
 
Britain has also been highly active in creating the EU’s European Security and 
Defence Policy (currently it is called as Common Security and Defence Policy – 
CSDP). Until the late 1990s London was against a strengthened WEU or EU that 
considered  military security issues, as Britain did not see the rational of duplicating 
NATO’s military capabilities in another institution and was not sure that a uniquely 
European formation in the military domain without the United States would work at 
all. In addition, with the possible emergence of an alternative defence forum London 
did not want to lose its influence enjoyed through NATO.
495
 However, Britain 
became more and more frustrated about the lack of progress in European capability 
development within NATO, and at the same time London received messages from the 
US that without serious capability development in Europe NATO’s existence could be 
questioned.
496
 Therefore, the Blair government attempted to facilitate military 
capability development via the EU as well, thus the idea of the Franco-British St. 
Malo agreement of 1998, which became the founding document of CSDP was Tony 
Blair’s initiative and did not come from the French part.497 Similarly, in the coming 
years Britain not only actively contributed to various initiatives aimed at 
strengthening EU defence – like adopting the Helsinki Headline Goal, the Capability 
Action Plan, the European Security Strategy, and framing Permanent Structured 
Cooperation –, but initiated and introduced the concept of the EU Battlegroups and 
together with France pushed the establishment of the European Defence Agency.
498
 
Despite the fact that France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military 
command structure in 1966, Paris has contributed significantly to NATO’s efforts 
since the end of the Cold War and even before the fall of the Berlin wall maintained a 
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much closer relationship with the Atlantic Alliance as it was widely believed. France 
not only kept its seat at the North Atlantic Council in the major political decision-
making body of NATO, but French contact groups co-operated with NATO’s regional 
commands from the end of the 1960s, France planned to place its forces under NATO 
operational control during a major European war, participated in joint manoeuvres 
with NATO forces and discussed military questions like nuclear deterrence with 
NATO.
499
 Right after the Cold War the question of France’s reintegration to NATO 
was raised and with the leadership of Jacque Chirac the reintegration attempt was 
almost successful in 1996-1997. However, the French wanted a bigger share from the 
command post allocations (among others the position of the commander of Allied 
Forces Southern Europe) than NATO members and especially the United States was 
willing to provide for Paris, thus France’s reintegration to NATO was not achieved 
that time. Still, a process of ‘creeping integration’ to NATO has been intensified on 
behalf of France and the practical co-operations between NATO and France have 
increased significantly.
500
 To the end of the 2000s France became the biggest 
contributing nation to NRF, its contribution to NATO’s budget was the third in tie 
with the UK,
501
 additionally France was among the top five troop contributors to 
NATO operations.
502




With regard to the European Union’s defence policy France has always been 
its biggest proponent. As Trine Flockhart puts ‘all French governments since the early 
1950s have held that French dominated European integration process would boost not 
only European but also French influence internationally.’504 Naturally, it was true for 
defence policy as well. After the end of the Cold War, France intended to create a 
‘European pillar’ in the NATO structure during the 1990s under the European 
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Security and Defence Identity. However, after the unsuccessful French attempt for 
reintegration into NATO, France began to focus on creating a defence arm for the EU. 
After the St. Malo agreement France was the main engine and played a crucial role 
for establishing ESDP and it would be too much to list how much France have done 




As this part demonstrated, France and Britain were highly interested in 
NATO’s and CSDP’s success and invested significant amount of resources in them. 
We can conclude that these two countries have played a central role in formulating 
those processes that positioned NATO and EU at the heart of European defence co-
operation through setting the agendas, designing and launching new initiatives and 
providing the necessary expertise and resources for them. Thus, it is highly important 
to know, why they have recently decided to co-operate in an MDC rather than in 
either NATO or EU as they have done it earlier.  
 
Why the United Kingdom and France opted for co-operating in an MDC? 
Based on my Research Framework chapter I am applying multiple case design to 
figure out why the countries in the studied cases created new MDCs instead of using 
NATO and EU defence co-operative frameworks. For this I test three rival 
explanations concerning every case. Thus, I try to identify the prerequisites of the 
operationalized generic predicted patterns of the three rival explanations regarding the 
Lancaster House Treaties. Accordingly, if I can identify all the prerequisites of one of 
the developed rival explanations regarding the Lancaster House Treaties, we can 
conclude that this rival explanation can sufficiently explain why the UK and France 
established the Lancaster House Treaties and not collaborated in NATO or EU. The 
three rival explanations are 1) the lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic 
defence cooperation 2) the impacts of the financial crisis, 3) different emerging shared 
threat perceptions of European states. 
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Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence 
cooperation  
 
Figure 14 – Rival Explanation 1: Predicted Lancaster House Treaties Pattern 
 
According to ‘Rival Explanation 1’, the adoption of Lancaster House Treaties’ main 
reason (see Figure 14) is that defence co-operation in EU and NATO had not evolved 
appropriately (independent variable), thus France and the United Kingdom became 
dissatisfied with the co-operations in NATO and EU (intervening variable). This rival 
explanation argues that these independent and intervening variables lead to the 
adoption of Lancaster House treaties. I developed three prerequisites for verifying 
‘Rival Explanation 1’. The prerequisites are the following: 
1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to 
be identified. 
2. The British and French dissatisfaction concerning the lack of progress of 
defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected. 
3. The creation of the Lancaster House Treaties needs to be linked to both to 
France’s and Britain’s dissatisfaction with NATO/EU. 
 
If these prerequisites are identifiable, we can conclude that “Rival Explanation 
1” has explanatory power concerning the case of Lancaster House Treaties. 
 
Prerequisite 1: 
The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation within the EU and NATO needs 
to be identified. 
This is the only prerequisite among the prerequisites of the three rival explanations, 
which is not directly associated with the participating states of the studied MDCs. In 
addition, the lack of progress concerning the relevant EU and NATO defence 
cooperation – especially in the area of military capability development – was 
introduced and demonstrated in the Literature Review chapter. Thus, in this section I 
am not going to repeat the events and processes in this regard, but based on the 
Literature Review chapter I will take Prerequisite 1 of Rival Explanation 1 as a given 
regarding every case. 
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Accordingly, Prerequisite 1 based on the Literature Review is confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 2: 
The British and French dissatisfaction concerning the lack of progress of defence co-
operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected. 
The United Kingdom and France have had different institutional preferences 
regarding defence co-operation. While Britain’s priority has been defence 
collaboration mostly via NATO, France attempted to facilitate an autonomous 
European defence via EU’s ESDP/CSDP. However, both countries became 
dissatisfied and frustrated by the lack of progress in NATO and EU mostly because of 
the lack of contribution by many of the other European countries. Although this 
dissatisfaction was present in both countries, the United Kingdom was more 
discontent with the evolution of defence cooperation in the two multilateral 
organizations than France, or at least London was more willing to express its opinion 
openly in this regard. 
The United Kingdom has been dissatisfied with its European allies and their 
contribution to defence for long time. As mentioned earlier, in the late 1990s one of 
the main reasons why Britain supported the launch of ESDP was that European 
nations were not willing to invest more into military capabilities via NATO and the 
United States sent very clear messages that Washington would lose its interest in the 
Atlantic Alliance, if Europeans did not want to provide more contribution in terms of 
military capabilities. Accordingly, Tony Blair initiated the St. Malo Agreement to 
facilitate Europeans to co-operate more on defence.
506
 During the 2000s the UK was 
at the centre of many of the NATO and EU defence co-operative initiatives and tried 
to convince and pressure its partners into taking defence issues more seriously. At that 
time, the UK focused on defence co-operation in terms of a contribution to NATO 
operations, especially in Afghanistan.
507
 Accordingly, the UK measured the 
collaborative efforts of its allies by their operational contributions and their level of 
defence budgets. 
Several British Secretaries of Defence expressed their frustration openly about 
the lack of contribution of European nations to operations and their low-level defence 
                                                 
506
 Howorth, Security and defence policy.  
507
  United Kingdom, House of Commons Defence Committee, The Future of NATO and European 
Defence. Ninth Report of Session 2007–08, Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written 
Evidence (London: House of Commons, 2008), 43-47. 
 147 
budgets. Among others Defence Secretary Des Browne (Labour) stated in 2007 that 
‘unless Europeans spend more on defence, and more of their defence budgets on 
capability, both NATO and the EU will be hamstrung. For Europe to have more 
capability its members must spend more – quite a lot more’508. In January 2009 
Defence Secretary John Hutton (Labour) also expressed his dissatisfaction about the 
unwillingness of Europeans to provide an appropriate level of contribution to 
NATO’s operations in Afghanistan. He stated that  
‘The campaign in Afghanistan is evidence of the limited appetite 
amongst some European member states for supporting the most 
active operation NATO has ever been tasked with. […] It isn't good 
enough to always look to the U.S. for political, financial and 
military cover. […] Freeloading on the back of U.S. military 
security is not an option if we wish to be equal partners in this trans-
Atlantic alliance.’509 
 
The British view was that while only a few countries – including the UK – 
took the brunt of the dangerous tasks and the fighting in the ISAF operation in 
Afghanistan, the troops from most European NATO members were deployed to stable 
parts of the country and their caveats impeded to send them to combat missions. The 
United Kingdom was also highly dissatisfied not only because Europeans sent 
proportionately much fewer soldiers to Afghanistan than Britain, but because they 
were not willing to deploy vital equipment like helicopters either.
510
 
Liam Fox both as Conservative shadow and then Coalition Defence Secretary 
criticized European NATO members for their insufficient level of contribution to the 
Afghan mission and their low defence budgets. In 2007 as shadow defence secretary 
he accused Germany, Italy and Spain of ‘not fully playing their role’ in ISAF, and 
also suggested that the NATO membership of Poland and Hungary should be 
suspended as ‘they have come into NATO, pocketed the security guarantee and have 
cut defence spending.’ He stressed that NATO should ‘be able to suspend NATO 
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members who do not spend the levels of funding that we agreed.’511 Fox as Defence 
Secretary was not so radical, but he consequently criticized NATO members whose 
defence budgets did not meet the 2% of GDP, which was agreed as a threshold by 
NATO members. He also pointed out that many NATO Allies were unwilling to 
deploy their soldiers and equipment on operations or if they did so with significant 
restrictions about how and where they could be used.
512
 Liam Fox’s opinion 
represented the British view well, when he mentioned only France, Turkey, Norway, 
Denmark and Estonia as worthy European partners concerning defence.
513
 Although, 
this message had been delivered after the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties, it 
was telling that Fox’s successors, Phillip Hammond, reiterated the Fox argument in 
2012. ‘Too many countries are failing to meet their financial responsibilities to 
NATO, and so failing to maintain appropriate and proportionate capabilities. Too 
many are opting out of operations or contributing but a fraction of what they should 
be capable of.’514 Such open and sustained criticism from successive British defence 
secretaries reflected the dissatisfaction of the British defence establishment 
disappointed with the defence collaborative efforts of many of their European allies in 
the second half of the 2000s and early 2010s.  
This view has also been underpinned by other officials and official documents. 
For instance, Quentin Davies, the UK Minister for Defence Procurement expressed 
his frustration regarding the slow progress in both NATO and EU, as ‘collaboration 
within the NATO planning process has failed to produce joint kit requirements’ and 
‘the European Defence Agency has not met early expectations’.515 In addition, the 
2010 British Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) clearly prioritized 
bilateral defence cooperation over multilateral collaborations. Although the document 
says that the UK will look for partners and possibilities to ‘share capabilities, 
technologies and programmes, ensuring that collective resources can go further’,516 it 
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also emphasizes the UK’s preference toward bilateral collaborations in this regard. It 
stated that the UK ‘will focus particularly on building new models of practical 
bilateral cooperation’ and ‘will generally favour bilateral equipment collaboration or 
off-the-shelf purchase, because such arrangements are potentially more 
straightforward and more fruitful than complex multilateral agreements, which have 
delivered mixed results for us in the past.’ 517  This basically means that the UK 
decided that it would not take part actively in Europe wide (i.e. NATO and EU) 
pooling and sharing projects, because earlier multilateral projects did not provide 
satisfactory results. 
French commitment to NATO had not been and could not be as strong as the 
UK’s, especially since Paris’ reintegration into NATO was only accomplished in 
2009 and omitted French nuclear forces. France’s priority had been developing an 
autonomous European defence with French leadership possibly via ESDP/CSDP, thus 
it is understandable that France was more interested in the success of ESDP/CSDP 
and accordingly had more stake in it. With regard to France, officials did not criticize 
openly NATO and EU members as the British defence secretaries did, but during the 
second half of the 2000s French disillusionment on ESDP became clear. This can be 
identified as French attitude and policies have significantly changed towards 
ESDP/CSDP in this period. Among others Bastien Irondelle and Frédéric Mérand 
referring to several French experts
518
 point out that at the end of the 2000s ‘a certain 
degree of disenchantment’ with ESDP’s operational accomplishments and a 
disappointment concerning ESDP’s ‘institutional stagnation’ were perceivable on 
behalf of the French.
519
 In addition, even the 2008 French White Paper on Defence 
and National Security mentioned ‘hopes and disappointments’520 regarding ESDP, 
highlighting the French dissatisfaction with the evolution of ESDP. Accordingly, it is 
not surprising that President Sarkozy and his team seemed ‘convinced that ESDP has 
reached a plateau in the pre-2007 configuration’. 521  Thus, President Sarkozy 
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attempted to reinvigorate ESDP during the French EU Presidency in 2008 and had 
great ambitions for that: he intended to establish the core of a European military HQ 
and also wanted to revise the European Security Strategy. Furthermore, Sarkozy also 
intended to define the criteria of PESCO and thus improving European capabilities, 
which France supported consequently from the very beginning. However, none of 




This experience might have been revealing for President Sarkozy as he did not 
attempt to achieve any major goal regarding ESDP/CSDP in the future. The French 
disillusionment in ESDP/CSDP was also well indicated by later developments: in 
early 2010, when the Spanish EU Presidency put PESCO on the agenda again, France 
was not the champion of the issue anymore, but ‘took a much nuanced position’ on it 
and even ‘seemed no longer support the idea’.523  
Based on these it is not surprising that French politicians became more and 
more frustrated. Antoine Rayroux who conducted a comprehensive discourse analysis 
of French parliamentary debates about ESDP pointed out that while in the period of 
2000-2007 the dominant discourse of members of parliament regarding ESDP was 
‘enthusiastic and ambitious’ in 2008-2009 the debates showed disappointment.524 As 
he points out,  
‘in 2008-2009, the discourse progressively turns more critical, as the 
first CSDP interventions overseas lack ambitions, industrial defence 
cooperation mostly happens at a bilateral level, and French MPs 
lament the fact that CSDP deals exclusively with overseas 
operations, not the defence of Europe. Several debates even suggest 
that the existence of a European defence should be called into 
question, with France’s return to NATO command structures and 
absence of new operations, cooperation, and European identity: 
“Europe of defence has broken down, and its achievements are 
particularly poor. ... And regarding European states’ reactions, let’s 
face it: defence is a priority for none of them” (Assemblée nationale 
2009).’525 
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Many analysts agree that one of the many reasons why Sarkozy finished the 
reintegration of France to NATO was the lack of progress in ESDP.
526
 French 
officials highlighted that French reintegration to NATO can be understood as St Malo 
II,
527
 because the logic behind it was very similar to Tony Blair’s move in the second 
half of the 1990s, when he supported the launch of ESDP because he wanted to 
facilitate European defence efforts this way. Now the situation was the other way 
around and France intended to do the same through reintegration into NATO, 
especially because the French defence establishment became convinced that via 
NATO Europeans might be more willing to develop their military capabilities.
528
  
In addition, with this step France could remove the obstacles caused by its lack 
of involvement in NATO’s integrated military structure. 529  Although the United 
Kingdom was keen to launch ESDP in the late 1990s and early 2000s and then to 
develop its institutions and capabilities, the British view changed significantly to the 
mid-2000s and especially once the defence establishment became frustrated with the 
lack of contribution by many European nations via ESDP.
530
 Consequently, the 
United Kingdom ‘played an active blocking role’ regarding the development of many 
EU capabilities and institutions, because British officials saw them as possible 
duplication of NATO assets.
531
 Therefore, the French had a very strong incentive to 
minimize the conflicts with the United Kingdom, the biggest European military 
power, and accordingly Sarkozy chose to reintegrate almost fully to NATO. France’s 
reintegration into the Atlantic Alliance did not mean that Paris was fully satisfied with 
the functioning of the organization. Among others the French saw serious problems 
with the conduct of ISAF, and by 2010 had the fear that ‘the Lisbon summit threatens 
to be a complete waste of time, unable to challenge the bureaucratic drift plaguing the 
institution and the instigation of a document of little use’.532 
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Despite these reservations, NATO became the primary organization for France 
regarding defence in the 2013 French White Paper,
533
 which is a significant shift 
compared to the 2008 White Paper, where the EU was still prioritized over NATO. 
Although the 2013 White Paper was published three years after the signing of 
Lancaster House Treaties, it reveals important tendencies about French defence policy 
between 2008 and 2013 when the two White Papers were published. In the 2013 
White Paper, another important change regarding defence co-operation is that 
bilateral collaborations are mentioned several times in this document,
534
 while this 
aspect was almost totally ignored in the 2008 White Paper.
535
 However, in contrast to 
the British 2010 SDSR the 2013 French White Paper officially does not prioritize 
bilateral defence co-operation over multilateral ones regarding capability 
development. In addition, the document refers to both NATO’s Smart Defence and 
EU’s pooling and sharing initiatives several times, and declares that France intends to 
engage in them and highlights the role of European defence industry in this regard.
536
  
In sum, we can see that France became dissatisfied with the faltering progress 
of ESDP/CSDP and Paris has given a bigger role for NATO in its defence policy after 
the French reintegration to NATO. Accordingly, France has found itself in the strange 
situation when it began to invest in and focus on an organization (NATO) which it 
historically distrusted, and became frustrated and disappointed with another 
organization (EU’s CSDP) which it had created and nurtured, and often saw as a 
potential competitor of the former one. 
 NATO ESDP/CSDP 
United Kingdom Growing dissatisfaction Lost interest entirely 
France 
Traditionally not interested, 
but growing interests after 
reintegration 
Growing dissatisfaction 
Figure 15 – Dissatisfaction of the United Kingdom and France regarding NATO and 
ESDP/CSDP 
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We can conclude that by 2010 both the United Kingdom and France grew 
generally dissatisfied with the progress regarding Europe wide defence co-operative 
efforts especially in the institutions which had been the most relevant for them (see 
Figure 15). For the UK, NATO has been the bedrock of defence policy, yet several 
British defence secretaries still criticized NATO members openly because of their 
inadequate defence efforts in the Afghanistan operations and their low level of 
defence budgets. In addition, the 2010 SDSR declared that bilateral cooperation on 
military equipment is the prioritized means for London. At the same time, Britain 
entirely lost its interest in ESDP because of its slow development and of the fear of 
duplicating capabilities and institutions in NATO. For France, ESDP was the priority 
during most of the 2000s and NATO had a smaller relevance for Paris, because 
among others France was not full member of the Alliance. Nevertheless, as ESDP 
stagnated and Paris could not reinvigorate this policy area even during the 2008 
French EU Presidency, the French establishment became disenchanted regarding 
ESDP. One of the many reasons why Paris was willing to reintegrate to NATO was to 
facilitate the defence efforts of European nations and remove the obstacles of its 
partial NATO membership posed towards Atlanticist NATO members. However, 
because of the traditional French distrust felt towards the Atlantic Alliance, NATO 
could not take over entirely the place previously occupied by CSDP in French defence 
policy. 
Based on the above detected dissatisfaction on behalf of the United Kingdom 
and France concerning the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and 
NATO, Prerequisite 2 has been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 3:  
The creation of the Lancaster House Treaties needs to be linked to both to France’s 
and Britain’s dissatisfaction with NATO/EU. 
As we have seen in the previous sections both Prerequisite 1 and Prerequisite 2 have 
been confirmed. This means that defence co-operation within the EU and NATO did 
not progress as expected (Prerequisite 1) and both Britain and France were 
dissatisfied with this situation (Prerequisite 2). This part investigates whether it was 
identifiable that the source of the creation of Lancaster House Treaties was the two 
countries’ aforementioned dissatisfaction concerning NATO and EU. As this part will 
show, both British and French officials and analysts considered the dissatisfaction of 
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the two countries regarding NATO and EU an important factor regarding the 
development of the Lancaster House Treaties. 
As we have seen in the case of Britain the SDSR 2010 provides important 
information in this regard. This official strategic document of the British MoD was 
developed parallel with the Lancaster House Treaties and states that the UK is looking 
for ‘practical bilateral cooperation’ with countries possessing similar military posture 
as Britain or collaborating with the UK on operations. In addition, the SDSR also 
states that the UK favours bilateral or off-the-shelf solutions on equipment 
procurement, because ‘complex multilateral agreements (...) have delivered mixed 
results for us in the past’.537 Basically this means that, in general, the UK supports 
practical bilateral cooperation, and because of the British dissatisfaction with 
multilateral solutions, the United Kingdom opts for bilateral agreements over 
multilateral ones in the field of equipment cooperation. These requirements fit exactly 
to the Lancaster House Treaties.  
Nevertheless, the connection between the Lancaster House Treaties and the 
British dissatisfaction with NATO and EU is not explicitly articulated in the 
document, and the dissatisfaction with multilateral frameworks is only expressed 
directly in terms of equipment cooperation. However, as one senior UK MoD official 
remarked ‘the curse of consensus’ in the EU and NATO frameworks had been 
perceived as a serious problem in the UK regarding defence cooperation.
538
 Thus, on 
behalf of the British the lack of progress in these two organizations were seen as an 
important factor when the Lancaster House Treaties were drafted, because British 
officials thought that with France, who had ‘broadly similar capabilities and strategy’ 
as the UK had, it would be ‘easier to do’ collaborative projects and making progress 
bilaterally than multilaterally within NATO or EU.
539
 Not only officials, but also 
British analysts expressed the view that ‘neither NATO nor the EU can offer the 
solution to the strategic dilemma both London and Paris face’ 540  and argued for 
stronger British-French bilateral defence cooperation because of this reason. 
In the case of France, officials were not only dissatisfied with the 
developments in EU structures regarding defence collaboration, but for instance 
Vincent Thomassier, the defence procurement attaché at the French Embassy in 
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London, also expressed his frustration concerning the lack of progress in other pan-
European structures like in MBDA as well. Referring to MBDA he said on the 
Franco-British Council Seminar in October 2009 that, ‘what we are doing is not 
enough. Three years ago we defined a common industrial strategy but I sense a 
frustration from the minister (...). We are not doing enough. Perhaps we are still too 
rich and the crisis isn’t pinching enough.’ 541  This type of frustration regarding 
multinational defence cooperation was repeated by other French officials as well, and 
they also recognized that the capability development projects initiated by the 1998 St 
Malo agreement basically failed. As a senior French MoD official stated in an 
interview about the Lancaster House Treaties in December 2010 ‘France fought hard 
for EU defence structures for ten years. We are now in a new era of developing 
capabilities. If we cannot do that collectively as Europe then we need to look at other 
ways.’542 In early 2011 a similar view was expressed by Benoit Gomis, former French 
MoD employee and research analyst at Chatham House that time, who highlighted 
that the ‘EU and other multilateral frameworks are clearly secondary to the 2010 UK-
French agreements’.543 
In hindsight, several analysts perceived that the frustration and dissatisfaction 
regarding the development in NATO and especially in EU had a major role in the 
creation of the bilateral Franco-British agreements in the form of the Lancaster House 
Treaties.
544
 As, for instance, Sven Biscop pointed out 
‘the Lancaster House meeting looked more like St-Malo in reverse, 
aimed at bilateral rather than European cooperation. France in its 
public diplomacy tried to frame the agreements in a European 
narrative. But for the UK, Lancaster House represented a choice for 
bilateral cooperation with the only other European country 
perceived to matter, to the detriment of multilateral cooperation with 
partners seen more as dead weight and within EU (or indeed 
NATO) institutions seen as the opposite of cost-effective.’545 
 
Based on the above mentioned documents, statements of officials and views of 
analysts Prerequisite 3 has been detected. Both the United Kingdom and France were 
dissatisfied with the progress in NATO and EU concerning defence co-operation and 
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this played an important role in deepening bilateral defence co-operation between 
each other. Accordingly, the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties is linked to both 




Figure 16 – Rival Explanation 1: Actual Lancaster House Treaties Pattern 
 
In regards to this rival explanation Prerequisite 1, Prerequisite 2 and Prerequisite 3 
were verified. This means that the independent variable of ‘Lack of progress on pan-
European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’ proved to be the source of the 
intervening variable of ‘UK and France are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’. By the 
verification of Prerequisite 1 and Prerequisite 2 we can say that due to the slow 
progress in EU and NATO regarding defence issues Britain and France became 
frustrated and dissatisfied with defence co-operation in these two organizations. By 
the verification of Prerequisite 3, it was shown that the intervening variable of ‘UK 
and France are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ and it has a strong link to the 
dependent variable of ‘Creation of the Lancaster House Treaties’. Accordingly, the 
British and French dissatisfaction with defence co-operation in NATO and EU was 
one of the main reasons why the Lancaster House agreements were signed. 
 
Rival Explanation 2 – Effects of the financial crisis 
 
 
Figure 17 – Rival Explanation 2: Predicted Lancaster House Treaties Pattern 
 
Rival Explanation 2 states that the financial crisis generated defence budget cuts in 
the France and the UK (independent variable). This phenomenon generated the need 
for alternative multinational solutions in these two countries in order to maintain their 
national military capabilities (intervening variable), and this process lead to the 
creation of the Lancaster House Treaties (dependent variable). The prerequisites for 
this rival explanation are the following: 
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1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in 
the UK and France. 
2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative 
multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the UK and 
France. 
3. The creation of the Lancaster House Treaties needs to be linked to UK’s and 
France’s search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national 
military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
 
Prerequisite 1:  
Defence budget cuts had to happen as the consequence of the financial crisis in the 
UK and France. 
The 2008 financial and economic crisis hit the United Kingdom and France 
significantly, and both London and Paris intervened massively to avoid the collapse of 
their banking and financial sectors. As a consequence of the huge stimulus packages 
that the two governments provided, the budget deficits of these two countries reached 
historical heights, and accordingly they were compelled to introduce austerity 
measures. In this section I investigate whether these austerity measures affected the 
defence budgets of France and the United Kingdom, and if so, how big their impact 
was. 
After the financial crisis the UK government introduced the biggest spending 
across-the-board cuts for decades. The 2010 Spending Review resulted in average 
departmental cuts of 19 % in order to save £81 billion over four years.
546
 According 
to the document, the Ministry of Defence had to make £4.3 billion of savings during 
2011-2015, which meant that the defence budget was set to be reduced by 8% in real 
terms for that period. Based on these conditions the announced defence budgets for 
the next fiscal years were £33.8 billion in 2011-2012, £34.4 billion in 2012-2013, 
£34.1 billion in 2013-2014 and £33.5 billion in 2014-2015.
547
 Although the Ministry 
of Defence suffered proportionately lower budget cuts that time than some other 
departments, it was not ‘ringfenced’ like health, education and overseas aid. Thus, 
according to the Office for National Statistics, the defence budgets of 2011-2012 and 
                                                 
546
 BBC, ”Spending Review 2010: George Osborne wields the axe,” BBC News, October 20, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11579979. 
547
 Ministry of Defence, ”Defence Budget Cut by Eight per Cent,” news release, October 20, 2010, 
GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-budget-cut-by-eight-per-cent. 
 158 
2012-2013 altogether fell by 7% which ‘was the largest decline in spending out of all 
ten functions of government.’ Namely, that defence spending ‘fell faster than any 
other area of government’ during these two years.548 
The Autumn Statement 2012 introduced another 1% reduction in the next year 
and 2% in the year after for every ministry in the UK. The Ministry of Defence was 
not excluded from these austerity measures either,
549
 and had to absorb an additional 
£735 million of cuts for the next two years (£245 million in 2013-2014 and 
£490 million in 2014-2015).
550
 At the same time, according to George Osborne, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the British MoD got the ‘flexibility on their multi-year 
budget to ensure that this will not lead to reductions in military manpower or the core 
defence equipment programme over the Parliament’. 551  However, when George 
Osborne announced the approved UK budget in March 2013, he announced an 
additional 1% departmental budget cut above the reductions already made in the 
Autumn Statement 2012. Consequently, the British defence budget was cut by an 
additional £249 million in 2013-2014 and by further £247 million in 2014-2015 
(altogether £496 million).
552
 These repeated cuts were bigger in real terms than the 
reductions that any other department had to make in the UK.
553
 
Between 2010 and 2013 French governments announced their intention of 
making altogether €132 billion savings for the coming years in five rounds. However, 
Paris used the tool of increasing taxes more extensively than London, whose approach 
focused mostly on cutting government expenses.
554
 Thus, it is less surprising that the 
French armed forces had to make less than 3% savings during the 2009-2014 period 
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from its planned €185.9 billion multi-year defence budget.555 With regard to the next 
five-year defence budget, at the end of 2013 the French government announced that 
France would spend €190 billion (pensions included) on defence between 2014 and 
2019, freezing the defence budget at €31.4 billion per year (pensions excluded) until 
2016, thereafter possibly allowing for a moderate increase.
556
 Although nominally the 
French defence budget was not decreasing, analysts pointed out that this was a real 
term cut, because it did not allow for inflation.
557
 In spring 2014 the French 
government announced that it intended to cut the already frozen defence budget by a 
further €2.4 billion from the planned €31.4 billion to €29 billion. However, the French 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the army, air force, and navy chiefs of staff 
threatened to resign, if this reduction had taken place. Thanks to this move of the top 
military leaders of France the defence budget was not any further.
558
 
Although budget cuts in France do not seem as severe as in the United 
Kingdom, because the defence expenses had been reduced by around 3% between 
2009 and 2014, and were frozen. However, if we take into consideration the intention 
of the 2008 French White Paper,
559
 which wanted to increase the defence budget by 
1% above the inflation per year from 2012, and spend €377 billion (pensions 
excluded) on defence between 2009 and 2020, there is a significant reduction 
regarding the planned French defence budget. Namely, the French MoD spent around 
€31-€33 billion (pensions excluded) every year in the period of 2009-2014.560 Thus, 
in the ten years planning period when France intended to spend €377 billion (pensions 
excluded) on defence, Paris actually spent less than €350 billion, which is more than a 
9% reduction.  
In conclusion, both the United Kingdom and France introduced reductions in 
their defence budgets after the financial crisis. While the British armed forces suffered 
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an 8% real term reduction beginning from 2010 and later they had to make additional 
cuts, right after the crisis the French defence budget was decreased by 3%, while in 
the period of 2009-2020 it will suffer more than 9% reduction.  
Based on the above detected British and French defence budget cuts, 
Prerequisite 3 has been confirmed.  
 
Prerequisite 2:  
The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative 
multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the UK and 
France. 
The previous section highlighted that both the United Kingdom and France have cut 
their defence budgets as a result of the financial crisis. In this section I investigate 
what respective measures the two countries have undertaken regarding their armed 
forces thanks to the reductions of the defence budgets and whether they had searched 
for alternative multinational solutions in MDCs to maintain their national military 
capabilities. In general, we can say that neither France nor the United Kingdom have 
searched for alternative solutions to maintain their national military capabilities; 
rather they were committed to handle their hardships in the traditional national way. 
Among others they did not search partners actively for pooling and sharing of military 
capabilities to mitigate the effects of the defence budget cuts, but they intended to 
absorb these negative effects alone.  
As Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman pointed out, the United Kingdom was 
the first Western country, which made a complete defence and security review taking 
into account the negative effects of the financial crisis.
561
 Thus the 2010 SDSR can 
indicate well how Britain intended to handle the ‘age of austerity’ concerning defence 
around the time the UK and France signed the Lancaster House Treaties. The 
preparation for the SDSR began already during the summer of 2009, when Secretary 
of State for Defence Bob Ainsworth (Labour) announced that the Ministry of Defence 
would develop a Green Paper for the SDSR until early 2010.
562
 Based on the results 
of this document the newly elected Conservative – Liberal Democrat government 
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eventually adopted the SDSR and published it on 19 October 2010. As the discussion 
on the Lancaster House Treaties between France and the UK began at the end of 
2009
563
 and they were signed on 2 November 2010, the treaties and the SDSR had 
been developed and drafted parallel and had an impact on each other.
564
 
The SDSR on the one hand revealed the future vision of what kind of 
capabilities and structures the British armed forces would need by 2020, on the other 
hand it focused its provisions mostly on the period of 2010-2015 and identified the 
necessary strategic decisions for that timeframe. Thus, it left certain questions to be 
answered after 2014 when the Afghanistan mission was set to end.
565
 According to 
Andrew Dorman ‘this allowed the government to justify significant cuts to the armed 
forces with plans to reconstitute some capabilities by 2020.’566  These cuts meant 
reductions in personnel, decommissioning of equipment, slowing the procurement of 
new equipment and even cancelling projects. Among others the SDSR envisaged a 
nearly 10% reduction of service personnel (17 000 from 175 000) until 2015, 
reducing the deployable number of brigades from six to five, the number of 
Challenger 2 main battle tanks by 40% and the artillery by 35%; decommissioned the 
Harrier fleet, reducing the size of the Tornado fleet, delaying  orders for the Joint 
Strike Fighters, cancelling the Nimrod MRA4 maritime aircraft programme, retiring 
the C130 Hercules transport aircraft fleet in 2022, one decade earlier than planned; 
decommissioned HMS Ark Royal and thus temporarily eliminated the British carrier 
strike capability, reducing the size of the surface fleet and so on. In accordance with 
these measures the SDSR decided to close bases, rationalize the command structure 
and the resource management systems.
567
 Although the SDSR increased the reserve 
forces to compensate some of the reductions and also introduced future procurement 
projects, the planned cuts show that the British armed forces faced very serious short-
term reductions regarding their capabilities. Thus, ‘inevitably, the UK’s level of 
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ambition has been scaled back’568 by the SDSR, which became absolutely clear from 
the military tasks and defence planning assumptions set.
569
  
The United Kingdom did not search for alternative solutions to help maintain 
its national military capabilities. First, the document did not mention any cooperation 
in the framework of NATO and EU or regional framework, which could fit to the 
definition of Multinational Defence Co-operation.
570
 This means that the British 
government – as the SDSR stated – was not interested in ‘complex multilateral 
agreements, which have delivered mixed results’ earlier regarding capability 
development.
571
 Instead, the British government intended to strengthen collaboration 
between nations on military operations and political issues in NATO and EU. Thus, 
the SDSR emphasized the importance of ‘ensuring that NATO has the political will 
and ability to respond to current and future threats’, ‘successfully complete the 
mission of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan’, 
‘recognise the importance of NATO’s wider security role’, ‘continue to reform 
NATO’, ‘foster better EU-NATO cooperation’, ‘support continued EU enlargement’ 
and ‘support EU missions’ etc.572  
Second, although the SDSR stressed the importance of ‘building new models 
of practical bilateral cooperation with those countries whose defence and security 
posture is closest to our own or with whom we cooperate in multinational operations’, 
the document did not mention directly which countries the authors were thinking of in 
this regard.
573
 Of course, the SDSR names the two most important partners of Britain 
concerning defence, and not surprisingly these were the United States and France. 
However, the cooperation with these two partners could hardly be called a new 
multinational solution, because of the existing collaboration with the US and the 
practical British-French defence cooperation that had flourished since the end of the 
Cold War. Yet, since the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties was so close to the 
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publication of the SDSR, the authors of the document probably had the British-French 
co-operation in their mind in this regard. However, if we investigate the document, 
we can see that it lists six initiatives to strengthen British-French defence 
collaboration, four of which (cooperation on training and doctrine, complex weapons, 
UAVs, logistics of A400) had already been underway in different formats before the 
negotiations on the Lancaster House Treaties began. Thus, only collaboration on 
cyber defence and the creation of a Joint Readiness Force were really new initiatives. 
In addition, even the other major projects stemming from the Lancaster House 
Treaties and its LoI and Package of Joint Measures like nuclear co-operation and 
collaboration on aircraft carriers had been discussed for years. Thus, the Lancaster 
House Treaties can be perceived more as the result of a long process than an 
immediate answer to the financial crisis. As a UK MoD official pointed out, the vast 
majority of the Franco-British bilateral projects had already existed before Lancaster 




Accordingly, we can conclude that London did not search actively for 
alternative multinational solutions to maintain its national military capabilities, but it 
focused more on how Britain could deal with the loss of capabilities as a consequence 
of austerity. Britain did not take into consideration the multinational organizations at 
all and rather focused – at least declaratorily – on bilateral cooperation, but no serious 
steps have been taken regarding capability development collaboration, except for 
strengthening the British-French cooperation. In addition, many of the initiatives of 
developing deeper British-French cooperation were not even new, but they had been 
incorporated into existing ones within the SDSR, the Lancaster House Treaties and its 
LoI and Package of Joint Measures. 
In contrast, the situation in France was quite different than that in Britain, as 
the French defence budget did not decrease as much as the British one. During the 
2008-2014 period the French armed forces had to realize only a 3% reduction in their 
planned budget, thus in France no bigger cuts in terms of personnel had been carried 
out
575
 nor in terms of capabilities than it had been planned in the 2008 White Paper. 
The 2013 White Paper was the first strategic document, which had been drafted after 
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the financial crisis in France, but the cuts and reductions foreseen there were not as 
serious as in the British SDSR either. Although the 2013 French White Paper decided 
that the personnel of the 288 000 strong Armed Forces (222 000 active military and 
66 000 other personnel)
576
 would be decreased by 34 000 between 2014 and 2019,
577
 
the French Armed Forces reduced its personnel by 40 000 in the period of 2008-2012 
as well.
578
 Therefore, the elimination of jobs in the armed forces cannot be 
exclusively attributed to the negative effects of the financial crisis, because this 
process began much earlier, and in addition the financial crisis did not hit the French 
defence budget as severely as it was expected.  
Although that is true that the French Armed Forces did not receive the same 
amount of resources in the period of 2014-2019 as it was proposed in the 2008 White 
Paper, this did not resulted in ‘radical strategic rebalancing’.579 Of course, freezing the 
defence budget in France had a price. Consequently, the French MoD decided to slow 
down the purchase of the Rafale jets, buying only 26 instead of 66 between 2014 and 
2019.
580
 It also decided to delay plans for further attack submarines and frigates.
581
 
However, Paris did not eliminate entire capabilities or cancelled projects as London 
did regarding the aircraft carriers or the Nimrod MRA4 maritime aircraft programme. 
As François Heisbourg highlighted, the ‘French have pointedly decided they are not 
going to make such crunchy choices’.582  
We can therefore conclude that France did not search for multinational 
alternative solutions to maintain military capabilities, which would have lost in 
consequence of the financial crisis, because Paris did not lose them as it decided to 
maintain its existing military capabilities nationally. The losses were instead managed 
by cuts to personnel and the rationalization and delay in the development of certain 
capabilities. That is another question that analysts pointed out the risks of the 2014-
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 In addition, although the French Armed Forces will certainly retain their 
current capabilities to conduct military operations abroad throughout most of the 
2010s, in the longer term it may face problems. Moreover, the French defence 




We can conclude that neither the United Kingdom nor France did search for a 
range of alternative multinational solutions in MDCs to mitigate the negative effects 
of the financial crisis to maintain their national military capabilities. The United 
Kingdom basically accepted that some of its military capabilities have been lost 
temporarily or permanently as a consequence of cuts resulting from the financial 
crisis. In the SDSR London declared that it is open only to bilateral cooperation and 
not to EU and NATO lead collaborations concerning capability development and 
named the United States and France as its main defence partners. However, in both 
cases the SDSR paved the road for continuing the already existing collaborative 
projects and did not plan to mitigate the new capability gaps through new 
multinational solutions. France also decided to handle its challenges in a national 
framework, but in contrast to Britain, Paris did not eliminate capabilities. Instead, 
thanks to the smaller reductions in its defence budgets decided to ‘muddle through’. 
Although France has always been the supporter of multinational solutions, and also 
participated in them actively in Europe, it resolved to maintain its military capabilities 
in a national framework. Thus, France did not search for alternative solutions either. 
Based on the above detected processes, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 3:  
The creation of the Lancaster House Treaties needs to be linked to the UK’s and 
France’s search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military 
capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
According to the previous sections Prerequisite 1 has been confirmed, while 
Prerequisite 2 has not been. Thus we can say that as a consequence of the financial 
crisis Britain and France decreased their defence budgets (Prerequisite 1), however 
there were no signs that these two countries looked actively for alternative 
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multinational solutions of pooling and sharing of capabilities with other countries to 
maintain their national military capabilities in the consequence of the defence budget 
cuts (Prerequisite 2). The only exception was the Lancaster House Treaties and its LoI 
and Package of Joint Measures, but the majority of the initiatives based on these 
agreements were not new at all and discussions about them had been going on often 
for years before the signing of the Treaties. Thus, they cannot be perceived as an 
answer to the defence budget cuts in the consequence of the financial crisis either, but 
rather the agreement was the result of the culmination of defence collaboration 
between France and the UK. 
If we analyse the discourse of British and French officials on the forums of the 
Franco-British Council, we can see that the effects of the financial crisis did not play 
a major role during their discussions before the creation of the Lancaster House 
Treaties either. That is true that they recognized that defence budget cuts could be 
expected, and ‘the heavy constraints on defence budgets […] will be a push towards 
speeding up Franco-British cooperation’.585 Some of the participants even perceived 
this situation as a positive thing, which might provide a needed window of 
opportunity to push for a deeper defence co-operation between the two countries.
586
 
However, others pointed out the possible dangers the financial crisis could pose to the 
decades long British-French defence collaboration. Christophe Burg, the director of 
industrial affairs at the DGA, noted that ‘in times of crisis like the one we are facing 
today it would be really dangerous if nationalism should reappear’ and in this regard 
he highlighted that Paris already channelled large sums into the defence sector to 
‘propping up the domestic economy’.587 Others argued that focusing on the mitigation 
of the effects of the financial crisis via defence co-operation would be problematic, 
because this would generate short term projects. Sir Menzies Campbell ‘expressed the 
fear that concentrating on the short term is the wrong aim: nothing will come of 
identifying military capabilities based on the available finances’.588 James de Waal 
emphasized that ‘the financial crisis must not emerge as the leitmotiv of a revival of 
the Franco-British dimension; it is not a synonym for more intense cooperation’.589 
Accordingly, both British and French officials were aware of both the opportunities 
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and dangers the financial crisis could provide for defence co-operation, but they did 
not perceive it as a game changer concerning British-French defence collaboration 
especially not in the short term.  
This is underpinned by the results of the interviews I conducted with British 
and French officials and scholars.
590
 Many of the interviewees mentioned that the 
financial crisis might have an impact on supporting the creation of the Lancaster 
House Treaties, but none of them deemed it as the most important factor. Certain 
officials did not even perceive the effects of the financial crisis as an important issue 
concerning the establishment of the treaties.
591
 However, all of them were aware of 
the phenomenon, that the agreement had a financial aspect, but it has not been 
necessarily linked to the financial crisis, but to a longer trend that pressured defence 
budgets in Europe. 
At the same time the question emerges, if not the effects of the financial crisis 
then what triggered the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010. We could 
see that defence co-operation between France and the United Kingdom has been 
evolved for decades, and the Lancaster House treaties canonized them into one 
overarching framework. However, why this canonization happened in 2010, and what 
could play a major factor in it, if it was not the financial crisis. In this regard all of the 
officials and scholars I interviewed during my research concerning the Lancaster 
House Treaties emphasized the importance of the personalities of and the chemistry 
between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron in the 
creation of Lancaster House Treaties. Sarkozy was an Atlanticist French president 
unlike his predecessors of the previous seventy years. Sarkozy’s pro-American and 
pro-UK personality helped not only making France’s reintegration to NATO happen, 
but also created trust between Paris and London as well.
592
 According, to British 
officials, without France’s reintegration to NATO, the Lancaster House Treaties could 
not come true, and this step helped a lot to ‘get over a silly rivalry’ between France 
and the United Kingdom on defence.
593
  
However, the successful Conservative election and the appointment of David 
Cameron as a prime minister of the UK in May 2010 were needed for starting a more 
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ambitious British-French defence deal too. Although the discussions between France 
and the UK about deepening defence co-operation began at the end of 2009, it was 
not clear what form it would take.
594
 David Cameron was the person who after 
became prime minister pushed for a more ambitious deal, and even sent a handwritten 
letter to President Sarkozy about his proposition to create a treaty on defence 
collaboration between France and Britain.
595
 Although, Cameron was the most keen 
on this issue first, Sarkozy took over the idea immediately and provided full 
support.
596
 Both Sarkozy and Cameron were right wing politicians, and it was very 
important that they actually liked each other and there was chemistry between 
them.
597
 At the same time, they supported this deal not only because they liked each 
other and ideological reasons, but they had their own agenda as well. For Sarkozy the 
treaty was important to show Germany and the EU that France could be lead Europe, 
and could pull the UK to European projects too. For Cameron, the deal was relevant, 
because he could show to British Eurosceptics that Britain could cooperate with 
Europeans outside EU frameworks.
598
 
Accordingly, we can conclude that as Prerequisite 2 was not detected, 
Prerequisite 3 could not be detected either. This part supported the findings of 
Prerequisite 2, as it showed that although British and French officials were aware of 
the possible positive and negative effects of the Franco-British defence co-operation, 
it was not deemed the most important factor in this regard. Rather the personalities, 
individual motivations and relationship of President Sarkozy and Prime Minister 





Figure 18 – Rival Explanation 2: Actual Lancaster House Treaties Pattern 
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The predicted pattern of Rival Explanation 2 was not proved in the case of the 
Lancaster House Treaties. Namely, Prerequisite 1 was verified, but Prerequisite 2 was 
not. This means that the intervening variable of ‘Need for alternative solutions to 
maintain national military capabilities’ was not found in this case (see Figure 18), 
thus the independent variable (UK and French defence budget cuts as a consequence 
of the financial crisis) could not be linked to the dependent variable (Creation of the 
Lancaster House Treaties). Accordingly, we can conclude that the decreasing defence 
budgets in the UK and France as a consequence of the financial crisis did not foster 
the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national 
military capabilities. However, it was shown that the personalities, individual 
motivations and the relationship of President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister 
David Cameron played a crucial role in establishing the Lancaster House Treaties. 
 
Rival Explanation 3 – Convergent threat perceptions 
According to Rival Explanation 3 the United Kingdom and France have perceived the 
same threat(s) as the biggest threat(s), thus they started to co-operate against this 
threat and finally institutionalized this co-operation into the Lancaster House Treaties.  
 
 
Figure 19 – Rival Explanation 3: Predicted Lancaster House Treaties Pattern 
 
Based on the Research Framework chapter, the independent variable of ‘Rival 
Explanation 3’ is the ‘perception of the same threat’ that is linked to the dependent 
variable of ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’ via the intervening variable of ‘alliances 
against the biggest threat’. Thus, this rival explanation assumes that the United 
Kingdom and France perceive the same threat(s) as the biggest threat(s) (independent 
variable), they start to discuss this with each other and begin to co-operate against it 
(intervening variable), and finally formalize this alliance by creating the Lancaster 
House Treaties (dependent variable). The prerequisites for these rival explanations are 
the followings: 
1. The UK and France had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as 
the largest threat. 
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2. The UK and France had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the 
shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of the 
Lancaster House Treaties. 
3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) the UK and France discussed 
and co-operated on and the initiation and creation of Lancaster House Treaties 
have to be detected. 
 
Prerequisite 1:  
The UK and France had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the 
largest threat. 
In order to identify whether the United Kingdom and France share the perception of 
the same threat(s) as the largest threat, I compare their strategic documents, which 
were valid at the time when the Lancaster House Treaties were developed. In the case 
of the United Kingdom the 2010 National Security Strategy
599
 (NSS) describe the best 
what kind of threats the British government perceived that time. With regard to 
France the 2008 French White Paper
600
 provides the most adequate information about 
the official French threat perception in 2010, the year when the Lancaster House 
Treaties were signed. 
The British NSS does not use the term threat but applies the term of risk, 
which is a less concrete and immediate security issue than a threat. As the NSS 
identifies only risks and not threats, I investigate them in this section. In the 
framework of National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) subject-matter experts, 
analysts and intelligence specialists identified and prioritised the internal and 
international risks the United Kingdom would face over 5 and 20 years horizons. The 
NSRA investigated many aspects and areas of different potential risks, and prioritized 
them taking into consideration their relative likelihood and relative impact and also 
the UK’s vulnerability to these. The NSRA was submitted to the National Security 
Council, which finalized the prioritization and ‘identified 15 generic priority risk 
types, and allocated them into three tiers ‘.601 To ‘Tier One’ belonged those risks that 
were deemed to have the ‘highest priority for UK national security looking ahead, 
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taking account of both likelihood and impact.’602 Risks of ‘Tier Three’ were the least 
important in terms of likelihood and impact to UK national security among the 
studied risks, and risks of ‘Tier Two’ were those, which were between the risks of 
‘Tier One’ and ‘Tier Three’ in terms of likelihood and impact.  
As I am interested only in the largest threat(s) – in this case ‘risks’ – the 
United Kingdom perceived, I study only the risks of ‘Tier One’, because they were 
deemed the most pressing security issues by the British government and its security 
community. They are the following: 
 ‘International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests, including a chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear attack by terrorists; and/or a significant 
increase in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland. 
 Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cyber 
crime. 
 A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response, such as 
severe coastal flooding affecting three or more regions of the UK, or an 
influenza pandemic. 
 An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK, and its 
allies as well as other states and non-state actors.’603 
 
The 2008 French White Paper does not elaborate the methodology of the risk 
assessment for the document, but we know that a commission set up by the French 
President was responsible to deliver the French White Paper. The membership of the 
commission was diverse and included members of parliament, experts from the armed 
forces and government agencies, scholars from academia and representatives of the 
defence industry.
604
 Thus, based on the work of this commission the 2008 French 
White Paper among others introduces the perceived vulnerabilities of France. This 
means, that the 2008 French White Paper does not use the term ‘threat’ either, thus I 
study the ‘vulnerabilities’ the document identified. The document does not use such a 
sophisticated categorization as the British NSS, it only states what the vulnerabilities 
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of France are and elaborates them in a few sentences. According to the 2008 French 
White Paper the most relevant seven vulnerabilities of France are:
605
 
 ‘Terrorism of mass destruction’ 
 ‘Ballistic and cruise missile threats’ 
 ‘Major attacks against information systems’ (cyber attacks)  
 ‘New and robust espionage activities’ 
 ‘Major criminal networks, including narco-trafficking’ 
 ‘Health risks (like pandemics), natural catastrophes, industrial disasters and 
technological risks’ 
 ‘High proportion of French citizens leaving the country’ 
 
Risks of the United Kingdom Vulnerabilities of France 
1. International terrorism incl. using of 
WMD 
2. Cyber attacks  
3. Large scale natural disasters and 
pandemic 
4. International military crisis drawing in 
the UK 
 
1. Terrorism of mass destruction 
2. Ballistic and cruise missile threats 
3. Major attacks against information 
systems (cyber attacks)  
4. New and robust espionage activities 
5. Major criminal networks, including 
narco-trafficking 
6. Health risks (like pandemics) natural 
catastrophes, industrial disasters and 
technological risks 
7. High proportion of French citizens 
leaving the country 
 
Figure 20 – British and French Risks and Vulnerabilities 
 
If we compare the risks and vulnerabilities (see Figure 20) the United 
Kingdom and France officially identified in their strategic documents as the most 
pressing security issues for them, we can assess that their risks and vulnerabilities are 
overlapping. For both France and Britain the top security issue is terrorism. Although 
there is a difference concerning them, because while the United Kingdom perceives 
terrorism broadly, France concentrates only on the potential terrorist attacks involving 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, in the case of the United Kingdom 
CBRN terrorist attacks are a major concern as well, thus we can conclude that in 
regard to the top priority security issue France and the United Kingdom share almost 
the same threat as the biggest threat. Cyber attacks are the second most important risk 
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for Britain and the third biggest vulnerability for France in their studied strategic 
documents. In addition, natural and manmade disasters and pandemics can be 
perceived also as major concerns the two states shared, because these issues were the 
third important area in the British NSS and the sixth one in the 2008 French White 
Paper. Accordingly, we can conclude that international terrorism including the 
potential usage of WMD, cyber attacks, natural and manmade disasters and 
pandemics were the threats identified as the biggest threats the two countries shared in 
the time of the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties. 
Based on the above detected findings, Prerequisite 1 has been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 2: 
The UK and France had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the shared 
threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of the Lancaster 
House Treaties. 
In this section I attempt to detect whether the United Kingdom and France had 
initiated discussions about the three shared threats (1. terrorism including the potential 
usage of WMD; 2. cyber attacks; 3. natural and manmade disasters and pandemics) 
the previous section confirmed, and whether they had concluded that they should co-
operate on acting together against these threats. In this section, the main sources of 
my research are the official declarations, communiqués and press statements made by 
French presidents and the British prime ministers after the Franco-British summits in 
the 2000s. These documents provide appropriate information whether the shared 
threats have been discussed on the highest level, and could be the basis of further 
discussions and actions on the lower levels between experts of the two studied 
countries. 
Although the official communiqués of the consecutive Franco-British summits 
have mentioned the problem of terrorism and proliferation of WMDs since the early 
2000s,
606
 the first reference to co-operation on these areas between the UK and France 
appeared in 2006 when the communiqué stated that the UK and France ‘will explore 
options for broad cooperation between naval, intelligence and civilian organizations 
in order to ensure improved coordination of our efforts against terrorism, proliferation 
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and illegal migration’.607 However, besides this one sentence the communiqués did 
not deal with these issues at all.  
A big shift can be perceived by 2008, as the part of the joint declaration of the 
Franco-British summit referring to defence and security issues
608
 began to focus much 
more on bilateral defence and security issues than cooperation within multilateral 
frameworks as it used to be typical in earlier declarations. On this occasion much 
bigger emphasis was put on several security and defence related topics than 
previously and among others the declaration clearly stated that the UK and France 
would co-operate on countering the proliferation of CBRN weapons, terrorism and 
cyber attacks. Furthermore, in terms of terrorism, which was perceived as the biggest 
threat by both countries in their respective strategic documents, the British prime 
minister and the French president agreed on several practical collaborations. They 
decided that they would co-operate ‘from threat analysis to technical and operational 
cooperation’ and in order to combat nuclear terrorism the two countries would ‘work 
together (...) by screening traffic including that passing through the Channel 
Tunnel.’ 609  In addition, they also agreed to develop ‘concerted responses to the 
development of violent extremism (...), including radicalisation and recruitment and 
terrorist propaganda’ and ‘organise a seminar to share experience and best 
practice’. 610  One year later the French President and the British Prime Minister 
decided to deepen their co-operation on counter-terrorism among others by ‘high level 
operational coordination’ and by establishing ‘high level, strategic working 
groups’.611  Their declaration on defence and security after the 2009 summit also 
touched the question of cyber attacks.
612
 Accordingly, since 2008 the UK and France 
have discussed the questions of terrorism and cyber attacks on the highest level and 
decided to co-operate on both issues, but co-operation on counter-terrorism was much 
more elaborated. 
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Besides the declarations of the summits and the actions that stemmed from 
them, British and French officials discussed threats before the Lancaster agreements 
as well. For instance, British officials were closely involved in the preparation of the 
2008 French White Paper,
613
 and also French officials participated in the work of the 
British SDSR published in 2010.
614
 In this process, the question of risks and 
vulnerabilities have been touched upon and discussed between the parties. The 
converging views on threats is also well represented by the declaration on defence and 
security of the 2009 Franco-British Summit which stated that ‘it is difficult to 
envisage a situation in which the vital interest of either of our two nations could be 
threatened without the vital interest of the other also being threatened.’ 615 
Furthermore, if we look at the discussions of experts and officials who participated in 
the two events of the Franco-British Defence Co-operation Roundtable in 2010, we 




We can conclude that the threat perceptions of France and the UK began to 
converge noticeably after 2008, and the two countries discussed two out of the three 
shared perceived risks and vulnerabilities identified on the highest level and began to 
co-operate on them. They discussed and co-operated most intensively on counter-
terrorism including the potential use of WMD and also discussed and began to 
collaborate on cyber security. However, they did not touch upon the questions of 
natural and manmade disasters and pandemics at all.  
Based on the above detected processes, Prerequisite 2 has been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 3:  
The links between the shared biggest threat(s) the UK and France discussed and co-
operated on and the initiation and creation of Lancaster House Treaties have to be 
detected. 
This section investigates whether the two threats – terrorism including the potential 
use of WMD and cyber attacks –, which are the biggest threats shared by the UK and 
France, and the two countries began discussions and practical co-operation on them, 
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were the main reasons for the adoption of the Lancaster House Treaties. In order to 
find out whether a link exists between them, I study and take into consideration the 
official statements, declarations of the signatories – President Nicolas Sarkozy and 
Prime Minister David Cameron – of the Lancaster House Treaties, the text of 
Lancaster House Treaties themselves, as well as the related LoI and Package of Joint 
Measures and the views and discourse of officials. 
At the Franco-British Summit on 2 November 2010 the British Prime Minister 
and the French President referred several times to terrorism, cyber attacks and new 
threats after they signed the Lancaster House treaties. The question of terrorism was 
highly topical that time, because two days earlier the Greek police in Athens caught a 
courier who intended to post a parcel bomb to French President Nicolas Sarkozy.
617
 
Thus, it is not surprising that David Cameron said on the joint press conference of the 
summit that  
‘the events of the last 72 hours have reminded us that our societies and 
our security have never been more connected and when the threats 
from terrorism, from cyber space and from nuclear proliferation cross 
our borders so must our response. (...) The terrorists think that our open 
societies and our interconnectedness is a source of weakness. They are 
wrong. Nicolas and I are absolutely determined to show that they are a 
source of our strength, our solidarity and our power in defeating 
terrorism.”618 
 
Furthermore, both President Sarkozy and David Cameron deemed cyber 
security as an important issue and a ‘major challenge’ for their countries. 619  In 
accordance with these statements the Joint declaration on defence and security 
cooperation of the 2010 Franco-British Summit declared that ‘together we face new 
challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
missiles, terrorism, cyber attacks, maritime and space security.’620 However, if we 
examine the whole declaration and the full text of statements delivered by President 
Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron we find that terrorism and cyber security did 
not play a major role in them. This means that the key messages were not about co-
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operation of terrorism and cyber threats regarding security and defence, but about 
nuclear co-operation and traditional defence collaborations on operations, as well as 
capabilities including Pooling & Sharing and defence industrial co-operation. 
This is reflected in the Lancaster House Treaties and  in the Package of Joint 
Measures. Although the Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty of the Lancaster 
House Treaties declares that terrorism, proliferation of WMDs and cyber-attacks are 
strategic challenges for both Britain and France, the Defence and Security Co-
operation Treaty does not address them at all. As I introduced earlier the five main 
objectives of this treaty are
621
 
1) coordination on capability development, maintenance, procurement, facilities 
and equipment ‘to perform the full spectrum of missions, including the most 
demanding missions’;  
2) reinforcing the defence industry, co-operation in research and development;  
3) collaboration on common deployments;  
4) co-operation on national (nuclear) deterrents;  
5) support each other regarding actions in the UN, NATO and in the CSDP. 
 
Based on these main objectives we can see that this treaty does not address the 
shared threats of terrorism and cyber security. Furthermore, besides the introduction 
of the treaty, where the common strategic challenges are listed, not a single reference 
was made on them, as the treaty focuses on these five main objectives. If we look at 
the second treaty of the Lancaster House Agreements, which is the Nuclear Treaty, 
we can see that this treaty mentioned the issue of ‘countering nuclear or radiological 
terrorism’ as a task where the UK and France will change ‘relevant classified 
information’.622 However, it is the only one reference to terrorism and there is no 
reference to cyber security at all in this document. The situation is very similar in the 
Package of Joint Measures as well, because among the eleven proposals what the 
document introduces, counter-terrorism and cyber security comprises one proposal, as 
they were put into one package. It means that from the eleven proposals only one 
addresses the shared threats,
623
 and this is less than one tenth of the package. 
Accordingly, we can say that issues related to the two biggest shared threats of France 
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and UK had a very minor role in the Lancaster House Treaties and its Package of 
Joint Measures. 
Based on this we can conclude that the shared threat perceptions of the UK 
and France could not initiate the Lancaster House Treaties, as their relevance in the 
treaties and the Package of Joint Measures were almost irrelevant. If terrorism and 
cyber security had been the main reasons of adopting the treaties, they should have 
dominated these documents and the overall framework of the documents should have 
been built around these two topics. However, it was not the case. The minor role of 
the shared threats in the Lancaster House agreements is underpinned by the fact that 
interviewed officials
624
 never mentioned the common threat perception as a major 
catalyst or main reason regarding Lancaster House agreements, and even on the 
meetings
625
 of the Franco-British Defence Co-operation Roundtable predating the 
Treaties these issues had barely been touched upon and had not become integrated 
part of the discourse. To sum up, there is no link between the question of terrorism 
and cyber attacks and the initiation and adoption of the Lancaster House Treaties.  
  Based on the above detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed. 
 
Conclusion 
We can conclude that Rival Explanation 3 does not have explanatory power about 
why France and Britain established the Lancaster House Treaties instead of using 
NATO and EU frameworks for defence co-operation 
 
 
Figure 21 – Pattern Rival Explanation 3: Actual Lancaster House Treaties Pattern 
 
We could see that Prerequisite 1 and Prerequisite 2 were verified, but 
Prerequisite 3 was not. Accordingly, the independent variable of ‘Perception of the 
same threat’ is valid and the proposed intervening variable of ‘Alliances against the 
biggest threat’ could be verified as well. By the verification of Prerequisite 1, we can 
conclude that the threat perception of the UK and France was almost the same, as 
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their relevant strategic documents at the time of signing of the Lancaster House 
agreements identified very similar risks and vulnerabilities. Both countries perceived 
terrorism as the top priority security issue, and cyber security was in the top three for 
the UK and France as well. Accordingly, they perceived the same threats as the 
largest threats. During the investigation of Prerequisite 2, I showed that from 2008 the 
two states discussed these issues on the highest level – head of state and head of the 
government – and initiated practical collaborations on them.  
However, Prerequisite 3 could not be verified, which means that there is no 
link between the fact that Britain and France perceived terrorism and cyber attacks as 
major threats, they discussed and co-operated on them and the initiation and adoption 
of the Lancaster House Treaties (see Figure 21). The examination of the Treaties and 
the Package of Joint Measures, the interviews taken with officials and the discourse 
between British and French experts highlight that the shared threat perception of 




In this chapter I intended to find out why the UK and France established the Lancaster 
House Treaties, when several pan-European structures existed for defence co-
operation in the framework of NATO and EU, where they could have co-operated? In 
addition, my research also intended to figure out the circumstances that encouraged 
these two countries to prefer a new co-operation on military capabilities rather than 
collaborating within NATO and EU. For this, I studied three rival explanations 
developed and operationalized in the research framework chapter, where I set 
independent, intervening and dependent variables for every rival explanation and 
developed prerequisites for every variable. In the current chapter I studied, whether 
these prerequisites could be verified concerning the Lancaster House Treaties. If all of 
the prerequisites of a rival explanation could be verified, we could conclude that the 
variables of the rival explanation are valid, thus it has explanatory power over the 
research question in the Lancaster House Treaties case. 
The first rival explanations presumed that France and the UK were dissatisfied 
with the progress of defence co-operation in NATO and the EU, thus they created the 
Lancaster House Treaties in the hope that this co-operative framework will work 
better than pan-European MDCs. The independent variable of this Rival Explanation 
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was the ‘Lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’, 
which was proved to be the source of the intervening variable of ‘UK and France are 
dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ which could be linked to the dependent variable of 
’Creation of the Lancaster House Treaties’, as Prerequisite 1, Prerequisite 2 and 
Prerequisite 3 were verified. Accordingly, the UK and France were dissatisfied with 
the progress concerning co-operation on capability development in the EU and 
NATO, and because of their frustration on this issue decided to establish a bilateral 
co-operation on defence, which became the Lancaster House Treaties. Accordingly, 
Rival Explanation 1 has explanatory power over the creation of the Lancaster House 
Treaties. 
Rival Explanation 2 states that the negative effects of the financial crisis lead 
to defence budget cuts in the UK and France, and the decreasing financial resources 
created a situation, when London and Paris had to search for alternative multinational 
solutions to maintain their national military capabilities, and they found this solution 
in the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties. According to Rival Explanation 2 the 
independent variable is ’UK and France defence budget cuts as a consequnece of the 
financial crisis’ that is linked via the intervening variable of the ’Need for alternative 
solutions to maintain national military capabilities’ to the dependent variable of the 
’Creation of Lancaster House Treaties’. Although Prerequisite 1 of Rival explanation 
2 in the case of the Lancaster House Treaties was verified, but Prerequisite 2 and 
Prerequisite 3 were not. This means, that the defence budgets in the UK and France 
were cut as a consequence of the financial crisis, but this phenomenon did not foster 
the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national 
military capabilities in the two studied countries. Thus, the negative effects of the 
financial crisis on defence budgets could not be the main reason of the the creation of 
the Lancaster House Treaties either. At the same time, my research highlighted that 
the personalities, individual motivations and the relationship of the signatories of the 
treaties – President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron – played a 
crucial role in establishing the Lancaster House Treaties. 
Rival Explanation 3 supposes that the UK and France extablished the 
Lancaster House Treaties, because they shared the same threat(s) as the biggest 
threat(s) (independent variable) and they began discussions on and co-operation 
against this threat (intervening variable) and finally institutionalized this alliance by 
signing the Lancaster House Treaties (dependent variable). We could see that 
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Prerequisite 1 and Prerequisite 2 could be verified, but Prerequisite 3 could not. This 
means that although France and the UK shared the same threats as the biggest threats 
and they also initiated discussions and co-operation concerning them (terrorism and 
cyber attacks), the shared threats were not the reason why Lancaster House Treaties 
were created. Thus, Rival Explanation 3 does not have explanatory power over the 
case of the Lancaster House Treaties. 
Only ’Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic 
defence cooperation’ - has explanatory power over the Lancaster House Treaties 
among the studied rival explanations. However, this chapter showed that it was not 
the only reason behind establishing this MDC, and based on the findings of my 
research it is possible to build the empirically based pattern that lead to the creation of 
Lancaster House Treaties (see Figure 22). Besides Rival Explanation 1, a crucial 
element concerning Lancaster House Treaties was that it could be built on a decades 
long British-French defence co-operation. In the first half of this chapter we could see 
that the majority of mechanisms and foras of British-French collaboration on defence 
were created in the 1980s, and many practical co-operative projects were going on 
between the two countries in the 1990s and 2000s. As I mentioned earlier a UK MoD 
official pointed out, the vast majority of the Franco-British bilateral projects had 
already existed before Lancaster House, and the treaties ‘only canonized’ them and 
put them into one overarching framework.
626
 Accordingly, the Lancaster House 
Treaties could not have been done without the at least 30 years long defence co-
operation between Paris and London. The already existing mechanisms and forums 
for negotiations, the networks of experts from both countries and the many practical 
co-operative frameworks were all needed to create this overarching framework over 
British-French defence co-operation. Without them there would not have been 
anything, which could have been put into this overarching framework.  
Both the dissatisfaction of the UK and France concerning the lack of progress 
on defence in EU and NATO frameworks, and the decades long British-French 
defence co-operation were long trends that were necessary and indispensible to create 
the Lancaster House Treaties. However, the variable that triggered this co-operation 
was the personalities, the motivations and the relationship of the signatories of the 
treaties. Nicolas Sarkozy’s Atlanticist views – including his support to France’s 
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reintegration to NATO – were necessary to build more trust between Paris and 
London. At the same time, David Cameron’s pragmatism and will to achieve 
something in Europe outside the EU was also significant. In addition, the fact that 
both of them were right wing politicians and liked each other helped as well. As one 
French scholar pointed out, this deal between David Cameron and Francois Hollande 






Figure 22 – Empirically Based Lancaster House Treaties Pattern 
 
What are the findings concerning the research questions in the case of the 
Lancaster House Treaties? Why did the UK and France established the Lancaster 
House Treaties, when similar pan-European structures existed in the framework of 
NATO and EU? What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various 
European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than 
collaborate within NATO and EU? This chapter highlighted that three major factors 
played significant roles in the establishment of the Lancaster House Treaties. First, 
the common theme of dissatisfaction with pan-European defence co-operation created 
a common ground for UK and France for a more intensive collaboration. Second, 
without previous decades long defence co-operation this more intensive collaboration 
could not have come true. Third, personalities and people matter. Accordingly, we 
can conclude, that the Lancaster House Treaties did not come from nowhere. It was a 
result of two long term trends, which were necessary for creating the ’groundwork’ 
for this MDC. However, what triggered the Lancaster House Treaties were a 
constellation of compatible political personalities, who grabbed these trends and 
pushed for a more intensive co-operation on defence.  
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CHAPTER 6.  
NORDIC DEFENCE CO-OPERATION 
(NORDEFCO) 
 
Defence ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden signed the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for establishing the Nordic Defence Co-
operation (NORDEFCO) on 4
th
 November 2009 in order to ‘strengthen the 
participating nations’ national defence, explore common synergies and facilitate 
efficient common solutions.’628 The five Nordic countries decided to enhance their 
defence related co-operation on every possible field including but not limited to 




The question emerges why the Nordic countries created a new co-operative 
framework on defence instead of using already existing ones in NATO and the EU. It 
is true that the Nordic countries did not all share NATO and EU membership, as 
Iceland and Norway were only members of NATO whilst Finland and Sweden were 
only members of the EU. Although Denmark was member of both organizations, 
Copenhagen decided to opt-out of being part of the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy, thus Denmark has not participated in EU led military operations or 
taken part in EU military capability development collaboration.
630
  
At the same time the Nordic states used both EU and NATO extensively to co-
operate militarily with each other and other countries. Although not members, Finland 
and Sweden are important partners for the Alliance, and their co-operation with 
NATO is based on long-standing policies and matured frameworks. Among others 
they became members of the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994 and the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997, and both of them have Individual Partnership 
and Cooperation Programme with NATO. This lays out a programme of co-operation 
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between them and NATO over a two year period and includes collaboration on 
security and peacekeeping, crisis management and civil emergency planning.
631
 
Finland and Sweden have also contributed to NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo 
and Afghanistan,
632
 in addition they maintain diplomatic missions to NATO in 
Brussels as well. Furthermore, Finland and Sweden are founding members of the 
Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) under the auspices of NATO Support and 
Procurement Agency, thus they procured and operate three C-17 transport aircraft 
alongside ten NATO nations.
633
 Norway is in a different situation as a solely NATO 
member but it participates in EU defence co-operation, including contributing to the 
EU Battlegroup project via the Nordic Battlegroup.
634
 Oslo also signed an 




Accordingly, when Nordic countries intend to participate in EU or NATO 
projects and operations they generally can, even though they may not be members of 
a particular organization. Thus, the Nordic states could have intensified their defence 
co-operation either in the EU or NATO, if they had wanted, because both 
organizations provided opportunities for that and some of the Nordic countries 
exploited these opportunities in the past. However, just like the participating countries 
of the Lancaster House Treaties and CEDC they decided to establish a multinational 
defence co-operation outside the EU and NATO.  
This chapter attempts to figure out why the Nordic countries created 
NORDEFCO instead of intensifying their defence co-operative efforts in the EU or 
NATO. The first part of this chapter introduces what kind of co-operation the 
NORDEFCO is and what are the implications of its launch has had. The next section 
delineates the previous defence collaborative frameworks among Nordic states to 
provide important background information and context for the later parts of the 
chapter. The biggest part attempts to answer the research questions of the thesis 
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concerning the Nordic states applying the research framework I introduced in the 
research framework chapter. Accordingly, I compare the three operationalized, 
predicted rival patterns with the empirically based pattern by checking whether the 
assumptions developed to each rival explanation came true before and during the 
creation of NORDEFCO.  
 
CREATION OF NORDEFCO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
The Nordic defence ministers signed the MoU of NORDEFCO in November 2009, 
but several studies and many negotiations were conducted in the previous years that 





 about how cost-effectiveness could be achieved via 
defence co-operation among Nordic armed forces to help each other keeping the full 
range of defence capabilities.
638
 In June 2008, another report was written together by 
Norway, Sweden and Finland that identified 140 possible areas for defence 
collaboration, and suggested 40 of them as an initial first step by the beginning of 
2010. In November the same year, Iceland and Denmark joined to this initiative, 
which culminated in the establishing of the so-called Nordic Supportive Defence 
Structures (NORDSUP), which ‘was something prelude to NORDEFCO’.639 
These activities remained at defence ministry level, but other processes also 
supported the creation of NORDEFCO. In June 2008, the foreign ministers of the five 
Nordic countries charged Thorvald Stoltenberg (former minister of foreign affairs of 
Norway) ‘to produce an independent report on how Nordic cooperation on foreign 
and security policy could be developed during the coming 10–15 years.’ 640  The 
Stoltenberg report was presented to the Nordic foreign ministers on an extraordinary 
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Thanks to these processes the Nordic Defence Co-operation was established at 
the end of 2009 by signing an MoU.
642
 With this step the participating countries put 
many of Nordic defence collaborations under the framework of one structure. The 
MoU of NORDEFCO emphasized that this MDC is ‘a comprehensive, enhanced and 
long-term approach to defence related issues’. 643  Accordingly, it listed several, 
general co-operation areas including ‘defence related strategic and policy issues of 
common interests’, enhancing operational effectiveness, improving interoperability, 
collaboration on multinational operations, gaining technological benefits, improve the 
competitiveness of the defence industry of the Nordic countries. In addition, the 
document kept open the possibility of collaboration in other areas and stressed that the 
participants will ‘identify new possible initiatives for cooperation in the areas of 
policy, capabilities and operations’.644 
NORDEFCO is not an organization but a ‘lean structure for a comprehensive 
cooperation’.645 Decision-making is based on consensus on every level, it has an 
annually rotating chairmanship, and both the defence ministers and Chiefs of Defence 
meet twice a year, while state secretaries meet once every year. The MoU established 
the Nordic Defence Policy Steering Committee (NORDEF PSC) and the Nordic 
Military Co-ordination Committee (NORDEF MCC). The PSC makes strategic 
decisions in any NORDEFCO related issues. It also makes sure that the co-operative 
efforts remain coherent, and tasks and provides guidance to the MCC.
646
 Meanwhile 
MCC manages the military level co-operation among the Nordic countries and 
establishes appropriate organizational structures for that if it is necessary. 
Furthermore, it provides military advice to PSC, and if MCC identifies any policy 
related issues, it forwards them to PSC.
647
 The PSC’s members are from deputy state 
secretary or director general level, while MCC consists officials from the strategic 
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 Originally the PSC focused on issues regarding policies, operations 
and capabilities, since 2014 it has also been dealing with co-operative armaments 
initiatives as well. Thus, currently the National Armaments Directors and Capability 




Figure 23 – The NORDEFCO Structure650 
 
Below the level of MCC the practical work is pursued around five 
Cooperation Areas (COPAs): Capabilities (COPA CAPA); Human Resources & 
Education (COPA HR&E); Training & Exercises (COPA TR&EX); Operations 
(COPA OPS); Armaments (COPA ARMA). The basis of agreements in the MCC and 
PSC are the recommendations coming from the COPAs. The COPAs meet on senior 
military representative level (usually O-6), and they decide on launching new 
initiatives and review on-going ones.
651
 The COPAs decide whether a new working 
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 Iceland does not send representatives to most of the COPAs’ meetings representatives as it does not 
have military. 
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group should be established for a certain activity, and existing working groups report 
back about their progress to the senior representatives of the COPAs.
652
 In 2014, the 
five COPAs managed more than 40 on-going projects,
653
 and some of them have 
already had tangible results:
654
 
 Platform for Security Policy Dialogue: As a result of Moscow’s intervention 
in Ukraine and the growing Russian military presence in the Baltic Sea region 
the relevance of discussions on security policy issues among the Nordic states 
enhanced. It also created a need for exchanging information on emergency 
planning and preparedness.  
 Operations: The four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway), 
which are participating in international peace operations, co-ordinate their 
activities concerning several operations (Syria, Afghanistan, Mali). 
 Capacity building: The Nordic countries are creating a joint capability for 
defence sector capacity-building. It means that they establish advisory teams 
that will be able to be deployed in a 6 months’ notice. Although not with this 
joint teams, the Nordic countries have already supported the East African 
Standby Force by advice and financial means in the framework of 
NORDEFCO. 
 Training and Exercises: During the Iceland Air Meet 2014 (IAM 2014) 
Iceland provided host nation support, while three Nordic countries – Norway, 
Sweden and Finland – together with the Netherlands conducted military 
exercises with fighter jets, helicopters, NATO AWACS and air-to-air 
refuelling aircrafts.  
 Air Surveillance: Norway, Finland and Sweden are co-operating with NATO 
on an Air Situational Data Exchange system, which allows Sweden and 
Finland to exchange air situational data between them and NATO countries.  
 Common contracting: In order to create significant savings, Norway and 
Sweden signed framework agreements with Rhenmetall M.A.N. Military 
Vehicles for the common procurement and logistical support of military trucks 
in 2014. Finland later decided to join to the framework agreements. Denmark 
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and Norway also signed a common life-cycle support contract with a company 
concerning their C-130J aircraft. 
 Base Camp Co-operation in UN Mission in Mali: Sweden and Norway 
collaborate on base camp materials and Sweden is leasing equipment from 
Norway to fulfil its peacekeeping tasks in Mali.  
 Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED): As a part of an EDA projects 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark are co-operating on training and procurement 
to support C-IED activities. 
 Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis (JDEAL): The Nordic countries 
decided to procure jointly two JDEAL laboratories for using them in 
operations. JDEAL’s full operational capacity was expected to be reached in 
2015. 
 Engineering: The on-going Nordic engineering collaboration was formalized 
on road construction, bridging capability and education. 
 Surplus sale of Multiple Launch Rocket System occurred between Denmark 
and Finland in 2014. COPA ARMA identified the possibility of the sale, and 
the National Armament Directors made it happen. 
 
As we could see, projects in NORDEFCO do not need the participation of all 
Nordic countries as they can choose to opt out of any activities, but they also have the 
opportunity to join to an on-going project later. Of course, the above listed projects 
not the only ones pursued in the framework of NORDEFCO. Among others, co-
operation on exercises, trainings, educational activities have been extremely 
successful throughout the years, but armament programmes and common 
procurements have usually generated disappointments.
655
  
On the one hand, we can see that Nordic defence collaboration is expanding 
and deepening and the political support exists for further progress. On the other hand, 
it seems that NORDEFCO has structural and political limits which will be difficult to 
overcome. For instance, in December 2013 the Nordic countries agreed on a vision 
about what the NORDEFCO should look like in 2020, which says: 
‘By 2020 we envision an enhanced political and military dialogue on 
security and defence issues and actively seek for new possibilities for 
cooperation. We create efficient and cost-effective solutions based on a 
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shared understanding of our mutual potential and challenges. We are 
committed to enhanced cooperation and coordination in capability 
development and armaments cooperation. We coordinate activities in 
international operations and capacity building, human resources, 
education, training and exercises. We seek to increase pooling of 
capabilities and to deepen cooperation in the area of life-cycle support 
of our defence inventories.’656 
 
Although this vision is in line with current ambitions and the significant 
progress has been achieved at a practical level, several analysts and practitioners 
argue that in the current circumstances NORDEFCO cannot grow appropriately. 
Some point out that the current aggressive/assertive Russian behaviour and Moscow’s 
growing military presence in the Baltic region have changed the situation significantly 
since launching NORDEFCO in 2009. Thus, as Sweden and Finland are not members 
of NATO, NORDEFCO will not necessarily be able to meet its full potential.
657
   
 
DEFENCE CO-OPERATION OF NORDIC COUNTRIES BEFORE THE 
CREATION OF NORDEFCO 
Defence co-operation among Nordic countries started on certain areas already during 
the Cold War, but the roots of defence collaboration dates back to the interwar period. 
The possibility of establishing a Nordic Defence Union among the Nordic countries 
was already discussed in the 1930s several times, but the idea was turned down, and 
the only defence co-operative efforts among Nordic countries were established 
bilaterally between Finland and Sweden and between Sweden and Norway on a 
limited scale before World War II.
658
 In that period all the Nordic countries deemed 
themselves neutral, and did not join neither to the Axis Powers nor to the Allies. 
However, this did not allow the majority of them from involvement in the Second 
World War. While Denmark and Norway were occupied by Nazi Germany in 1940,
659
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Britain invaded Iceland in the same year.
660
 Finland successfully fought for its 
independence against the Soviet Union during the war and in the final years it also 
expelled German troops from its territory.
661
 Sweden was the only Nordic country 
during World War II that was not involved directly in major military confrontations. 
However, it is worth to note that Sweden provided a volunteer corps with more than 




The idea of establishing the Nordic Defence Union was raised again after the 
war and was seriously considered by the governments of Sweden and Norway in 
1948. Finland and Denmark joined in the negotiations soon afterwards and these four 
Nordic countries established the Scandinavian defence committee in October 1948 to 
investigate different aspects of the creation of the Nordic Defence Union.
663
 However, 
the idea of a Nordic defence bloc was not realized, as Denmark, Iceland and Norway 
became founding members of NATO in 1949, while Sweden chose to keep its neutral 
status and established itself as an armed neutral country. Finland signed a special 
agreement with the Soviet Union
664
 in which Helsinki agreed to maintain a neutral 
status in return for Soviet troops leaving its territory. As a result, Finland was not 
allowed to develop closer relationships with the West and remained more or less on 
the Soviet orbit during the Cold War. 
As a consequence of the Nordic states division between East and West orbits 
defence co-operation during the Cold War could only be limited. Nevertheless, 
Denmark, Iceland and Norway collaborated extensively in the framework of NATO, 
and they were able to co-operate militarily with Finland and Sweden in UN 
peacekeeping operations. Accordingly, Nordic defence co-operation on this area did 
not create tensions between Nordic countries and ‘their’ respective super powers. The 
Nordic co-operation on peacekeeping operations was extremely successful during the 
Cold War. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
665
 worked together closely and 
                                                 
660
 Donald F. Bittner, The lion and the white falcon: Britain and Iceland in the World War II era 
(Hamden: Archon Books, 1983). 
661
 Henrik O. Lunde, Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War 
II (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2013). 
662
 Martina Sprague, Swedish volunteers in the Russo-Finnish Winter War: 1939 - 1940 (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 2010). 
663
 Blidberg, Just good friends, 41-63. 
664
 Roy Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-84 (London: Macmillan, 1985), 174-
175. 
665
 Iceland does not have armed forces, thus Rejkyavik did not take part actively in this co-operation. 
 192 
often deployed peacekeepers to the same conflict zones at the same time. The four 
Nordic countries altogether provided the 25% of peacekeeping forces to UN 
operations during the Cold War (approximately 125,000 troops), which generated a 
huge reputation for them.
666
 They also developed a distinct Nordic model for 




 creating institutional frameworks for defence ministerial negotiations and 
working groups for practical co-operation; 
 co-operation on military education by establishing joint UN peacekeeping 
courses; 
 developing national stand-by forces of volunteers which could be deployed in 
short notice; 
 willingness for deploying troops for UN operations. 
 
The framework for the above-mentioned co-operation was called 
NORDSAMFN (Nordic cooperation group for military UN matters), where decision 
making among Nordic states was based on consensus, and troop contributions to UN 
operations were made on a case-by-case basis.
668
 The Nordic stand-by force, which 
was the most important element of NORDSAMFN, was established by Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark in 1964, and later Finland also joined to this collaboration. In 
the second half of the Cold War the Nordic stand-by force consisted a 6000 strong 
troop pool (Denmark 950 troops, Finland 2000 troops, Norway 1330 troops, Sweden 
2000 troops), but it was never used as a joint Nordic force, despite the fact that this 
possibility was considered several times.
669
 However, as a result of the continuous 
Nordic contribution to UN missions and because of difficulties in recruitment, the 
Nordic stand-by force became instead a system that ensured the rotation of Nordic 
troops in UN operations than a real stand-by force, which could have been deployed 
in a short notice.
670
 The training, deployment of and providing equipment for the 
national elements of the stand-by unit were responsibilities of the individual Nordic 
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countries. The soldiers of the stand-by-force were volunteers, approximately 90% of 
them were civilians who completed their basic military training as conscripts and only 
10% were professional soldiers. Every volunteer had the obligation to finish a 3-4 
weeks long national peacekeeper training, while non-commissioner officers and 
officers took part in joint Nordic UN training programmes as well.
671
  
After the end of the Cold War the geopolitical situation changed significantly 
in Europe, which created an environment that supported co-operation among Nordic 
states on military affairs. The Soviet Union collapsed, thus Finland could distance 
itself from Moscow, and also Sweden’s position on armed neutrality could be eased. 
Accordingly, both countries changed their neutral status and became non-aligned. 
Although, they still do not join to military alliances like NATO. However, the 
evolution of their approach in this regard allowed them to join to the EU in 1995 and 
participate in EU’s security and defence policy. 672  In addition, they are also 
participating in NATO partnership structures as it was mentioned earlier, accordingly 
EU membership and NATO partnership status provided Stockholm and Helsinki new 
platforms to participate in defence collaboration outside the framework of the UN. 
This would have been impossible during the Cold War, when the East-West divide 
was stark, and the Kremlin probably would not have tolerated Finland’s and Sweden’s 
abandonment of neutrality to non-alignment.
673
 Furthermore, the security situation 
was much  safer in Europe in the 1990s and 2000s, and although the defence budgets 
and troop levels of the Nordic countries were significantly decreased,
674
 these 
developments (Euro-Atlantic integration, peaceful security environment in Europe) 
created an environment where defence co-operation become much less sensitive 
among Nordic states than earlier. 
Accordingly, in 1994 Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden established the 
Nordic Armament Co-operation (NORDAC) ‘with the goal of coordinating 
armaments development, maintenance and procurement’.675 NORDAC provided some 
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tangible benefits and generated savings by information sharing on technology and test 
results,
676
 which were discussed in the so-called Co-operation Groups (COG).
677
 
COGs were dedicated to broad co-operation areas like logistics, military clothing, 
NATO codification, Nordic Public Private Partnership, investigation (of new areas of 
co-operations) etc., and helped to facilitate some smaller procurements between the 
Nordic countries.
678
 At the same time, the few major joint Nordic armament 
collaborations failed. The Standard Nordic Helicopter Programme (SNHP) did not 
result in an all-Nordic procurement as it was intended, because Denmark decided to 
buy the AgustaWestland EH101 helicopter, while the other Nordic countries opted for 
the NH90 helicopter. Similarly, the Viking submarine project started with only three 
Nordic nations (Finland did not participate), but Norway decided to quit the 
programme in 2003, and Denmark did the same one year later.
679
 As analysts pointed 
out, one of NORDAC’s significant problems was that it had a great imbalance 
favouring Sweden concerning armament deals in the Nordic region, as Stockholm had 
the strongest defence industry among the participating countries.
680
 
The Nordic peacekeeping model, which was the success story of Nordic 
military co-operation in the Cold War, faded after the fall of the Iron Curtain. 
Jakobsen highlights that two changes contributed to this situation.
681
 First, many 
states, which earlier were not interested in participating in peacekeeping missions, 
began to send troops in big numbers to peacekeeping operations. This meant that the 
Nordic countries lost their status as major troop contributors. Secondly, the peace 
operations after the Cold War needed a different approach concerning the use of 
force. While peacekeepers had previously used force mostly for self-defence, the 
international operations of the 1990s and 2000s needed combat-capable forces for 
offensive operations as well.
682
 Realizing this situation, Nordic countries created 
several new Nordic frameworks for reforming their participation in international 
missions. These were NORDCAPS, the Nordic Battlegroup and SHIRBRIG.  
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They established NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military 
Peace Support) in 1997, and at the same time they abolished NORDSAMFN the co-
operative structure that was created in the Cold War.
683
 The size of NORDCAPS’ 
force pool (12 000) was twice the size of NORDSAMFN’s (6 000), but the force pool 
was never used for joint deployments, and as the EU Battlegroup concept was 
introduced in 2004 analysts deemed NORDCAPS ‘obsolete’, and NORDCAPS’ force 
pool was ceased in 2006.
684
 Under NORDCAPS the Nordic countries rather created a 
joint support package for improving UN capacities, and started security sector reform 
projects in the Balkans, in Africa and in Ukraine.
685
 In addition NORDCAPS’ 
framework was used to create the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG), which was established 
under the aegis of the EU’s battlegroup initiative, and was on stand-by for the first 
time in 2008. Sweden took the responsibilities of NBG’s framework nation and 
provided 2000 troops to the unit, while Finland and Norway contributed to it on 
company level. Because of Denmark’s opt out from ESDP/CSDP it could not take 
part in this project, but Ireland and the Baltic countries did.
686
 The third co-operative 
frameworks on operations was the Danish-lead SHIRBRIG (Multinational Stand-by 
High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations). Although it was not purely a Nordic 
initiative as Canada and the Netherlands also contributed to this unit, it had a heavy 
participation from the four Nordic countries. The multinational brigade was 
established in 2000, and made forces available at short notice for UN operations for a 
maximum of six months. Elements of SHIRBRIG were deployed among others to UN 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN headquarters in Liberia, UN Mission in Sudan 
and also supported African multinational organizations to create their stand-by forces. 
However, not like the NBG SHIRBRIG could not be deployed for conducting 
offensive enforcement operations,
687




As it was mentioned in the previous section, NORDSUP was established with 
a ‘focus on force production and supportive functions’689 in 2008 after a trilateral 
study of Finland, Norway and Sweden identified 140 possible military co-operation 
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areas among the three Nordic countries, and they began collaborating on 40 of them. 
Iceland and Denmark joined shortly to this initiative. NORDEFCO was created in 
2009 and took over the responsibilities and institutional structures of NORDSUP, 
NORDCAPS and NORDAC merging all of them into one overarching framework.
690
 
Rieker and Terlikowski pointed out that the establishment of NORDEFCO in 2009 
‘was in reality nothing more than a merger of earlier cooperation initiatives 
(NORDAC, NORDCAPS and NORDSUP) in different areas within a common 
framework. This means that it has not led to the establishment of any new 
institutions.’691 
This section showed that the concept of defence co-operation among the 
Nordic states goes back to the interwar period and Nordic defence collaborations have 
evolved for the last half-century. Before and after World War II Nordic states 
considered the establishment of a Nordic Defence Union, but this idea was not 
realized. However, structured and well-established defence collaboration has been 
going on among Nordic countries since the 1960s. They began to co-operate 
extensively on UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, and they were 
highly successful for developing and applying a distinct Nordic peacekeeping model 
in the aegis of NORSAMFN during the Cold War. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, 
the new geopolitical situation created opportunities for Nordic defence collaboration, 
but also created difficulties for it. The international situation was much more suitable 
for establishing new co-operative frameworks and the Nordic countries exploited this 
opportunity by creating NORDAC, NORDCAPS, NORDSUP, NBG, SHIRBRIG and 
NORDEFCO. At the same time these new Nordic defence co-operative frameworks 
have been a symptom of the crisis of the Nordic model, and highlights that the Nordic 
countries could not find a new long lasting, stable model for military co-operation in 
the post-Cold War period. 
 
CREATING NORDEFCO INSTEAD OF CO-OPERATING IN NATO AND EU  
The forthcoming sections of the chapter attempts to answer the question why the 
Nordic states created NORDEFCO instead of using pan-European structures – EU 
and NATO – for defence co-operation. The situation of Nordic states is different 
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compared to the participating countries of the previously studied sub-regional MDCs. 
First, every participating states – except Austria – of the Lancaster House Treaties and 
CEDC were members of both NATO and EU, when these sub-regional MDCs were 
created. Second, for most of the participating states of Lancaster House Treaties and 
CEDC NATO and/or EU had a bigger relevance than for ‘normal’ members. Britain 
and France had great stakes at least in one of the two organizations for decades, 
because they founded and nurtured these institutions (France – EU; UK – NATO) to 
support their foreign and security policy goals. In the case of the post-communist 
Central European states, NATO and EU were important not only in political and 
practical terms, but they also had a symbolic role in the eyes of Central Europeans. 
Namely, for Central Europeans EU and NATO memberships represented the West, 
thus when they joined these two organizations they felt that they finally left the ‘East’ 
and belonged to the ‘West’ again.  
The dynamics concerning NORDEFCO is quite different. First, the 
participating countries of NORDEFCO belong only either to NATO or to EU, and 
none of them have memberships in both organizations. The only exception is 
Denmark, but because its opt-out from ESDP/CSDP we can regard Copenhagen as a 
NATO member only concerning defence issues. Accordingly, NORDEFCO states are 
more like Austria in CEDC in terms of institutional membership, as they are member 
of only one of the relevant institutions concerning my research. In addition, they are 
not major countries in NATO and EU as France and UK, and for them NATO and EU 
are not relevant as symbols, as it used to be for Central European post-communist 
countries, because the Western orientation of Nordic countries was never questioned. 
Accordingly, we can say that Nordic countries were less integrated into transatlantic 
structures than participating states of the Lancaster House Treaties and CEDC, and – 
as we will see in the coming sections – they had quite different motivations to take 
part in NATO and EU defence collaborations. At the same time, they participated in 
NATO and EU operations during the 1990s and 2000s, and as the first section of this 
chapter showed they participated in several EU and NATO capability development 
projects even though they were not members of the particular organization. The 
question emerges; why they decided to deepen their already existing Nordic based 
defence collaborations by establishing NORDEFCO instead of focusing their efforts 
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Why the Nordic countries opted for co-operating in an MDC? 
In the Research Framework chapter I explained that I attempt to answer my research 
questions by using multiple case design, and with regard to every case I test three 
rival explanations. Thus, I try to identify the prerequisites of the operationalized 
generic predicted patterns of the three rival explanations regarding NORDEFCO. If I 
can identify the prerequisites of one of the rival explanations regarding this case, we 
can say that a rival has explanatory power why the Nordic countries established 
NORDEFCO instead of co-operating in NATO or EU. The three rival explanations 
are 1) the lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation 2) the 
impacts of the financial crisis, 3) different emerging shared threat perceptions of 
European states. 
 
Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence 
cooperation  
 
Figure 24 – Rival Explanation 1: Predicted NORDEFCO Pattern 
 
According to ‘Rival Explanation 1’, (see Figure 24) defence co-operation in NATO 
and EU did not progress appropriately (independent variable), and Nordic countries 
became dissatisfied with this situation in NATO and EU (intervening variable). 
Finally, this dissatisfaction caused the creation of NORDEFCO (dependent variable). 
For this rival explanation, I created three assumptions that are prerequisites for 
verifying ‘Rival Explanation 1’.  
The prerequisites are the following: 
1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to 
be identified. 
2. The dissatisfaction of Nordic countries concerning the lack of progress of 
defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected. 
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3. The creation of the NORDEFCO needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction of 
Nordic countries with NATO/EU. 
 
If all of these prerequisites can be confirmed, we can assess that ‘Rival 
Explanation 1’ has explanatory power over the creation of NORDEFCO.  
 
Prerequisite 1: 
The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to be 
identified. 
This is the only prerequisite among the prerequisites of the three rival explanations, 
which is not directly associated with the participating states of the studied MDCs. In 
addition, the lack of progress concerning relevant EU and NATO defence 
cooperation, especially in the area of military capability development, was introduced 
and demonstrated in the Literature Review chapter. Thus, in this section I am not 
going to repeat the events and processes in this regard, but based on the Literature 
Review chapter I will take Prerequisite 1 of Rival Explanation 1 as a given regarding 
every case. 
 Accordingly, Prerequisite 1 based on the Literature Review is confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 2: 
The dissatisfaction of Nordic countries concerning the lack of progress of defence co-
operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected. 
The four Nordic countries that have armed forces (Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden) were not critical towards NATO and EU before the creation of 
NORDEFCO. They tended to be reliable and constructive members of the 
organization they had membership in and they had not showed any sign – at least 
publicly – that they would be dissatisfied with the lack of progress on defence co-
operative efforts in the EU or in the NATO. 
Denmark was viewed as an unreliable NATO ally during most of the Cold 
War and Copenhagen was highly sceptical towards NATO and US policies in the 
1980s. At the same time, Norway was viewed as one of the most trusted NATO 
members in that period, but it became ambivalent towards NATO during the 1990s. 
However, at the time of the creation of NORDEFCO, Denmark was considered as a 
top-tier member of NATO, and Norway was also perceived as a country that fulfilled 
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its NATO commitments. Their high regard and prestige in the Alliance is shown by 
the fact that they have given the last two Secretary Generals of NATO. Former prime 
minister of Denmark, Anders Fogh Rasmussen was the first Nordic politician to 
became Secretary General of NATO, and held this position between 2009 and 2014. 
Currently, Jens Stoltenberg, former prime minister of Norway, is the incumbent of the 
post. Yet, despite the recent achievements of both countries being acknowledged by 
their allies, Denmark and Norway have struggled with military transformation and 
fulfilling demands of the NATO and especially of the US. Thus, they focused more 
on their own problems concerning defence than on the weaknesses of other NATO 
members in the 2000s.  
During the Cold War Denmark was perceived as a ‘reluctant ally’ 693  in 
NATO, and even the term ‘Denmarkization’, which referred to allies who accepted 
‘NATO protection without willingness to pay for it’, 694 highlights that Copenhagen’s 
relationship with NATO was more than problematic. As early as the 1950s the NATO 
allies talked about a ‘Danish problem’ and throughout the 1970s Copenhagen was 
repeatedly criticized because of his lack of defence efforts.
695
 The situation 
culminated in the 1980’s when Denmark’s foreign policy was ‘characterized by 
scepticism toward the alliance in general and the United States in particular’.696 In the 
framework of the so-called ‘footnote policy’ Denmark attached ‘dissenting footnotes’ 
to NATO communiqués concerning the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) initiative 
and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s.
697
 Not surprisingly, American 
officials including their Secretary of Defense and the President heavily criticized 
Copenhagen.
 698
 Lord Carrington, the Secretary General of NATO even told that 
‘Danish policy ran the risk of excluding the country from the alliance’.699 
 At the same time, Norway was deemed as a reliable ally. Although, in the 
beginning of the Cold War Oslo and Copenhagen were on the same page on several 
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issues and implemented restrictive policies towards NATO. Thus, they did not allow 
the establishment of foreign military bases or the storage of nuclear weapons on their 
soil during peacetime, and restricted allied military activities in some of their areas.
700
 
However, Oslo made much more defence efforts along the lines of NATO goals 
during the Cold War, and was much less critical towards US policies (INF, SDI) 
during the 1980s than Denmark. By the 1970s and 1980s, Norway was deemed as one 
of the most reliably NATO members by the US,
701
 and proportionately Oslo received 
the largest American military support among allies in that period.
702
 Accordingly, it is 
not surprising that certain analyst described the relationship between Oslo and 
Washington as ‘an alliance within the alliance’.703  
However, the roles of Denmark and Norway in NATO changed after the end 
of the Cold War, and while Denmark earned the label of the ‘impeccable ally’704 
Norway was deemed an ‘ambivalent ally’.705 It was argued that Denmark’s change of 
attitude towards NATO happened, because Copenhagen intended to ‘compensate for 
the sins of the 1980s’, but more importantly, because it felt that it had to ‘compensate 
for the consequences of the defence opt-out’ concerning the EU.706 As Copenhagen 
shut itself out of ESDP/CSDP Denmark concentrated on NATO, as it remained its 
only option. Denmark adapted faster to the new international environment than 
Norway and already by 1992 established the 4500-strong Danish International 
Brigade (DIB) for international operations, and was willing to deploy war-fighting 
and sizeable forces to NATO operations on the Balkans throughout the 1990s.
707
 
Copenhagen also left its earlier position on the necessity of UN resolutions 
concerning international operations and took part in NATO’s Kosovo operations and 
in the coalition of willing intervention in Iraq as well. In NATO’s ISAF mission, 
Denmark deployed almost 700 troops mostly in high-risk areas, which contribution 
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was highly praised by allies.
708
 At the same time, Denmark transformed its armed 
forces successfully. The process began with the creation of DIB, but it got pace 
slowly and was executed ‘half-heartedly’ in the 1990s, and as a consequence of the 
peace dividend the defence budget and troop levels were cut in Denmark as well.
709
 
However, this half-hearted transformation was much faster than the similar processes 
in the vast majority of allies. Although NATO recognized and valued Danish soldiers 
and their contribution to international operations already during the 1990s and early 
2000s, the 2004 Defence Agreement by focusing exclusively on deployability, 
sustainability, professionalization and by the abolition of the remaining territorial 
defence forces pushed Denmark irrevocably to the top-tier of NATO members. The 
process that started with the 2004 Agreement was called as ‘role model within 




However, Danish policy makers and the armed forces faced difficulties around 
the time of the creation of NORDEFCO. It did not finish the transformation process 
according to the original plans because Danish participation in demanding 
international operations cost much more than anticipated. As a result, the costs of 
operations were subsidized from the financial resources previously allocated for 
capability development. Another serious problem was that many soldiers resigned 
because of the frequent overseas deployments. In addition, the debate about burden 
sharing in the Alliance began to shift to the level of defence budgets, and as 
Denmark’s defence budget in terms of GDP was not close to the agreed NATO 
level
711
 Copenhagen had concerns about the sustainability of its top-tier NATO 
member status.
712
 Accordingly, the highly sceptical Danish views of the 1980s about 
NATO radically changed to the second half of the 2000s, and the lack of progress on 
defence co-operative efforts in NATO was not a major concern for Danish decision 
makers, as they rather focused on how Denmark could keep its position in NATO.  
In terms of the progress of the defence co-operation in the EU, Denmark was 
not dissatisfied either, as Denmark was not part of the ESDP/CSDP. Although the 
Danish parliament supported the Treaty of the European Union, the majority of 
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Danish voters voted against it on a referendum in 1992. Thus, the Danish political 
leadership made a special arrangement in the European Council and opted-out of co-
operation on EU level in four areas including defence. This was acceptable for Danish 
voters on another referendum in 1993, but it meant that Denmark did not have a word 
in ESDP/CSDP.
713
 Although, the opt-out on defence matters had not significant 
impact on Denmark’s prestige, coalition power and reputation in the EU in general,714 
the fact that Danish officials are not taken seriously concerning defence issues in the 
EU created deep frustration in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of 
Defence. As a Danish MoD official put it: ‘We are obliged to be attentive towards 
every change and development in the ESDP. We have to participate in meetings and 
in committees but we are not taken seriously. Our market value vis-a-vis the other EU 
countries is very limited… As a bureaucracy, we are paralysed.’715 Accordingly, a 
kind of dissatisfaction of Danish officials regarding ESDP existed, but it was not 
because of ESDP’s lack of progress per se, but because Denmark could not participate 
in it.  
As we have seen, Norway was viewed one of the most co-operative and 
reliable NATO members in the Cold War, but it quickly lost this status in the 1990s, 
as Oslo adapted to the new international situation much slower than Denmark and was 
ambivalent to the direction NATO took. Countries with high defence budgets, large 
well-trained militaries and relevant strategic position were deemed ‘good allies’ in 
NATO during the Cold War, which Norway met perfectly. However, after the Cold 
War the meaning of ‘good ally’ changed, and in this regard the focus shifted to the 
number of capable troops deployable to international operations and the willingness to 
use them in combat missions.
716
 At the same time, Norway was reluctant to send 
combat troops to NATO operations especially in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, Oslo 
deployed only non-combat troops (field hospital, helicopter wing, logistics battalion) 
to the international operations on the Balkans, which changed only in 1997 when 
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Norway provided a mechanized battalion to the SFOR mission in Bosnia.
717
 
Although, Norway sent F-16 fighter aircraft and a mechanized battalion to the Kosovo 
war in 1999 like Denmark, the Norwegian aircraft were not able to deliver an air-to-
ground capability and the Norwegian battalion needed twice as much time to be 
deployed than the Danish one.
718
 The major deficiencies in Norway’s military 
capabilities were clear to all. Partly this was because Oslo was not only reluctant and 
sceptical about out of area operations but it was also not an enthusiastic supporter of 
NATO enlargement either,
719
 preferring to concentrate on NATO-Russia relations.
720
 
Two reasons are generally identified by analysts for this reluctance.
721
 The 
first one stems from Norway’s geopolitical position, and while the Alliance focused 
on out of area operations and NATO enlargement in the 1990s, Norway’s main 
security problem remained territorial. Although Norway did not believe that Moscow 
would attack in the short term, the proximity of Russia remained a concern for 
Norway, because of the instability of the Russian state in the 1990s and the 
competitive interests of Norway and Russia in the High North.
722
 The other issue is 
cultural. Norwegians perceive themselves as a peaceful nation, who never started a 
war,
723
 and according, to this line of reasoning Norwegian soldiers should be used to 
bring peace via UN peacekeeping missions to other countries. This partly explains the 
reluctance of deploying combat troops to international operations in the 1990s. The 
late transformation of Norwegian armed forces can be partly linked to the strong 
tradition of territorial defence and conscription, which not only supported the idea that 
the ‘people’ have to defend the territory where they live, but also served as an 
important socialization and educational institution.
724
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However, in the 2000s Norway’s attitude changed and became a less 
ambivalent ally in NATO. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence started to reform 
defence in 2001 creating the capability to deploy more troops in demanding 
international operations. Although Oslo’s focus on Russia did not change radically, 
the visible Russian military decline helped the Norwegian armed forces to focus less 
on territorial defence, and the government could argue that Norway has to take its 
share in NATO operations in an exchange for a future help form the Alliance.
725
 
Referring to the necessity of adapting to deployments in international operations, 
Norwegian Chief of Defence, Sverre Diesen put it that ‘we are facing some 
fundamental developments, which leave us few choices but to adapt or to become 
militarily and security politically irrelevant.’726  
Accordingly, Norway not only transformed its military, but became more 
ambitions in international operations as well. In the first period of NATO’s Afghan 
mission, Norway deployed special operation forces and F-16 fighter aircrafts capable 
for conducting air-to-ground tasks as well.
727
 Although, it sent only non-combat units 
to the coalition of willing operations in Iraq, the Norwegian contribution to the ISAF 
mission increased gradually and Oslo was praised by US representatives for 
‘punching above its weight’ in Afghanistan in 2008.728 At the same time, US and 
NATO officials expressed their disappointments, as Norway ‘answered negatively to 
the alliance request to contribute combat forces for the south’.729 Accordingly, we can 
see that Norway made huge steps to become again a trusted ally in the 2000s, and was 
not dissatisfied with the lack of progress on defence co-operation in NATO anymore. 
Although, Norway’s scepticism and ambivalence towards NATO policies were 
clearly detectable in the 1990s, this attitude changed and softened significantly to the 
mid-2000s, and Norway aligned with NATO’s major policies and initiatives.  
With regard to the EU, Norway was not dissatisfied either. Although Norway 
is not an EU member, Oslo is much more integrated into ESDP/CSDP than EU 
member Denmark, as Norway participated in the EU Battlegroup initiative with 
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providing troops for the Nordic Battlegroup, Oslo also takes part in EDA projects and 
provides troops to EU operations. Although some segments of Norway’s political 
leadership were ambivalent towards ESDP/CSDP in the early 2000s,
730
 since then 
every government has supported Norway’s participation in it. Thanks to these 
activities Norway achieved some level of access and even influence in ESDP/CSDP, 
but not as much as it expected. At the same time, Norwegian diplomats have a similar 
problem as the Danish ones, namely they feel that they are often side-lined in the 
decision-making processes of ESDP/CSDP.
731
 Thus, for Norway the progress (or the 
lack of progress) of defence co-operation in EU is not a problem per se, rather the 
Norwegian MoD is concerned that it does not have enough influence in it. 
Sweden and Finland were in a very different situation than Norway and 
Denmark, as they were neutral EU members and did not join the NATO. As we will 
see, these two countries did not have problem with the lack of progress on EU or 
NATO level defence co-operation before the creation of NORDEFCO. Its reason was 
partly that EU’s defence co-operation progressed on a way these two countries 
preferred, and despite the fact that they were not members of NATO, they could join 
to the NATO initiatives they preferred and could ignore NATO initiatives and 
international operations they did not like.  
During the Cold War, European neutral countries like Sweden and Finland 
‘had to demonstrate the ability to defend themselves autonomously against violation 
of their neutrality and to maintain their territorial integrity. Moreover, their neutral 
status required that they achieved this by conducting a nonaggressive policy.’732 Thus, 
these countries relied heavily on doctrines of dissuasion and territorial defence and 
militarily engaged only in peacekeeping operations.
733
  
However, after the Cold War these states adopted a more co-operative strategy 
towards NATO and the EU and developed their military capabilities to be able to 
participate in a range of expeditionary operations.
734
 In addition, Sweden and Finland 
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also invested huge energy in making sure that EU’s security and defence policy would 
take a direction, which was acceptable for them. In 1996, two years after Finland and 
Sweden joined the EU, the two Nordic countries jointly proposed  the so-called 
Petersberg tasks, which defined CFSP’s and ESDP’s future, and made sure that ESDP 
would not focus on collective defence for a while but on ‘humanitarian and rescue 
operations, peacekeeping and crisis management, thus their non-alignment policy 
could be maintained’.735 They also supported the British-French initiative in St Malo, 
although Sweden had concerns that ESDP progressed too fast by setting capability 
goals – the so-called headline goals – for EU members in the end of the 1990s.736 
However, during the Helsinki Summit in 2000 both Stockholm and Helsinki made 
sure that the headline goals would not be too demanding and the new institutions and 
processes would be developed according to their interests. Furthermore, they insisted 
and successfully ‘uploaded’ to ESDP that EU should not only focus on the military 
side of crisis management, but it must include the civilian aspects of it as well.
737
 
Accordingly, we can see that both Sweden and Finland played a major and leading 
role by shaping CFSP’s and ESDP’ goals, requirements and institutional framework 
in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
Finland and Sweden have also been participating actively in many EU led 
crisis management operations
738
 and also made significant changes to prepare their 
armed forces for expeditionary tasks. However, the two countries had very different 
approaches in this regard. Despite the fact that according to the Finnish laws 2000 
Finnish soldiers may serve abroad in international operations,
739
 Finland still 
prioritizes territorial defence over expeditionary operations, it also prefers civilian 
crisis management tasks in international missions and is willing to use force only for 
self-defence purposes.
740
 Finland still has a large conscripts based military, which has 
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approximately 350,000 soldiers (mostly reservists),
741
 and Helsinki’s focus 
concerning capability development remains on territorial defence like air defence 
capabilities, modernization of regional troops etc.
742
 This approach is understandable, 
if we take into consideration that Finland shares a 1340 km long border with 
Russia,
743
 and has the memory that it had to defend itself from Russia during World 
War II several times. However, as ESDP/CSDP’s demands and requirements 
concerning military transformation were not demanding, Finland did not have 
problem with the lack of progress of defence co-operation in the EU as it could 
successfully represent its interests.
744
 Namely, with some minor changes Finland 
could continue its Cold War practices and participate in peace support operations, but 
now it had the opportunity to conduct this activity not only as a member of the UN 
but as a member of the EU as well. At the same time, it could focus on territorial 
defence and was not under pressure to transform its armed forces like many NATO 
members. 
In contrast with Finland, Sweden became one of the major proponents of 
transformation and expeditionary operations in the EU and ‘fully embraced’745 the 
opportunities ESDP provided in this regard.
746
 In 1999, Sweden began to transform its 
traditional territorial defence focused military to an armed forces focused on 
expeditionary operations. The reason why Sweden ‘had to do’ this was summarized 
perfectly by Hakan Syrén the Chief of Defence of the Swedish Defence Force:  
‘To a greater degree than before, our peace and freedom is built 
upon active participation in European security cooperation…  Our 
operative long-term plan is to contribute to building peace and 
security in an increasingly complicated world where national 
borders do not play the same role they used to.’747 
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Accordingly, Sweden deemed its participation in international operations 
necessary partly because it believed that promotion of peace and human security was 
its duty, and partly because Swedish contribution to international operations served 
Swedish interests and national security.
748
 During the 2000s, Sweden radically 
reorganized and transformed its armed forces by developing a small professional 
military with expeditionary, rapid deployable capabilities and abandoning territorial 
defence entirely. Even conscription was abolished in 2010, and the number of 
Swedish soldiers was reduced to 34,000.
749
 To create a successfully transformed 
armed forces, Sweden used the EU Battlegroup initiative as an engine for change. As 
Stockholm became the lead nation of the Nordic Battlegroup and provided the vast 
majority of troops and capabilities for that, this allowed the Swedish political and 
military elite to execute many necessary changes in the military until 2008, when the 
Nordic Battlegroup became operational.
750
 Thus, Sweden was not dissatisfied with the 
lack of progress of European defence co-operation at the time when NORDEFCO was 
launched (2007-2009), because the processes in the EU concerning defence were in 
tune with Swedish intentions.  
Finland and Sweden did not have a problem with the progress of defence co-
operation in NATO either. On the one hand, the two Nordic countries were not part of 
NATO, thus for them this issue was less relevant than for members of the Alliance. 
On the other hand, Sweden and Finland had the opportunity to co-operate with NATO 
extensively. As Andrew Cottey pointed out, the force structure, the defence budget 
and even the level of contribution to NATO international operations of Sweden and 
Finland ‘have been broadly comparable with alliance member states of similar 
population size’.751 Both countries deployed approximately 500 troops to the IFOR 
mission in Bosnia and 800 troops to KFOR in Kosovo during the 1990s. Sweden even 
provided one of the three non-NATO member-led Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) in Afghanistan. Stockholm deployed 500 troops to the ISAF mission, while 
Finland contributed by 150 Finnish soldiers to the Swedish PRT.
752
 The collaboration 
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between the two Nordic countries and NATO was not confined to operations. Thanks 
to the different structures established for facilitating partnerships between NATO and 
non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland participated in the development of all the 
collaborative frameworks related to NATO partnerships,
753
 and also participated in 
NATO exercises and trainings.
754
  
With regard to co-operation on capability development with NATO, Sweden 
and Finland took part both in individual NATO projects and systematic defence co-
operation as well. For the former, the best example is the earlier mentioned Strategic 
Airlift Capability (SAC). In this project, the two Nordic countries together with ten 
NATO member states procured and have been maintaining three C-17 transport 
aircrafts under the auspices of a NATO agency.
755
 The systemic capability 
development co-operation between NATO and its Nordic partners is going on in the 
framework of Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP). PARP 
was designed for NATO partners, and this process ‘serves as a planning tool to guide 
and measure progress in defence and military transformation and modernisation 
efforts’. 756  This means that the Alliance and PARP members agree on so-called 
Partnership Goals (PGs) to make sure that capability development of partners are in 
line with NATO’s plans. Thus, the armed forces of partners can become interoperable 
with the militaries of NATO to be able to participate effectively in NATO’s 
international operations. The PGs are agreed mutually between NATO and each 
PARP member, and PARP members’ progress on the Partnership Goals is reviewed 
regularly. In the 2001-2006 period both Sweden and Finland accepted more than 60 
PGs.
757
 Sweden took fully advantage of this process and deemed it ‘as one of the most 
effective and useful tools for improving interoperability and overall 
modernization.’ 758  Thus, similarly to the EU Battlegroup initiative Sweden used 
PARP as a tool to foster its own military transformation. Although, Finland was very 
co-operative in PARP as well, Finland was less eager to accept profound changes 
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concerning its armed forces in this process, thus PARP for Finland was more ‘a 
window into NATO that provides the Finnish defence establishment with an in-depth 
understanding of NATO requirements, force structures, standards, and planning 
disciplines.’759 Accordingly, progress (or the lack of it) on defence co-operation in 
NATO was not a concern for Finland and Sweden, because although they were not 
members of the Alliance, they could participate in many NATO partnership co-
operative frameworks on the depth and level they deemed appropriate. 
We can conclude that none of the studied Nordic countries were dissatisfied 
with the lack of progress of defence co-operation at NATO and EU in the period 
when NORDEFCO was established (2006-2009). We could see that although 
Denmark was highly critical towards NATO in the 1980s, and Norway was 
ambivalent to the developments of the Alliance in the 1990s, the attitude of both 
countries had changed to the 2000s, and they became reliable supporters of most 
NATO policies, transformed their armed forces for expeditionary tasks and were 
relevant contributors to NATO’s operations. At the same time, huge efforts were 
needed from them to get their ‘good ally’ status, thus they did not focus on the lack of 
defence co-operation in NATO, rather they were occupied by the difficulties to 
maintain their position in the Alliance. They were even less concerned with EU level 
defence co-operation, as Norway was not an EU member and Denmark opted-out of 
ESDP. Their major problem was not the lack of progress in the EU, but the fact that 
they could not have influence in ESDP/CSDP related decisions. Sweden and Finland 
were not dissatisfied with the lack of progress regarding defence co-operation in EU 
and NATO either. In the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s they made sure that 
ESDP would take a direction that was convenient and acceptable for them. Although, 
Stockholm and Finland took a very different approach concerning transformation of 
their armed forces, ESDP/CSDP provided a very flexible framework to satisfy both of 
them. This was the case concerning NATO too. Sweden and Finland have not been 
NATO members, but they have contributed to NATO operations and co-operated 
extensively with the Alliance on the level they wanted. 
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed. 
 
 
                                                 
759
 Michel, Finland, Sweden and NATO. 6. 
 212 
Prerequisite 3: 
The creation of the NORDEFCO needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction of Nordic 
countries with NATO/EU. 
This section studies whether the establishment of the NORDEFCO can be linked to 
dissatisfaction of Nordic countries concerning NATO and EU. As the findings in 
Prerequisite 2 showed the Nordic countries were not dissatisfied with NATO and EU 
concerning capability development co-operation before and during the creation of 
NORDEFCO. However, the question emerges, if Nordic countries were not 
dissatisfied with NATO and EU, why did they create NORDEFCO instead of 
collaborating in one of the pan-European organizations. Accordingly, it is important 
to investigate how EU/NATO related institutional considerations played a role in 
establishing NORDEFCO. 
The differences in EU and NATO memberships of the Nordic countries was 
not a relevant problem, as Nordic countries could co-operate with the organizations 
they were not part of too. At the same time, for instance Norway perceived Nordic co-
operation as an opportunity for Nordic countries to get access and ‘penetrate’ even 
more to the projects of the organization that they were not members of, but other 
Nordic states had membership in it.
760
 For Norway this was the EU, as Sweden and 
Finland were active members of ESDP/CSDP. In addition, Norway hoped that it 
could co-operate with Nordic countries on the security issues of the North Sea, as 
prospects of collaboration with NATO members did not seem fruitful in this regard.
761
  
In the case of Sweden and Finland institutional consideration for participating 
in NORDEFCO was quite different. As we could see in the description of Prerequisite 
2, these too countries were not dissatisfied with the developments on defence co-
operation in the EU in general. However, officials from both countries deemed this 
organization ‘too slow, large, heterogeneous and cumbersome’ especially for very 
practical oriented collaboration on capability development that intended to save 
costs.
762
 They believed that smaller groupings of countries was better suited for this 
task. An interview from 2010 with General Hakan Syren, who was Chairman of the 
European Union Military Committee at the time and was the Chief of Defence of the 
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Swedish Defence Force during the creation of NORDEFCO, represents well the 
Swedish way of thinking in this regard:  
 ‘We are trying to bring clusters of countries that can cooperate 
around the table, and we are trying to find different areas where it’s 
possible to cooperate. This can be training and exercise, education, 
maintenance, procurement, or surveillance and, if we can identify 
these areas pragmatically and put the member states around the 
table, then the bottom-up approach will meet the top-down 
approach, and then we have an instrument that really can activate, 
stimulate and give inspiration for deeper cooperation. This is also 
forced by the lack of money…’763 
 
Finland supported NORDEFCO for similar reasons, and Finnish officials also 
perceived the EU ‘too heterogeneous, slow moving, and based in any case on NATO 
standards’, thus they would have preferred capability development related defence co-
operation in NATO over EU.
764
 However, as Finland was not NATO member, it 
would have been too difficult to fulfil the potential of this co-operation, thus they 
rather opted for the Nordic option.  
Denmark was not especially interested in NORDEFCO on capability 
development, because Copenhagen was ahead of other Nordic countries concerning 
military transformation and its main partners were top-tier NATO members like the 
UK and the US in this regard. Furthermore, Denmark already cut its capabilities and 
specialized its armed forces to provide effective expeditionary forces to NATO and 
coalition of willing operations,
765
 thus Nordic co-operation would not have provided 
tangible benefits for Denmark. 
We can conclude that the dissatisfaction with EU/NATO did not play a major 
role in establishing NORDEFCO. Although in general Finland and Sweden – the two 
Nordic countries that are EU members and participating in ESDP/CSDP – were not 
dissatisfied how defence co-operation progressed in the EU before the creation of 
NORDEFCO, their experience about EU decision-making suggested that the EU 
would not be the appropriate choice for multinational co-operation on capability 
development. Thus, they supported the idea of creating a smaller Nordic group for 
collaboration for this purpose. At the same time, the Nordic NATO members did not 
believe that their respective organization – the Alliance – would not be appropriate for 
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multinational capability development. Denmark was not enthusiastic about 
NORDEFCO and it did not shift from NATO co-operation towards NORDEFCO. 
Although, Norway partly shared Sweden’s and Finland’s view about the difficulties 
of co-operation in big multilateral organizations,
766
 Oslo’s main institutional related 
reason for establishing NORDEFCO was not the dissatisfaction with EU/NATO, 
rather it intended to get more access to ESDP/CSDP via NORDEFCO. 
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed. 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up Rival Explanation 1 has no explanatory power about why Nordic states 
established NORDEFCO instead of using the NATO and EU frameworks for 
capability development (see Figure 25). Prerequisite 1 was confirmed, but 
Prerequisite 2 was not. Accordingly, the independent variable of ‘Lack of progress on 
pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’ could not be the source of the 
intervening variable of ‘Nordic countries are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’. Thus, 




Figure 25 – Rival Explanation 1: Actual NORDEFCO Pattern 
 
However, we saw that for some degree EU/NATO related institutional 
considerations played a role in establishing NORDEFCO. Among others Sweden and 
Finland did not feel that the EU could be an effective platform for co-operation on 
capability development, because they deemed the EU to large and slow for this task. 
They believed that collaboration in a smaller, like-minded group would be much more 
effective. This type of reservations concerning EU played a role in the launch of 
NORDEFCO from the part of these two countries. In the case of Denmark, the 
EU/NATO related institutional perspectives did not play a significant role in creation 
NORDEFCO, while Norway hoped that it can get better access to ESDP/CSDP via a 
Nordic military co-operation. 
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Rival Explanation 2 – Effects of the financial crisis 
Rival Explanation 2 argues that the main reason and independent variable why 
NORDEFCO was established is the financial crisis and its negative effects on the 
Nordic defence budgets. According to the intervening variable of Rival Explanation 2, 
Nordic countries realized that they needed alternative multinational solutions to 
maintain their national military capabilities to mitigate the negative effects of the 
financial crisis. The dependent variable is that as a consequence of this chain of 
events, Nordic countries established NORDEFCO (see Figure 26). Based on these, 
the prerequisites for this rival explanation are the following: 
1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in 
the Nordic countries. 
2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative 
multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the Nordic 
countries. 
3. The creation of NORDEFCO needs to be linked to Nordic countries’ search 
for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities 
as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
 
 
Figure 26 – Rival Explanation 2: Predicted NORDEFCO Pattern 
 
Prerequisite 1: 
Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in the 
Nordic countries. 
The Nordic countries have small, open and export oriented economies, which were 
affected by the global economic crisis of 2008. However, the four Nordic countries 
possessing armed forces (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) successfully managed  
the situation and the impact of the economic crisis for the four Nordic economies 
‘was not as serious as expected and their recovery was obvious’.767 In 2011, an EU 
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report on the impact of the financial crisis on European defence highlighted that ‘with 
the exception of Sweden, Poland, France, Finland and Denmark, all states are 
implementing more or less drastic consolidations measures strongly affecting defence 
spending’.768 We can see that three of the five EU countries that did not cut their 
defence budgets after the financial crisis were participating states of NORDEFCO 
whilst Norway was not included in the report but its situation was similar to the other 
three Nordic countries. 
Denmark was the only Nordic country that slightly decreased its defence 
budget after the financial crisis. Copenhagen initially considered only a 500 million 
USD saving over a five-year period from an approximately 4 billion USD annual 
defence budget,
769
 which is a mere 2.5% decrease. The Danish MoD intended to 
achieve this savings by cutting operating costs and decommissioning older 
equipment.
770
 However, Danish defence spending more or less stagnated until 2012, 
since 2013 it has been decreasing sharply,
771
 which generated a series of problems 
regarding manning and maintaining different platforms.
772
 At the same time, these 
defence budget problems cannot be attributed directly to the direct effects of the 
economic crisis, as the defence budget cuts happened five years after the crisis broke 
out.  
Finland increased its defence budget by 13% to 2.78 billion EUR in 2009,
773
 
and in the next year the Finnish MoD announced that its defence spending would 
increase further by 2% every year in the period of 2011-2015.
774
 Accordingly, the 
financial crisis did not have any serious impact on Finnish defence budgets and 
military capabilities. Although the 2% increase was not executed in 2014 and 2015 as 
it was originally planned, the Finnish defence budget never went below 2.66. billion 
EUR.
775
 Similarly to Finland, Sweden and Norway also increased their defence 
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budgets after the financial crisis.
776
 In 2013, the Norwegian defence budget was 7.4 
billion USD, which was a 20% increase compared to the 2009 defence budget (6.2 
billion USD).
777
 Sweden also increased its defence budget every year after the 
financial crisis, and provided 16% more funding for defence in 2014 (44.98 billion 
Swedish krone) than in 2009 (38.51 billion Swedish krone).
778
 At the same time 




We could see that the states did not decrease their defence budgets 
significantly as a consequence of the financial crisis. Only Denmark executed smaller 
cuts in defence spending whilst the other three countries increased their defence 
budgets more than 15% after 2008.  
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 1 has not been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 2: 
The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative 
multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the Nordic 
countries. 
The findings in Prerequisite 1 highlighted that the Nordic countries did not cut their 
defence budget as a consequence of the financial crisis. Accordingly, this could not 
foster the search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military 
capability in the Nordic countries. 
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 3: 
The creation of NORDEFCO needs to be linked to Nordic countries’ search for 
alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a 
consequence of the financial crisis. 
As Prerequisite 1 was not confirmed, thus Prerequisite 2 could not be confirmed 
either. Accordingly, in the case of the Nordic countries the creation of NORDEFCO 
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cannot be linked to the negative effects of the financial crisis on defence budgets. This 
means, that NORDEFCO was not established to mitigate the impacts of the financial 
crisis via multinational defence co-operation.  
Although, NORDEFCO was not created because of the financial crisis, its 
establishing had a very important economic rationale. As Toumas Forsberg 
highlighted ‘cost-effectiveness, the financial aspect, is the most commonly cited 
argument for increased Nordic cooperation in security and defence policy’.780 During 
the 2000s several Swedish and Norwegian official reports and academic studies were 
published, which pointed out that the current state of defence affairs did not allow 
smaller countries to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities.
781
 Many reasons were 
mentioned including the decreasing defence budgets after the Cold War, the increased 
demand for participation in costly international operations, increasing labour costs 
and the problem of defence inflation, which refers to the phenomenon that every 
generation of defence equipment costs significantly more than the previous 
generation, resulting in  static defence budgets losing their purchasing power.
782
  
The former Norwegian Chiefs of Defence Sverre Diesen and the former 
Swedish Chief of Defence Hakan Syrén are deemed to be the ‘architects’ of 
NORDEFCO,
783
 and they had very good interpersonal chemistry.
784
 Both of them 
used the concept of a special version of a ‘critical mass’ to describe the above-
mentioned problem. Under critical mass Sverre Diesen understood the ‘smallest 
practical number of any given weapon system’, and He argued that  
‘we […] need to remind ourselves that there is a lower limit as to 
the number of systems or units of each capability – tanks, frigates, 
fighters – which can be sustained before it becomes either 
unpractical, prohibitively expensive or both. An air force of 10 
modern jet fighters is absurd, both because of sky-rocketing unit 
costs and the fact that operating 10 planes will not generate a 
sufficiently large pool of people with pilot experience required to 
fill all the positions in the command structure, the support 
organisation and other functions necessary to operate and support a 
fighter force.’785 
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 Sverre Diesen, ”Multinational Defence Integration: Potential in the Nordic Region” (speech, Round 




However, the armed forces of smaller European nations – including the 
Nordic countries – became so small that many capabilities were below the threshold 
of ‘critical mass’.786 The vision of Diesen and Syrén was that this problem should be 
solved with the help of multinational defence co-operation. As Diesen put it: 
‘This means that each participating nation [of the defence co-
operation] will retain its full spectrum of weapon systems and 
capabilities, achieving instead the necessary economy of scale by 
integrating their force production or force generation processes. In 
other words, all the support functions underpinning and enabling the 
operational capabilities such as military schools, maintenance 
workshops, specialist training centers, storage facilities, bombing 
ranges and other infrastructure etc etc, will be joint, each country 
looking after its designated slice of these support functions for all 
the participating nations.’787 
 
Accordingly, it is not so surprising that the Norwegian and Swedish armed 
forces published reports independently
788
 and together as well in 2007,
789
 where they 
emphasized the necessity of co-operation with other Nordic countries to achieve cost-
effectiveness in order to be able to keep full range of defence capabilities.
790
 As we 
could see, the debate about this issue had been going on in Norway and Sweden for 
years, and the Chiefs of Defence of the two countries supported the idea of closer 
multinational defence co-operation in the Nordics. Probably, the fact that both 
countries were in the middle of the transformation of their armed forces in the 2000s 
fostered a better understanding of each other too, as they faced very similar problems 
during this process.  
Finland joined in the analytical work of mapping possible co-operative areas 
among the Nordic countries, which resulted in the Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish joint 
report that identified 140 areas for collaboration.
791
 Based on the results of this 
analysis, the three countries established NORDSUP to create joint logistical and 
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support capabilities, co-ordinate training activities and harmonise their equipment.
792
 
NORDSUP’s progress report reiterated the argument of Diesen and Syrén: 
‘Given the loss of purchasing power, small and medium sized 
countries will not be able in the close future to sustain complete and 
balanced armed forces. To put it somewhat simplified we face two 
options: either to share capabilities with strategic partners on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis or to face a future with fewer 
capabilities.’793 
 
As we know, NORDSUP was incorporated into NORDEFCO together with 
NORDCAPS and NORDAC, but the question of ‘critical mass’ and cost-effectiveness 
dominated the discourse concerning Nordic co-operation on defence. Accordingly, we 
can conclude that the financial crisis did not play a role in the creation of the 
NORDEFCO, rather the main motive behind NORDEFCO was the recognition that 
small states were not able to maintain full spectrum of military capabilities because of 
different structural financial constraints. Thus, the Swedish and Norwegian Chiefs of 
Defence started a process to solve this problem with multinational defence co-
operation in the Nordic region.
794
 
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed. 
 
Conclusion 
We can conclude that Rival Explanation 2 has no explanatory power about why 
Nordic countries established NORDEFCO, and did not use NATO and EU for 
defence co-operation.  
 
 
Figure 27- Rival Explanation 2: Actual NORDEFCO Pattern 
 






 That is another question, how feasible this concept is. Analysts pointed out that generating savings 
via NORDEFCO is more than problematic because of political and operational problems as well. See: 
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Prerequisite 1 was not confirmed that meant that neither Prerequisite 2 and nor 
Prerequisite 3 could not be valid either (see Figure 27). Accordingly, the negative 
effects of the financial crisis on Nordic defence budgets did not have any relationship 
with the creation of NORDEFCO, because defence spending of Nordic countries were 
not decreased after the financial crisis. However, the analysis pointed out that the 
creation of NORDEFCO had a very important economic background especially from 
the part of Sweden and Norway and partly from Finland as well. The military 
leadership of these countries believed that the structural financial constraints of their 
defence sectors could be handled by multinational defence co-operation, thus they 
created NORDSUP to save costs by extending and deepening defence collaboration 
on many areas. Later NORDSUP was integrated into NORDEFCO. 
 
Rival Explanation 3 – Convergent threat perceptions 
Rival Explanation 3 suggests that NORDEFCO was created because Nordic countries 
have perceived the same threats as the biggest threats (independent variable). 
Accordingly, they began to discuss how they should co-operate to face with these 
threats together (intervening variable), and finally they institutionalized this co-
operation in the form of NORDEFCO (dependent variable). 
 
 
Figure 28 – Rival Explanation 3: Predicted NORDEFCO Pattern 
 
For this rival explanation I developed three prerequisites, which are the 
followings: 
1. The Nordic countries had to share the perception of the same threat or threats 
as the largest threat. 
2. The Nordic countries had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding 
the shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of 
NORDEFCO. 
3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) Nordic countries discussed and 




Prerequisite 1:  
The Nordic countries had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the 
largest threat. 
To identify whether Nordic countries shared the perception of the same threat(s) as 
the largest threat, I compare the threats of the relevant national security documents of 
the four Nordic countries that have armed forces (Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden) describe. Just like in the CEDC and Lancaster House cases, I am also 
focusing on national security documents regarding Nordic countries and do not take 
into consideration public perceptions about threats, because public perceptions are 
volatile and national security documents are the foundations of foreign and security 
polices of governments. 
Interestingly the Nordic countries do not have explicit national security 
strategies. For instance, Sweden published only a national strategy on ‘Swedish 
participation in international peace-support and security-building operations’ in 
2008,
795
 but did not have any other national security or defence related strategic 
document during the time when NORDEFCO was launched. Denmark did not have 
strategic level document on how national security should be organized either, and 
officials at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs state that Denmark ‘does not need 
one’.796 Similar to Sweden and Denmark, Finland and Norway did not have national 
security and national military strategies either. However, it does not mean that they 
did not provide political guidance for national security and defence institutions. 
Nordic countries provided guidance in the forms of different official documents. 
Although the structure and focus of these documents are quite different than the 
national security and national military strategies of the participating countries of 
CEDC and the Lancaster House Treaties, they provide an appropriate basis for 
analysis. Thus, during this section I compare the contents of official documents from 
2008-2009 of the four Nordic countries concerning security threats and challenges, as 
the publication of these documents were close enough to the creation of NORDEFCO 
to represent the official threat perception of the studied states that time. 
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With regard to Finland, I study the government report on Finnish Security and 
Defence Policy from 2009,
797
 in the case of Norway I analyse the recommendations 
of the Armed Services Committee of the Norwegian Parliament on a defence and 
security from 2008,
798
 and from Sweden I investigate a functional Government Bill on 
defence from 2009.
799
 Among the Nordic states, Denmark’s case is unique regarding 
the document I analyse, because it is not a governmental decree or a report of the 
Parliament. I use an official report compiled by the Danish Defence Commission in 
2008,
800
 which document provided the guidance for the so-called Danish Defence 
Agreement 2010-2014 published in 2010.
801
 The Defence Commission’s members are 
politicians, scholars, military officers, and governmental officials, who have 
appropriate knowledge and experience on defence issues. The Commission is not a 
permanent body, but it is created only when the Danish government perceives that 
strategic changes needed concerning Denmark’s defence policy. The 2008 Defence 




The documents I analysed mention the threats and challenges the studied 
Nordic countries face, but in most cases they do this in an unstructured way, thus it is 
not clear, which threat was the most relevant for the individual Nordic countries. The 
only exception is the Finnish document that not only mentions the threats but also 
systematically describes them and provides appropriate context to make clear, why 
they were important threats and challenges for Finland.
803
 On average nine threats and 
challenges were mentioned by the individual documents, and five of them were 
common theme in all of them. These were the following: 
 Terrorism 
 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
 Environmental issues (natural disasters and/or climate change) 
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 Arctic region 
 Cyber attacks 
 
We can conclude that the four Nordic countries shared the view about these 
five issues and considered them as security threats or challenges. If we would like to 
know the proportion of the shared threats from all of their perceived threats, we can 
say that Norway and Finland shared 63%, Denmark shared 71% and Norway shared 
42% of their perceived threats with the other studied Nordic countries. Thus, we can 
conclude that Nordic countries had similar threat perceptions in 2008-2009, because 
many of their perceived threats were shared with the other Nordic states. At the same 
time, we cannot figure out whether they shared the same threat or threats as the 
largest threat, because their official documents did not prioritize them appropriately.  
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 1 has been partially 
confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 2:  
The Nordic countries had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the 
shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of 
NORDEFCO.  
To analyse whether these shared threats played a role in creating NORDEFCO, I 
study whether the Nordic countries initiated discussions and co-operation on them 
before the creation of the NORDEFCO. For this purpose I used the results of the 
Stoltenberg Report and compared them with the shared threats identified in 
Prerequisite 1. If the Stoltenberg report covered the topics of the shared threats, we 
can conclude that high-level governmental discussions were initiated about them, as 
the Nordic ministers of foreign affairs discussed the Stoltenberg report in 2009. If the 
ministers discussed the above-mentioned shared threats, as a next step I also have to 
analyse whether co-operation was initiated on the discussed shared threats. I chose the 
Stoltenberg report as a reference point for my analysis, because of two reasons. First, 
it was the only official report, which covered comprehensively security and foreign 
affairs issues form a Nordic perspective, and was discussed on high level by ministers 
before the creation of NORDEFCO. Second, many Nordic analysts perceive the 
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Stoltenberg report as an important step in creation of NORDEFCO,
804
 which probably 
means that the Stoltenberg Report had significant impact on NORDEFCO. 
As I mentioned in a previous section of this chapter, Thorvald Stoltenberg was 
asked by the foreign ministers of the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Sweden, Norway) in June 2008 ‘to produce an independent report on how 
Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy could be developed during the 
coming 10–15 years.’ 805  The development of the report was based mainly on 
interviews and conversations with different officials and experts from the five Nordic 
countries. For this Stoltenberg got a small secretariat from Norway, and two contact 
persons from each Nordic capital to help facilitate and organize the meetings and the 
research. Accordingly, no committee was established, and, except the contact persons, 
no other officials took part in the development of the report. Thus, the report ‘was less 
likely to be a list of lowest common denominators, but also it was not “owned” by the 
governments that commissioned it. They could take or leave its contents piecemeal, 
which is precisely what they did.’ 806 The Stoltenberg report was published half a year 
later, and Stoltenberg presented the results of it to the Nordic foreign ministers on an 
extraordinary meeting in February 2009.
807
 The report contained 13 concrete 
proposals that were partly defence related and also covered issues concerning foreign 
policy and non-military aspects of security. These were the followings:
808
 
 Proposal 1. Nordic Stabilisation Task Force  
 Proposal 2. Nordic cooperation on surveillance of Icelandic airspace  
 Proposal 3. Nordic maritime monitoring system  
 Proposal 4. Maritime response force 
 Proposal 5. Satellite system for surveillance and communications  
 Proposal 6. Nordic cooperation on Arctic issues  
 Proposal 7. Nordic resource network to protect against cyber attacks 
 Proposal 8. Disaster response unit  
 Proposal 9. War crimes investigation unit  
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 Proposal 10. Cooperation between foreign services  
 Proposal 11. Military cooperation on transport, medical services, education, 
 materiel and exercise ranges  
 Proposal 12. Amphibious unit  
 Proposal 13. Nordic declaration of solidarity  
 
If we compare the proposals with the five shared threats of the Nordic 
countries (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental 
issues, arctic region, cyber attacks), we can conclude that three shared threats are 
addressed by the Stoltenberg report. Environmental issues were dealt in the 
framework of the ‘Nordic maritime monitoring system’ (Proposal 3), as one of its 
aims was to create capabilities to monitor pollution in the Nordic region,
809
 and in the 
framework of ‘Disaster response unit’ (Proposal 8). This unit would co-ordinate 
Nordic efforts in the case of large-scale natural or manmade disasters.
810
 The Arctic 
region – another shared challenge – is directly addressed in Proposal 6, where the co-
operation should include maritime safety, search and rescue services and also issues 
related to environment and climate change.
811
 The topic of Arctic region was touched 
partly in Proposals 4, 5, 6 and 12 too. Stoltenberg also proposed co-operation on 
cyber issues by establishing a Nordic resource network to handle cyber threats and ‘to 
facilitate exchange of experience and coordinate national efforts to prevent and 
protect against’ cyber attacks.812 Accordingly, we could see that discussions were 
initiated on three Nordic shared threats by the Stoltenberg report: environmental 
issues, Arctic region and cyber attacks. The question is, whether co-operation 
happened after the discussions on these issues. 
Clive Archer made an assessment about the Nordic responses concerning the 
Stoltenberg report’s proposals, and he found that only six of the thirteen proposals 
received immediate attention by the Nordic foreign ministers. However, in 2009 some 
kind of co-operation started or continued on every proposal except the last two ones 
(the amphibious unit and the Nordic declaration of solidarity).
813
 Furthermore, the 
Nordic foreign ministers also accepted a version of the Nordic solidarity clause – the 
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Stoltenberg report’s most far-reaching proposal – in April 2011.814 Although it was 
watered down significantly compared to the original proposition, because 
Stoltenberg’s idea was to establish a kind of mutual defence agreement, and the actual 
version of the Nordic solidarity clause applies only to natural and man-made disasters, 
cyber and terrorist attacks. At the same time, this also means that we can conclude 
that co-operation also started against terrorism among the Nordic states even though 
this was not explicitly mentioned in the Stoltenberg report. 
We can conclude that discussions and co-operation started concerning four 
shared threats of the Nordic countries before the creation of NORDEFCO. Three of 
them (environmental issues, Arctic region, cyber attacks) were addressed by the 
Stoltenberg report and its follow-up co-operative initiatives, and Nordic collaboration 
in the case of a terrorist attack was included into the Nordic solidarity clause. The 
Nordic countries did not deal with the question of co-operation on proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, which was their fifth shared threat. 
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has been confirmed. 
 
Prerequisite 3:  
The links between the shared biggest threat(s) Nordic countries discussed and co-
operated on and the initiation and creation of NORDEFCO have to be detected. 
In the previous section, we could see that the Nordic countries launched discussions 
and started co-operation on their shared threats except on the proliferation of WMD. 
This section investigates, whether these collaborations could be linked to the creation 
of NORDEFCO.  
In general, we can say that there is no link between the co-operation on the 
shared threats and the creation of NORDEFCO, as the Nordic collaborations 
concerning the shared threats were not conducted in NORDEFCO. After the Nordic 
foreign ministers had discussed the Stoltenberg report, the question of the maritime 
response force (Proposal 4) and Arctic co-operation (Proposal 6) were dealt with by 
the Arctic Council and for collaboration on cyber attacks (Proposal 7) the Nordic 
national computer emergency response teams were assigned. In addition, the co-
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operation on disaster response (Proposal 8) was not continued in NORDEFCO either 
but on a ministerial meeting on Civil protection and Crisis preparedness.
815
  
Among the proposals of the Stoltenberg report the creation of ‘Nordic 
Stabilisation Task Force’ (Proposal 1), the ‘Military cooperation on transport, medical 
services, education, materiel and exercise ranges’ (Proposal 11) and ‘Amphibious 
unit’ (Proposal 12) dealt with military issues, and these were the areas where 
NORDEFCO could have a role.
816
 However, the Nordic states had lesser ambitions in 
these areas, and did not intend to invest into a Nordic Stabilization Task Force or into 
an Amphibious Unit. Furthermore, only the Amphibious Unit would have had some 
limited link to the Arctic Region anyway. The only proposal, where Stoltenberg 
directly referred to co-operative frameworks (NORDAC, NORDCAPS), that became 
integrated parts of NORDEFCO later was Proposal 11 about military co-operation. 
However, the issues of Proposal 11 did not have a direct link with the shared Nordic 
threats identified in Prerequisite 1 (environmental issues, Arctic region, cyber attacks, 
terrorism) as we could see in Prerequisite 2. 
Accordingly, the co-operative efforts, which could be linked to the shared 
threats, were not related to the creation of NORDEFCO, as they were conducted in 
other Nordic collaborative frameworks. At the same time, there were some military 
related issues that the Stoltenberg report incorporated, they either could not be linked 
to the shared threats or co-operation did not start on them.  
However, I would like to note that the process led to the Stoltenberg report 
created a very positive milieu towards Nordic co-operations in general, and this 
milieu probably helped the creation of NORDEFCO as well. The Nordic foreign 
ministers’ discussion when they asked Stoltenberg to develop the report about 
possible future areas for Nordic foreign and security policy co-operation was in the 
same month, when the Finnish-Swedish-Norwegian NORDSUP report was published. 
The foreign ministers meeting and the process of the development of the Stoltenberg 
report probably generated the positive milieu, which made sure that Denmark and 
Iceland joined to NORDSUP in November 2008 and helped to create NORDEFCO as 
well. This environment, where political support existed to Nordic co-operation in 
general probably made it much easier to go one step further from NORDSUP to 
NORDEFCO, which integrated every Nordic defence related collaborations into one 
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frameworks. Without this milieu the new Nordic military co-operation could have 
remained on trilateral level between Finland, Norway and Sweden in NORDSUP. 
Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed. 
 
Conclusion 
Rival Explanation 3 does not have explanatory power over the creation of the 
NORDEFCO, despite the fact that the Nordic countries’ threat perception was very 
similar (independent variable) and they began discussions and co-operation on the 
shared threats (intervening variable) in the framework of the Stoltenberg report and its 
follow-up collaborations. Thus, both Prerequisite 1 and Prerequisite 2 could be 
confirmed. However, the creation of the NORDEFCO (dependent variable) could not 
be linked to these discussions and co-operations on shared threats, because co-
operation on them started in different frameworks and not in NORDEFCO. 
Accordingly, Prerequisite 3 could not be confirmed and thus we can conclude that 




Figure 29 – Rival Explanation 3: Actual NORDEFCO Pattern 
 
At the same time, the positive milieu towards Nordic co-operations that 
existed in 2008-2009, probably helped to create NORDEFCO. Without activities on 
other areas concerning foreign and security policy the new Nordic military co-
operation could have stuckd in a Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish NORDSUP. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I attempted to figure out why the Nordic countries created the 
NORDEFCO, when they had the opportunity to co-operate in NATO and/or EU 
frameworks as they did earlier? Furthermore, I was also curious of the circumstances 
that encouraged the participating states to choose a new collaboration rather than co-
operating in NATO and EU. In this chapter I studied the three rival explanations 
developed and operationalized in the research framework chapter to get answers to 
my research questions. During the operationalization of the rival explanations I 
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created variables and prerequisites for them, and in this chapter I studied, whether 
these prerequisites could be confirmed regarding the NORDEFCO case. If all of the 
prerequisites of a rival explanation could be confirmed, we could conclude that the 
variables of the rival explanation were valid, thus it has explanatory power over the 
research questions concerning NORDEFCO. 
Rival Explanation 1 suggests that the independent variable was the ‘Lack of 
progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’ which resulted in 
the intervening variable of ‘Nordic countries are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ that 
led to the dependent variable of ‘Creation of NORDEFCO’. Rival Explanation 1 did 
not have explanatory power over why Nordic countries chose to co-operate in 
NORDEFCO instead of collaborating in NATO and EU. Although Prerequisite 1 was 
confirmed, Prerequisite 2 was not, which meant that Nordic countries were not 
dissatisfied with the progress concerning EU/NATO related defence co-operation 
before the creation of NORDEFCO. Accordingly, Prerequisite 3 could not be 
confirmed either, namely the establishing of NORDEFCO does not have relationship 
with the dissatisfaction of Nordic countries on NATO/EU defence collaborations, 
because Nordic countries were not dissatisfied with it. At the same time, my analysis 
revealed that certain EU/NATO related institutional considerations played a role in 
creating NORDEFCO. The main element here was that the two EU members, Sweden 
and Finland, did not believe that the EU could be an effective platform for co-
operation on capability development, as they perceived the EU to slow for effective 
co-operation on multinational capability development. They believed that 
collaboration in a smaller group, where the participants know better each other would 
be much more appropriate. The NATO members, Norway and Denmark, did not have 
such type of reservations with NATO, but Norway was interested in improving its 
relations on defence co-operation with EU member Nordic states (Sweden and 
Finland) via NORDEFCO to get more access to ESDP/CSDP projects and initiatives.  
Rival Explanation 2 assumes that as a consequence of the financial crisis of 
2008 defence budget cuts happened in the Nordic countries (independent variable), 
thus the Nordic states searched for alternative multinational solutions to maintain their 
national military capabilities (intervening variable). This search led them to create 
NORDEFCO (dependent variable). My research showed, that already the Prerequisite 
of the independent variable could not be confirmed, because no serious defence 
budget cuts happened in the Nordic countries after the financial crisis. Only Denmark 
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decreased its defence spending slightly, but the three other Nordic armed forces 
received more financial resources that time. As a consequence, the prerequisites of the 
intervening and dependent variables could not be true either. Thus, the defence budget 
cuts could not be the reason why NORDEFCO was created, as no serious budget cuts 
happened in the Nordic countries in the studied period. However, my research 
highlighted that the creation of NORDEFCO had a very important economic 
rationale, which was shared and propagated mostly by Sweden and Norway, and later 
Finland supported this concept as well. The Chiefs of Defence of Sweden and 
Norway were convinced that they could solve the problem of ‘critical mass’ with 
multinational defence co-operation. This shared vision of the two military leaders 
contributed greatly to the creation of NORDEFCO. 
Rival Explanation 3 argues that Nordic countries perceived the same threat(s) 
as the biggest threat(s) to their national security (independent variable) and began 
discussions and co-operation on these shared threats (intervening variable) that led to 
the creation the NORDEFCO by institutionalizing the co-operations on the shared 
threats (dependent variable). We could see that Rival Explanation 3 does not have 
explanatory power over the creation of the NORDEFCO either. Nordic countries 
shared the perception of same threats with each other, and they also began to co-
operate on them, thus the prerequisites of the independent and intervening variables 
could be confirmed. However, these collaborations were not institutionalized in 
NORDEFCO but in other frameworks. Accordingly, the prerequisite of the dependent 
variable could not be confirmed, which means that shared threat perceptions did not 
play a role in establishing NORDEFCO. At the same time, the fact that many 
collaborations were discussed and started among the Nordic countries shows, that the 
political milieu was very supportive for deeper Nordic military co-operation. In other 
political circumstance NORDEFCO could not necessarily have been emerged in its 
current form. 
So what kind of implications the case of the NORDEFCO countries has on the 
research questions? Namely why have Nordic countries established NORDEFCO, 
when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework of NATO and EU? 
What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to 
prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within 
NATO and EU? My research concluded that none of the rival explanations have 
explanatory power over the creation of NORDEFCO. The empirically based pattern 
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(see Figure 30) highlights that three new independent variables were the most 
important once concerning the creation of NORDEFCO. The first one is the shared 
vision and leadership role of the Swedish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence. 
Although, the problem of ‘critical mass’ posed hardships to many smaller European 
countries most of them did not start collaboration on this issue with another countries. 
The leadership role and shared vision of Diesen and Syrén was needed to kick off co-
operation on this issue first bilaterally than regionally.  
 
Figure 30 – Empirically Based NORDEFCO Pattern 
 
The second variable is the institutional considerations of Sweden and Finland, 
and lesser extend of Norway. The two EU members did not deem EU as an 
appropriate forum for multinational defence co-operation on capability development, 
because EU was deemed too slow for that, and as they were not NATO members a 
Nordic co-operation seemed to be a beneficial option for them. At the same time, 
Norway was interested to get more access to ESDP/CSDP projects, and hoped that via 
a deeper Nordic defence collaborative framework it could get this access. 
The third independent variable is the political milieu, which supported the 
creation of a fully Nordic defence co-operation. Without this milieu the military co-
operation among Nordic states could have stopped by creating NORDSUP with the 
participation of Finland, Norway and Sweden only. We could see that basically these 
three countries were really interested in defence co-operation with their Nordic 
partners on capability development, because of their institutional considerations and 
shared vision. Denmark has always been sceptical towards this initiative and Iceland 
 233 
did not have too much to add for this co-operation. However, Denmark and Iceland 
were also pulled into a reenergized Nordic defence collaborative framework, and the 
positive milieu probably facilitated the integration process and helped to incorporate 
NORDCAPS and NORDAC together with NORDSUP into NORDEFCO’s 
overarching framework. Without the political milieu supportive to Nordic co-
operation in general, the integration might have stopped between Finland, Norway 
and Sweden in NORDSUP. 
My research highlighted as well that the engine of the creation of 
NORDEFCO was the Swedish-Norwegian core. Both countries had EU/NATO 
related institutional considerations for creating NORDEFCO, but most importantly 
their military leadership shared a vision about solving the ‘critical mass’ problem via 
multinational defence co-operation. When they started practical collaboration and had 
an appropriate basis to extend this co-operation they also involved Finland, who also 
had its own interests in participating in a Nordic co-operation. The core later pulled 
the less interested countries (Denmark, Iceland) into this defence co-operative 
framework as well thanks to the supportive political milieu for Nordic. This 
demonstrates that a strong core can launch a much wider multinational defence co-




CHAPTER 7.  
CONCLUSION  
 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH GOALS AND METHODOLOGY  
In this thesis I have considered why European states have established new sub-
regional MDCs recently, instead of co-operating in NATO and EU institutional 
frameworks for military collaboration, when this was the norm in the 2000s. Not 
surprisingly, military co-operation in NATO and EU has received most of the 
scholarly attention over the last quarter century, and collaborations in the form of 
more traditional bilateral and sub-regional MDCs remains an understudied area. As a 
result, this thesis has attempted to fill this empirical gap in the literature by 
investigating three of the newly emerged sub-regional MDCs, focusing on the reasons 
why they were created and what circumstances helped their launch. Based on this the 
thesis formulated the following research questions:  
 Why have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs 
in recent years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework 
of NATO and EU? 
 What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European 
states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than 
collaborate within NATO and EU? 
The literature review demonstrated that most of the existing literature was 
focused on EU and NATO related defence co-operation. In contrast, there was 
comparatively little attention dedicated to developments at the sub-regional level and 
an empirical deficit clearly existed at the sub-regional MDCs. Moreover, at the 
conceptual level there had been no attempt at studying sub-regional MDCs in a 
systemic and comparative manner. Therefore, I developed a research design for 
studying sub-regional MDCs based on Robert K. Yin’s case study research method.817 
I used an embedded multiple-case design and applied pattern matching as the main 
analytical technique. Three case studies were selected - CEDC, the Lancaster House 
Treaties and the NORDEFCO - for my research as they were established in the late 
2000s and early 2010s, thus they could provide a glimpse about dynamics of the 
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creation of sub-regional MDCs over a consistent period. The ‘embedded unit of 
analysis’ were three different possible explanations for the reason of the creation of 
the studied cases. The explanations supposed that the reasons for the creation of the 
MDCs were the following: 
1. Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation 
2. Effects of the financial crisis 
3. Convergent threat perceptions in Europe 
In order to investigate the cases and their embedded unit of analysis I applied 
pattern matching, which ‘compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one 
(or with several alternative predictions)’.818 As a result, I developed rival explanations 
concerning the three possible explanations by creating operationalized predicted 
patterns for each of them in the form of different independent, intervening and 
dependent variables. During the operationalization process, I developed a series of 
assumptions that served as prerequisites for verifying the studied variables of the 
patterns of the rival explanations. I also used the so-called literal replication logic, 
which means that I was searching for similar predicted results regarding every case. 
Accordingly, I assumed that one of the rival explanations would be able to answer my 
research questions appropriately, while the others would not be convincing. At the 




In this chapter, I first compare the results of my research regarding every rival 
explanation across the three cases to figure out whether one of the rival explanations 
could answer my research questions on every case. Second, I introduce the 
empirically based patterns of the three cases, and finally I generalize the results of my 
research to make conclusions about the reasons and circumstances why the three 
studied sub-regional MDCs were created. This generic framework provides added 
value to our knowledge about how and why sub-regional multinational defence co-
operation emerges. 
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Comparison of the individual rival explanations across the studied cases  
In this section I analyse how convincingly the rival explanations could explain my 
research questions across the cases of CEDC, Lancaster House Treaties and 
NORDEFCO. For this, I compare the individual generic rival explanations and their 
‘actual’ version concerning every case. Thus, I briefly introduce what the generic 
rival explanations look like, and thereafter I compare them with their actual CEDC, 
Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO versions respectively. If a rival 
explanation can explain every case convincingly, we can conclude that it has 
explanatory power over my research questions.  
 
Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence 
cooperation  
This rival explanation suggests that European states were dissatisfied with the lack of 
progress on NATO/EU level defence co-operative efforts, thus they created sub-
regional MDCs for progressing better in a different format. In this case the 
independent variable is ’lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence 
cooperation’ which links via the intervening variable of ‘European nations are 
dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ to the dependent variable of ‘creation of sub-
regional MDC’ (see Figure 31). 
 
 
Figure 31 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 1 
 
Based on this pattern’s variables I developed several assumptions as 
prerequisites for verifying this rival explanation. Basically, each variable has its own 
prerequisite, thus Prerequisite 1 is prerequisite for the independent variable, 
Prerequisite 2 is for the intervening variable and Prerequisite 3 is for the dependent 
variable. The prerequisites are the following: 
1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO had to 
be identified. 
2. The dissatisfaction of countries of the studied sub-regional MDC concerning 
the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO had to 
be detected. 
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3. The creation of the sub-regional MDC needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction 
of the participating countries with the NATO/EU. 
 
If we compare the actual patterns of the three cases (see Figure 32) with the 
generic pattern of Rival Explanation 1, we can see that Rival Explanation 1 has 
explanatory power over the case of the Lancaster House Treaties only. Every 
prerequisite of the Lancaster House Treaties could be verified, which means that the 
pattern of Rival Explanation 1 met the empirical based pattern concerning this case. It 
was shown, that both the United Kingdom and France were dissatisfied with the 
progress of defence co-operative efforts in NATO and the EU, as they felt that most 
of the European countries do not take defence seriously enough, thus a closer co-
operation between Europe’s premier military powers would be beneficial. This 
phenomenon played an important role in establishing the Lancaster House Treaties 





Figure 32 – Actual Case Patterns of Rival Explanation 1 
 
As far as the CEDC and NORDEFCO are concerned Rival Explanation 1 does 
not have explanatory power, because Prerequisite 2 could not be verified concerning 
these two cases. As the intervening variable was not valid, it could not link the 
independent variable to the dependent variable either. This means that although lack 
of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation (independent 
variable) could be verified based on the Literature Review chapter, the dissatisfaction 
of the Nordic and CEDC countries with NATO and EU defence co-operation 
(intervening variable) could not. We could see that the NATO member CEDC 
countries were not critical towards NATO, rather bigger allies were critical towards 
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them on defence issues.
819
 They were not dissatisfied with the lack of progress on EU 
defence collaborations either, because they focused almost exclusively on NATO 
issues, and were less concerned with ESDP/CSDP. Austria has been an EU member 
only, and Vienna was not dissatisfied with ESDP, as a less deep co-operation and less 




Although the NATO member Nordic countries used to be sceptical (Denmark 
in the 1980s)
821
 and ambivalent (Norway in the 1990s)
822
 towards NATO earlier, in 
the period when NORDEFCO was created they became relevant proponents and 
supporters of NATO policies, co-operative initiatives and operations.
823
 Sweden and 
Finland were not dissatisfied with NATO either, because despite the fact that they 
were not NATO members, they could join plenty of NATO initiatives and 
operations,
824
 and they could choose the level and depth of this co-operation. The 
Nordic EU members were not dissatisfied with the EU as it was flexible enough to 
support both Sweden’s ambitious military transformation goals 825  and even make 
Finland satisfied with its territorial defence focus. Denmark could not participate in 
ESDP/CSDP, because of its opt-out, thus interestingly the non-EU member Norway 
was more integrated into ESDP/CSDP projects, initiatives and operations. Lack of 
progress in ESDP/CSDP was not a problem for them, but Danish and Norwegian 




 Based on the comparison of the predicted generic version of Rival 
Explanation 1 and the three actual case patterns we can conclude that Rival 
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Explanation 1 cannot explain per se why the three sub-regional MDCs were 
established, because it had explanatory power over the case of Lancaster House 
Treaties only. 
Rival Explanation 2 – Effects of the financial crisis 
Rival Explanation 2 assumes that as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008 the 
defence budgets cuts of the studied European states were decreased, which forced 
them to turn to multinational solutions in order to get help to maintain their national 
military capabilities. At the end of this process, the studied countries created sub-
regional MDCs to mitigate the effects of the defence budget cuts. Accordingly, the 
independent variable of Rival Explanation 2 is ‘defence budget cuts as a consequence 
of the financial crisis’, the intervening variable is ‘need for alternative solutions to 
maintain national military capabilities’ and the dependent variable is ‘creation of sub-
regional MDC’ (see Figure 33). 
 
Figure 33 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 2 
The prerequisites for the variables of the pattern of this rival explanation are 
the following: 
1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in 
the participating countries of the studied sub-regional MDC. 
2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative 
multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the 
participating countries of the studied sub-regional MDC. 
3. The creation of the studied sub-regional MDC needs to be linked to the 
participating countries’ search for alternative multinational solutions to 





Figure 34 – Actual Case Patterns of Rival Explanation 2 
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If we compare the actual case patterns (see Figure 34) and the generic pattern 
of Rival Explanation 2, we can conclude that none of the actual case patterns met the 
generic one. In the cases of CEDC and the Lancaster House Treaties, we can see that 
the participating countries cut their defence budgets as a consequence of the financial 
crisis, thus the prerequisite of the independent variable was verified. However, they 
did not search for alternative multinational solutions (except for Hungary)
827
 to 
mitigate the effects of their decreased defence budgets on national military 
capabilities, rather they chose to absorb the losses individually. In the case of the 
Lancaster House Treaties, the United Kingdom accepted that some of its military 
capabilities would be lost temporarily or permanently,
828
 while France rather opted 
for ‘muddling through’ and slowed down its military modernization.829 The CEDC 
countries chose different strategies to deal with the defence budget cuts as well, but 
basically all of them attempted to solve its financial problems on its own.
830
 
Accordingly, the prerequisite of the intervening variable was not verified concerning 
these two cases, thus the intervening variable (‘need for alternative solutions to 
maintain national military capabilities’) could not link the independent variable to the 
dependent variable (‘creation of sub-regional MDC’).  
The NORDEFCO case was different, because already the dependent variable 
was not verified, namely the Nordic countries did not cut their defence budgets. Only 
Denmark decreased it slightly, but the other three Nordic countries that have armed 
forces (Finland, Norway, Sweden) increased their defence budgets significantly in the 
years following the financial crisis.
831
 As even the independent variable was not 
verified, it could not be the source of the intervening and dependent variables either. 
Based on the fact that Rival Explanation 2 could not provide the answer to my 
research questions concerning the studied cases, we can conclude that it does not have 
explanatory power over them. 
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Rival Explanation 3 – Convergent threat perceptions 
Rival Explanation 3 supposes that the countries perceived the same threat(s) in their 
sub-region, and accordingly they began to form an alliance by starting conversations 
and co-operation against this threat(s). As a final step, they institutionalized this 
alliance in the form of the studied sub-regional MDCs. Based on the above-mentioned 
logic the independent variable of Rival Explanation 3 is ‘perception of the same 
threat’ by the countries of the studied sub-regions, the intervening variable is starting 
establishing ‘alliances against the biggest threat’ by these countries and the dependent 
variable is ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’ (see Figure 35). 
 
 
Figure 35 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 3 
 
The prerequisites for verifying the variables of this pattern are the following: 
1. The participating states of the studied sub-regional MDC had to share the 
perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat. 
2. The participating states of the studied sub-regional MDC had to initiate 
discussions and co-operation regarding the shared threat and had to begin to 
co-operate on them before the creation of the sub-regional MDC. 
3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) the participating states of the 
studied sub-regional MDC discussed and co-operated on and the initiation and 




Figure 36 – Actual Case Patterns of Rival Explanation 3 
 
The analysis of the actual case patterns (see Figure 36) suggests that none of 
them met the generic pattern of Rival Explanation 3. The dependent variable in all 
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three cases was verified, accordingly the countries of the individual sub-regional 
MDCs shared the same threats as the most important national security issues. In case 
of CEDC, the intervening variable could not be verified. Although CEDC countries 
shared the same threats, they did not start discussions or co-operation on them in 
CEDC format, because they had already been collaborating on these issues in 
different Central European, European and other multilateral formats. In regard to the 
Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO the participating countries started 
conversations and co-operation in Nordic and British-French bilateral frameworks on 
the shared threats, thus the intervening variable was verified in these cases. However, 
there was no link between the intervening and dependent variables. The analysis of 
the Lancaster House Treaties and the Package of Joint Measures, the interviews with 
officials and the discourse between French and British experts highlighted that shared 
threats were not a factor in establishing of this MDC. The Nordic countries discussed 
many security related issues on high level and they began collaborations on them, but 
co-operation on issues that could be connected to the shared threats were not initiated 






 Proliferation of WMD 
 Terrorism 
 Regional conflicts 
 Organized crime 
 Cyber security 




 Cyber security 
 Natural and man-made 
disasters 
 Terrorism 
 Proliferation of WMD 
 Environmental issues 
(natural disasters and/or 
climate change) 
 Arctic region 
 Cyber attacks 
 
Figure 37 – Shared Threats of the Sub-regional MDCs’ Participating Nations 
 
The comparison of the shared threats of the participating nations of the three 
sub-regional MDCs (see Figure 37) shows that these countries not only shared threats 
with their sub-regional partners, but they shared them with countries in other sub-
regions as well. Accordingly, regarding most of the threats it would not have been 
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logical to start a sub-regional co-operation, because these were not sub-region specific 
problems. The only exception here is the Arctic region, where Nordic countries have 
special interest as a consequence of their geopolitical location.
832
 Accordingly, this 
comparison supports the findings that the studied sub-regional MDCs could not be 
created against sub-regional threats. 
We can conclude that none of the three rival explanations answered the 
research questions of my thesis. 
 
Why the sub-regional MDCs were created? – The empirically based patterns  
Although the studied rival explanations did not answer why European countries 
established the three studied sub-regional MDCs, when similar pan-European 
structures existed in the framework of NATO and the EU, my research has helped to 
rule out many possible answers to this question, and has also assisted in the 
development of the empirically based patterns concerning every case. The empirically 
based patterns answer my first research question: 
 Why have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs 
in recent years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework 
of NATO and EU? 
 
 
Figure 38 – Empirically Based CEDC Pattern 
 
The empirically based CEDC pattern (see Figure 38) highlights that one of the 
main reasons why CEDC was created is that NATO’s and EU’s initiatives (Smart 
Defence, Pooling and Sharing) created a milieu, which supported the creation of 
MDCs in general. This milieu had an impact on Central European countries, and 
accordingly they intended to create CEDC to support NATO’s and EU’s new 
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initiatives. This means that CEDC countries did not want to establish an alternative to 
NATO and EU frameworks for defence co-operatiion, rather they wanted to support 
them with CEDC. The other identified main reason of the launching of CEDC was 
that every CEDC countries had individual motivations to co-operate in a CEDC 




, the two countries 
that initiated CEDC, but every participating state had some interest in it, if nothing 
else they just did not want to be left out.  
Based on these, I identified two independent variables concerning the creation 
of CEDC. One of them is ‘EU and NATO generated milieu that supported creation of 
sub-regional MDCs’. This independent variable is linked to the dependent variable of 
‘creation of CEDC’ via the intervening variable of ‘CEDC countries wanted to co-
operate on NATO and EU multinational projects’. The other independent variable is 




Figure 39 – Empirically Based Pattern of Lancaster House Treaties 
 
As we could see, the rival explanation of ‘Lack of progress in pan-
European/Transatlantic defence cooperation’ had explanatory power over the 
Lancaster House Treaties case, thus this contributed significantly to the creation of 
this MDC. Another important factor was that defence co-operation between Britain 
and France had already been going on for decades.
835
 As the Lancaster House Treaties 
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basically put the already existing co-operative initiatives into one framework,
836
 this 
process was crucial. A third reason was that the personalities and motivations of the 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron matched and 
was chemistry between them worked well.
837
 Although, the first two factors were 
long-standing trends, the constellation of compatible political personalities, who 
grabbed these trends and pushed for a more intensive co-operation was needed to 
trigger the Lancaster House Treaties. 
Thus, the empirically based pattern of the establishing of the Lancaster House 
Treaties (see Figure 39) has three independent variables. The first is the ‘Lack of 
progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation’, which according to 
Rival Explanation 1, is linked to the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties 
(dependent variable) via the intervening variable of the ‘UK and France are 
dissatisfied with EU and NATO’. The second and third independent variables were 
the ‘decades long defence co-operation between France and UK’ and ‘personalities, 
motivations and relationship of leaders’, which were directly connected to the 
dependent variable of the ‘creation of the Lancaster House treaties’. 
 
Figure 40 – Empirically Based Pattern of NORDEFCO 
 
The actual empirically based pattern of NORDEFCO (see Figure 40) shows 
that the creation of this MDC happened thanks to three main reasons. First, the 
Swedish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence shared a vision that they could solve their 
‘critical mass’ problem via multinational defence co-operation, 838  and took a 
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leadership role in this regard. Second, several countries had institutional 
considerations that supported the creation of NORDEFCO. Sweden and Finland did 
not perceive EU as the most appropriate forum for defence co-operation of capability 
development, and as they were not members of NATO they believed that a sub-
regional organization would suit their interests better.
839
 Although Norway was not 
EU member and did not have serious concerns with co-operation in NATO, Oslo saw 
NORDEFCO as an opportunity to get more access to ESDP/CSDP via more robust 
defence co-operation with EU member Finland and Sweden.
840
 The third main factor 
was the political milieu that supported the Nordic co-operation in general. Without 
this milieu, the military co-operation among Nordic states could have stalled by 
creating NORDSUP with the participation of Finland, Norway and Sweden only. 
Accordingly, the empirically based pattern of the creation of NORDEFCO had three 
independent variables: ‘shared vision and leadership of the Swedish and Norwegian 
ChoDs’, ‘institutional considerations of Sweden, Finland and lesser extent Norway’ 
and the ‘supportive political milieu to Nordic collaborations’. 
 
Circumstances that encourage establishing sub-regional MDCs – a generic 
framework  
The previous section answered the first research question concerning the studied 
cases. This section attempts to generalize the results of my research and answer the 
second research question of my thesis that asks the following question: What have 
been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer 
sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within 
NATO and EU? 
I made generalizations based on the empirically based patterns introduced in 
the previous section and the empirical material used for studying the three rival 
explanations. According to the results of my research, I concluded that the three cases 
provide two main structural and two main situational factors that played the most 
significant roles in the creation of these sub-regional MDCs. The factors are: 
Structural Factors: 
 Previous defence collaborations between the participating states 
                                                 
839
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 Similar perception about certain defence related EU/NATO processes and 
initiatives 
 Situational factors: 
 Strong leadership of a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good 
interpersonal chemistry among them 




In regard to sub-regional MDCs, under the term of structural factors I outline solid 
long-standing relationships, trends, perceptions that had been developed for a 
relatively long period and do not change overnight. Usually they are bounded by and 
linked to certain structures e.g. organizations, institutions, frameworks. I identified 
two structural factors concerning the circumstances that encourage the creation of 
sub-regional MDCs: 
 Previous defence collaborations between the participating states 
 Similar perception about certain defence related EU/NATO processes and 
initiatives 
 
Based on the research of the three cases, we can conclude that these structural 
factors did not trigger the establishment of sub-regional MDCs, but they enabled their 
creation. This means, that the existence of these structural factors would not have 
been enough per se to launch sub-regional MDCs, but without their presence the 
studied MDCs would not have been established either. 
 
Previous long-standing defence collaborations between the participating states 
If we look at the three studied sub-regional MDCs, we can see that they barely 
included new initiatives or new institutions. Basically all of them created new 
frameworks that merged with already existing defence collaborations, some of which 
had been evolving for decades.  
In regard to the Lancaster House Treaties, a UK MoD official pointed out, that 
the vast majority of the Franco-British bilateral projects had already existed before 




 These defence collaborations between France and Britain 
have been evolved for almost 30 years. For instance, the agreement that made sure 
that British and French defence ministers would meet twice a year was signed in 
1982, the two MoDs agreed on that they would not start new armaments programmes 
without discussing it with each other in 1984.
842
 The Anglo-French Joint Nuclear 
Commission was established in 1992, the Letter of Intent between the French and 
British armies was signed in 1997, and the Memorandum for Understanding 
concerning co-operation on defence related research and development was signed in 
2000.
843
 These were only the frameworks that opened the opportunity for the two 
countries to collaborate on a range of activities including aircraft carriers, UAVs, 
A400 transport aircrafts, missile systems, helicopters, trainings and exercises etc. 
The situation with NORDEFCO was the same. As analysts have pointed out, 
NORDEFCO ‘was in reality nothing more than a merger of earlier cooperation 
initiatives […] in different areas within a common framework.’844 The origins of the 
Nordic defence collaboration go back to the 1960s, when NORDSAMFN was 
established to improve Nordic co-operation on UN peacekeeping operations.
845
 
NORDSAMFN was abolished in 1997, and a larger and more developed structure was 
created in the form of NORDCAPS in the same year.
846
 NORDAC was established 
Nordic collaboration in the field of armament development and procurement in 
1994,
847
 and NORDSUP was launched to focus on ‘force production and supportive 
functions’ 848  in 2008. Basically, these three structures were merged into the 
framework of NORDEFCO in 2009. 
Although CEDC did not have as long a history as the British-French bilateral 
defence co-operation and the Nordic military collaborations, defence co-operation 
among Central European states has evolved rapidly since the end of the Cold War. 
They collaborated in bilateral, sub-regional (e.g. Visegrad Group, CENCOOP) and 
regional (OSCE, EU, NATO) frameworks, and accordingly they developed dense 
bilateral and multilateral co-operative relations with each other. If we look at the 
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 we can see that almost all of them were based on on-going 
projects, like the Austrian-Croatian bilateral SOF co-operation, the Czech-Croatian 
bilateral training for Air Mentor Teams, the Czech-led Multinational Logistic Co-
ordination Centre etc. Thus, similarly to the Lancaster House Treaties and 
NORDEFCO, CEDC was an initiative that put already existing collaborations into 
one overarching framework. 
Accordingly, previous long-standing defence collaborations between the 
participating states of the studied sub-regional MDCs were crucial, as they enabled 
the creation of CEDC, Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO. Without the 
already existing multinational projects and institutions the studied MDCs could not 
have been created in their current format. 
 
Similar perception about certain defence related EU/NATO processes and initiatives 
The similar perceptions of the participating countries of the MDCs about certain 
processes and initiatives of EU and NATO affected the creation of the studied sub-
regional MDCs significantly, but the type of its impact was different concerning every 
case. In regard to the Lancaster House Treaties, the British and French dissatisfaction 
regarding the progress on EU and NATO level defence capability co-operation 
facilitated the creation of the British-French MDC. Both countries perceived 
processes on capability development negatively in these two institutions, and they 
believed that as the only two major military powers in Europe could progress faster 
bilaterally than it was possible for them within EU and NATO.
850
 CEDC was 
established to support NATO and EU initiatives, because the smaller Central 
European countries perceived that they did not have enough resources to provide 
appropriate capabilities to than new Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing 
initiatives.
851
 Thus, Central European countries investigated how could they work 
together to support NATO and EU in their efforts, and searched partners for already 
existing projects in the framework for CEDC. In the case of NORDEFCO, the EU 
members Sweden and Finland did not deem EU as an appropriate forum for 
multinational defence co-operation on capability development, because it was deemed 
                                                 
849
 Csiki and Németh, “Perspectives of Central European Multinational Defence Co-operation,” 18. 
850
 See the analysis about this topic in the Lancaster House Treaties Chapter. 
851
 See the analysis about this topic in the CEDC Chapter. 
 250 
too slow and complicated for that.
852
 These phenomena supported the establishing of 
NORDEFCO. 
The studied European countries were deeply integrated into EU and/or NATO, 
and their perceptions concerning these organizations took a long time to evolve. Thus, 
these perceptions are probably deeply ingrained into the way of thinking of decision 
makers of the studied countries. Accordingly, the similar perceptions about NATO 




Under the term of situational factors I understand personal relationships, and the 
political and economic environment that might change relatively fast. Accordingly, 
these elements create a situation that is not a long-lasting one; still provide a window 
of opportunity to launch initiatives. I identified two situational factors concerning the 
circumstances that encouraged the creation of sub-regional MDCs. 
 Strong leadership of a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good 
interpersonal chemistry among them 
 Supportive political milieu towards sub-regional multinational defence co-
operation 
 
Based on the research of the three cases, we can assess that the situational 
factors help to explain why the studied sub-regional MDCs were established at a 
particular time. The presence of these factors triggered the launch of the studied 
MDCs, without them the MDCs could not have begun. 
 
Strong leadership of a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good 
interpersonal chemistry among them 
In all three cases a core group of enthusiastic high-level officials initiated the sub-
regional MDCs. They were the key figures concerning the launch of the studied 
MDCs that means that for some reasons they invested time and resources to create 
these collaborative frameworks.  
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With regard to NORDEFCO, the former Norwegian Chief of Defence Sverre 
Diesen and the former Swedish Chief of Defence Hakan Syrén were the key figures 
and the ‘architects’ of the co-operation. They shared the same vision that their 
‘critical mass’ problem could be overcome by deeper multinational, Nordic defence 
co-operation.
853
 They took the leadership role to launch several analyses and organize 
different multinational (bilateral, trilateral with Finland, Nordic) discussions about 
this issue. They pressed forward for the institutionalization of the co-operation they 
imagined. In the case of the Lancaster House Treaties, David Cameron was the person 
who pushed for an ambitious defence agreement with France, and even sent a 
handwritten letter to President Sarkozy about his propositions.
854
 Sarkozy became 
enthusiastic about the idea and provided his full support.
855
 In the launch of CEDC the 
Austrian defence policy director Jan Pucher and his Hungarian counterpart Péter 
Siklósi were the key figures. They organized seminars
856
 to lay down the foundations 
of CEDC and thereafter they also took the CEDC presidency roles for continuing and 
deepening this co-operation.  
In all three cases the key figures (Diesen and Syrén, Cameron and Sarkozy, 
Pucher and Siklósi) had a very good interpersonal chemistry among them as well. 
This seems to be logical, because people less likely start new co-operation with 
people they do not like. Accordingly, we cannot ignore the role of personalities in the 
creation of sub-regional MDCs. 
 
Supportive political milieu towards sub-regional multinational defence co-operation 
Supportive political milieu was crucial concerning the launch of the studied MDCs in 
every case. Without the milieu that supported Nordic collaborations in general, 
NORDEFCO might have not been created. Most probably, new Nordic military co-
operation would have stopped by creating NORDSUP with the participation of 
Finland, Norway and Sweden, as these three states were interested the most in deeper 
Nordic defence co-operation. However, the positive milieu of the time helped to tet 
Denmark and Iceland involved into a reenergized Nordic defence collaborative 
framework. In the CEDC case the NATO and EU created a positive milieu by 
launching the Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing initiatives. My research 
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showed that these initiatives emphasized and encouraged the necessity of 
multinational defence collaborations that facilitated the establishing of CEDC. As far 
as the Lancaster House Treaties are concerned, the political milieu was different and 
was strongly attached to the British Prime Minister and the French President. For 
Cameron, the domestic political milieu was the most important one, because he 
wanted to demonstrate to British Eurosceptics that Britain could cooperate with 
Europeans outside the EU.
857
 For Sarkozy, the European-level political milieu was 
more relevant, and wanted to show that France could lead Europe and even could pull 
the UK to European projects.
858
  
To sum up, supportive political milieu towards launching new sub-regional 
MDCs was important, because without that the enthusiastic officials should have 
worked in vacuum. Probably, they were still convinced that launching the MDC was 
necessary, but outside the enthusiastic group other officials or countries would not 
have been necessarily participated in a new defence co-operative framework. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The original patterns of rival explanations I developed for conducting the research 
about why certain European countries established new sub-regional MDCs instead of 
co-operating within NATO and the EU and figuring out the circumstances that 
encourage European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation over NATO and EU 
could not explain the research questions. However, this research framework provided 
the opportunity to close the rival explanations out as possible explanations, and 
helped to develop the empirically based patterns concerning every case that could 
convincingly explain individually the three studied cases. These empirically based 
patterns helped to develop a generic framework that describes the circumstances, 
which encouraged the creation of the studied sub-regional MDCs.  
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